Opinion
AANCV166019920S
08-31-2016
Leon Parks v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Barry K. Stevens, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 17, 2016, the plaintiff, Leon Parks, filed a two-count amended complaint against the defendant, Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc. The plaintiff's amended complaint alleges the following facts. On February 10, 2014, the plaintiff was on the defendant's premises where he was being treated at the emergency room. The defendant, through its agents, servants, or employees, discharged the plaintiff so he could take himself to the Connecticut Mental Health clinic for a planned admission there. While exiting the defendant's emergency room, the plaintiff fell and sustained injuries due to the icy conditions of the driveway outside of the defendant's emergency room.
Count two alleges that at the time of his discharge, the plaintiff was confused, slurring his speech, and had an unstable gait. The plaintiff specifically alleges that his " injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant and/or its servants and employees in: releasing the plaintiff from the defendant hospital emergency room . . . despite the fact that he was confused, was having difficulty walking and needed assistance to get out of the wheelchair he was in while he was in the defendant hospital emergency room, the defendant and/or its agents and servants released the defendant and allowed him and directed him to walk to the Connecticut Mental Health Clinic on his own and on foot without assistance or supervision despite his confusion, unsteady gait and difficulty walking." Compl., Count 2, ¶ 7.
On May 12, 2016, the defendant filed its motion to dismiss count two of the plaintiff's amended complaint as well as a supporting memorandum of law on the ground that the plaintiff failed to provide a good faith opinion letter pursuant to General Statutes § 52-190a. On June 6, 2016, the plaintiff filed its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendant filed a reply memorandum on June 20, 2016, and this matter was heard on the June 27, 2016 short calendar.
General Statutes § 52-190a provides in relevant part: " (a) No civil action . . . shall be filed to recover damages . . . in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney or party filing the action . . . has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant . . . To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or claimant's attorney . . . shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider . . . that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion."
DISCUSSION I
" [A] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). " A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014). " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). It is well established that, " in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 310 Conn. 626. Further, failure to obtain a good faith opinion letter as required by General Statutes § 52-190a implicates personal jurisdiction and warrants dismissal of the action. See Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 401-02, 21 A.3d 451 (2011).
II
In its motion to dismiss and reply memoranda, the defendant argues that count two of the plaintiff's amended complaint sounds in medical malpractice instead of ordinary negligence, and the plaintiff's failure to obtain a good faith opinion letter pursuant to General Statutes § 52-190a warrants dismissal of count two. The defendant argues that the plaintiff's allegations in count two are premised on the defendant's decision to discharge the plaintiff, which was substantially related to the medical treatment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff counters that his treatment at the defendant's emergency room was over and he needed supervision to make it safely to his next scheduled treatment at the Connecticut Mental Health clinic, which is not a medical procedure nor an issue beyond the knowledge of an ordinary lay person.
" The classification of a negligence claim as either medical malpractice or ordinary negligence requires a court to review closely the circumstances under which the alleged negligence occurred. [P]rofessional negligence or malpractice . . . [is] defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services . . . Furthermore, malpractice presupposes some improper conduct in the treatment or operative skill [or] . . . the failure to exercise requisite medical skill . . . From those definitions, we conclude that the relevant considerations in determining whether a claim sounds in medical malpractice are whether (1) the defendants are sued in their capacities as medical professionals; (2) the alleged negligence is of a specialized medical nature that arises out of the medical professional-patient relationship; and (3) the alleged negligence is substantially related to medical diagnosis or treatment and involved in the exercise of medical judgment." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Gold v. Greenwich Hospital Ass'n, 262 Conn. 248, 254, 811 A.2d 1266 (2002); Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center, 61 Conn.App. 353, 357-58, 764 A.2d 203, appeal dismissed, 258 Conn. 711, 713, 784 A.2d 889 (intrinsically).
In the present case, the parties do not dispute the first prong of the Gold test that the defendant was sued in its medical capacity, but rather, whether the negligence was of a specialized medical nature substantially related to the plaintiff's medical diagnosis. The court agrees with the defendant that the conduct about which the plaintiff claims, namely the releasing of the plaintiff from the emergency room " on his own and on foot without assistance or supervision despite his confusion, unsteady gait and difficulty walking, " was inextricably related to the judgment made by the medical provider about whether the patient was medically stable enough to be released from medical care and allowed to travel independently without assistance or supervision. When presented with a similar issue, the court in Consiglio v. Streeto, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-06-5001967-S, (March 24, 2009, Lager, J.) (47 Conn.L.Rptr. 387), explained that " [a] decision to permit [the plaintiff] to ambulate without supervision in light of his specific medical conditions and taking into account the treatment he had been rendered, including the medications that had been administered to him, required a determination of a specialized medical nature." Id., 388, at *10. The court further stated, " under the circumstances of this case any conclusion as to what would constitute 'appropriate supervision' or 'appropriate assistance' necessarily would rest on a determination as to what . . . a patient . . . would have required based on his underlying medical conditions and the treatment the hospital was providing him." Id., 389, at *12. Accord Gold v. Greenwich Hospital Ass'n, supra, 262 Conn. 255 (decision to discharge patient without determining whether plaintiff was dangerous to others implicated medical judgment); Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 567, 573, 265 A.2d 70 (1969) (decision not to help elderly patient disrobe before examination required " medical judgment on the part of the physician predicated on his knowledge of her physical and mental condition on that day"); see also, Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center, supra, 61 Conn.App. 361 (" The mere characterization of an activity as routine does not exclude that activity from the realm of medical judgment").
The case on which the plaintiff relies, Badrigian v. Elmcrest Psychiatric Institute, Inc., 6 Conn.App. 383, 505 A.2d 741 (1986), is distinguishable. In Badrigian, the plaintiff's decedent, a mentally ill person, was discharged from the defendant's main facility and was attending an outpatient program across a state highway from the main facility. While crossing the highway on his way to lunch, the plaintiff's decedent was struck by a motor vehicle and killed. In holding that the complaint did not assert a medical malpractice claim, the Appellate Court stated " that the alleged failure to provide a supervisor to monitor the plaintiff's decedent in safely crossing the highway was not a medical procedure." Id., 386. The court agrees with Judge Lager's analysis in Consiglio that as compared to a case presenting facts like the present one, " Badrigian is not a particularly useful precedent because it only involved the defendant's failure to use reasonable care to recognize specifically that a person such as the decedent, who was incapacitated by mental illness, might require assistance in crossing a busy state highway and generally that it 'owed a duty to any customer to provide a safe facility, not just to patients . . .' Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center, supra, 61 Conn.App. at 363, 764 A.2d 203. Such a broad duty to business invitees, premised on the apparent dangers of operating a facility that is bisected by a busy highway, is based on principles of premises liability law that do not apply in this case." Consiglio v. Streeto, supra .
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for these reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss count two of the amended complaint is granted and the objection to the motion is overruled .
So ordered.