Opinion
NO. 4:01-CV-0541-A.
April 24, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Came on for consideration the above-styled and numbered action wherein Clair Parnell is plaintiff and the JoAnne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, is defendant. On March 29, 2002, the United States Magistrate Judge issued his findings, conclusions, and recommendation and granted the parties until April 19, 2002, in which to file and serve any written objections thereto. On April 19, 2002, plaintiff filed her objections. The court now reviews de novo those portions of the magistrate judge's findings and conclusions to which specific objections have been made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the only issues before the court are whether the final decision of the defendant Commissioner that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is supported by substantial evidence and whether the decision complies with applicable legal standards. Crouchet v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 202, 204 (5th Cir. 1989). If supported by substantial evidence, defendant Commissioner's findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). The court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its opinion for that of the Commissioner, but must scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner's findings. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1302 (5th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.Crouchet, 885 F.2d at 204. In determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court considers (1) objective medical facts and clinical findings, (2) diagnosis of examining physicians, (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability as testified to by the claimant, and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history. Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981). "[N]o substantial evidence" will be found only where there is a "conspicuous absence of credible choices" or "no contrary medical evidence." Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)).
The issues before the administrative law judge were whether plaintiff was entitled to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under §§ 216(i) and 223, respectively, of the Social Security Act, as amended. Having reviewed the record, the court finds that the decision that plaintiff was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence. The court further finds that the decision comports with applicable legal standards.
In her objections to the magistrate judge's findings and conclusions, plaintiff alleges that the administrative law judge erred in assigning more weight to the opinion of one treating physician, Dr. Garcia, than another, Dr. Bollinger. The court notes that the administrative law judge was entitled to determine the credibility of the medical experts and weigh their opinions accordingly. Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1990). Although the opinion of a treating physician is normally accorded considerable weight in determining disability, the administrative law judge may give less weight to an opinion of a treating physician when that opinion is so brief and conclusory that it lacks strong persuasive weight, is not supported by medically acceptable clinical laboratory diagnostic techniques or is otherwise unsupported by the evidence. Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1985). The treating physician's opinion may also be rejected if the record reflects that the physician is not credible and is "leaning over backwards to support the application for disability benefits." Id.
Here, the administrative law judge did not wholly disregard Dr. Bollinger's assessment of plaintiff's capacity to work. Rather, he said that he could not give controlling weight to that opinion because it conflicted with that of Dr. Garcia, who apparently believed that plaintiff was trying to get relief to which she was not entitled. See tr. at 142; 140; 138. The ALJ further found that plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain were not corroborated by objective medical evidence.See Harper v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1989).
The court notes that this is not a case like Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2000), where the ALJ summarily rejected the opinions of a treating physician based only on the testimony of a non-specialty medical expert who had not examined the claimant. 209 F.3d at 458. Rather, this is a case where there is competing firsthand medical evidence and the ALJ found as a factual matter that controlling weight could not be given to the opinion more favorable to plaintiff. Dr. Garcia's records reflect that plaintiff continually tried to get out of returning to work although Dr. Garcia believed that she could perform some sort of sedentary work. Even Dr. Bollinger noted, on July 7, 2000, that plaintiff's mobility had improved although she still experienced some pain.
The court ORDERS that the decision of defendant Commissioner that plaintiff did not qualify for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits be, and is hereby, affirmed.