Opinion
No. C—96-01855 DLJ
10-11-2011
EUNICE PARQUET, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Defendant.
ORDER
On August 30, 2011, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and Suggestion of Death on the Record. Defendant informs the Court that plaintiff is deceased and that there are no qualified survivors to continue the suit. Defendant therefore requests that the Court dismiss the pending action.
I. Background
According to Social Security Administration Records, Plaintiff applied in 1987 for disability benefits. Her original request was denied. Plaintiff filed a second application in 1990. She received a partially favorable decision in 1994 and began receiving benefits then but she also sought review in the Federal Court.
On January 16, 1997, this Court granted the Commissioner's request for remand, pursuant to sentence six of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On remand, in November 1997, Plaintiff again received a partially favorable decision. See Exhibit A ¶ 6, Declaration of William Zuroff. Plaintiff requested review and had another hearing on August 3, 1998. On September 17, 1998, an ALJ issued a res judicata dismissal. See Exhibit A.
Again according to Social Security records, plaintiff received Title 2 benefits until they were suspended in July, 2009. Plaintiff died on July 11, 2009. The Social Security Administration contends that plaintiff has no survivors entitled to her benefits and seeks an order of dismissal from this Court.
II. Discussion
In a sentence six remand case, the Court retains jurisdiction following the remand. See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991); Carol v. Sullivan, 802 F.Supp 295, 300 (C.D.Cal. 1992)("[A] sentence six remand, because of clear language in the social security statute, implies and necessarily involves a reservation of the jurisdiction for the future and contemplates further proceedings in the district court and a final judgment at the conclusion thereof. A sentence six remand judgment. . . is therefore always interlocutory and never a 'final' judgment.")(paraphrasing and quoting from Melkonyan).
Normally, the parties would move the Court to reopen the case after completion of remand proceedings for the purpose of dismissal or entry of judgment. Here, however, because Plaintiff died before the Court was requested to resolve its sentence six jurisdiction, the Commissioner has requested that the Court reopen and immediately dismiss the action with prejudice, each party to bear its own fees, costs, and expenses.
There being nothing in the record to indicate that such dismissal is not warranted and no filings before this Court at any time since 1999, good cause appearing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, each party to bear its own fees, costs, and expenses.
IT IS SO ORDERED
D. Lowell Jensen
United States District Judge