Opinion
24A-CR-1180
11-12-2024
Cameron Parks, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha Griffin Christopher Taylor-Price Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Andrew M. Sweet Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Jennifer Prinz Harrison, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D20-2112-F3-36620
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Talisha Griffin
Christopher Taylor-Price
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Andrew M. Sweet
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Brown and Kenworthy concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mathias, Judge.
[¶1] Cameron Parks appeals his conviction for Level 3 felony aggravated battery following a bench trial. Parks raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
Parks does not appeal his conviction for Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In the fall of 2021, Parks's thirteen-year-old son, C.P., played football on a team coached by Martin Walker in Indianapolis. During the weekend of November 20, Walker's team traveled to play a series of games in Tennessee. During the team's Sunday game, C.P. suffered a broken leg.
[¶3] Walker contacted Parks immediately to tell him that C.P. had been injured and taken by ambulance to a nearby hospital. Parks was "very, very upset" and blamed Walker for C.P.'s injury, calling Walker "all kinds of names" and saying that Walker had run C.P. "into the ground." Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 89, 91. After the game, Walker texted Parks and told Parks "not . . . to talk to me like that, period." Id. at 91. Parks responded with several unkind words, adding, "You won't have the last laugh, tough a** boy." Id.
[¶4] Walker and his team returned to Indianapolis and arrived around 1:00 a.m. on Monday. About ten minutes later, Walker returned to his home. And, about fifteen minutes after that, Parks showed up at Walker's residence. Walker met Parks at the front door. There, Parks shot Walker in his left leg and then fled the scene.
[¶5] Walker called 9-1-1, reported to officers that Parks had shot him, and received transportation to a nearby hospital. Paramedics concluded that Walker's left tibia had "split in two" and that he needed immediate corrective surgery. Id. at 107. Following that surgery, Walker had "two to three months" of physical therapy. Id. To date, he continues to have arthritis in his hip; he cannot lay on his left side; and, when he sits down after a typical workday, the "whole left side of [his] leg hurts." Id. at 107-08.
[¶6] The State charged Parks in relevant part with Level 3 felony aggravated battery. After a bench trial at which Walker testified and the State submitted supporting medical records, the court found Parks guilty. The court then entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Parks accordingly, and this appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶7] On appeal, Parks contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that he committed Level 3 felony aggravated battery. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[¶8] To prove that Parks committed Level 3 felony aggravated battery as charged, the State was required to show that Parks knowingly or intentionally inflicted an injury on Walker that caused Walker to suffer the "protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member," namely, Walker's left leg. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5(2) (2021). Parks disputes only whether the State demonstrated that Walker suffered the protracted loss or impairment of the function of his left leg. As we have explained: "protracted" under the aggravated-battery statute means "to draw out or lengthen in time; prolong"; and "impairment" means "the fact or state of being damaged, weakened, or diminished." Fleming v. State, 833 N.E.2d 84, 89 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005) (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted). We have also recognized that "the aggravated battery statute [does] not requir[e] expert testimony" for the State to satisfy this element. Id.
[¶9] In support of his argument on appeal, Parks relies substantially on our Court's opinion in Neville v. State, 802 N.E.2d 516 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), trans. denied. In that case, the State alleged that the defendant had committed aggravated battery after he had shot his victim in the leg. The shooting fractured the victim's knee joint. He underwent surgery at a hospital and was hospitalized for three days. Upon his discharge, he was given a ten-day prescription for pain management.
[¶10] At trial, the victim did not testify, and, thus, "the jury heard no evidence from the victim as to how long he used his crutches, wore his brace, experienced pain, or otherwise suffered loss or impairment of the function of his leg." Id. at 519. Further, although the State had submitted the victim's medical records, those records did not show that physicians had "document[ed] the severity of [the victim's] injury or note[d] whether he would experience protracted loss or impairment of the function of his leg." Id. Instead, the State merely left it to the jury's "common knowledge that the nature of [the victim's injury] resulted in protracted loss or impairment of the function of his leg." Id. We concluded that the State's evidence was insufficient to establish that the victim had suffered the "protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ." Id.
[¶11] We conclude that Neville is readily distinguishable. Unlike in Neville, here the victim testified to his injuries. Specifically, Walker testified that the shooting had "split" his left tibia in two, which required corrective surgery. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 107. He further testified that, following that surgery, he had "two to three months" of physical therapy. Id. And he testified that he continues to have arthritis in his hip; he cannot lay on his left side; and, when he sits down after a typical workday, the "whole left side of [his] leg hurts." Id. at 107-08. Further, the State submitted medical records that corroborated Walker's initial injury, surgery, and physical therapy. That evidence readily supports the jury's finding that Walker suffered the "protracted loss or impairment of the function of" his left leg due to Parks shooting him. I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5.
[¶12] Still, Parks argues that Walker's assessment that the shooting resulted in the arthritis in his hip and difficulty lying on his left side and sitting after work is "pure speculation." Appellant's Br. at 12. Parks similarly criticizes the State for offering no other evidence to corroborate these parts of Walker's testimony. But we think Walker was in a reasonable position to know the condition of his body before and after the shooting and to speak to the differences, and Parks's argument goes to the weight of Walker's testimony, which we will not reconsider. And, again, the State had no burden to offer independent medical evidence here. Fleming, 833 N.E.2d at 89.
[¶13] Finally, Parks asserts that the "function of a leg is to allow a person to stand and move from one point to another," and Walker's testimony does not show that he suffered a protracted loss or impairment of that function. Appellant's Br. at 13-14. Parks's assessment of Walker's testimony is incorrect. He testified that he had to undergo physical therapy for two to three months following the surgery on his leg, and, at the trial nearly two-and-one-half years later, Walker continued to suffer from the shooting. That evidence is demonstrative of a protracted loss or impairment of the function of his leg.
[¶14] For all of these reasons, we affirm Parks's conviction for Level 3 felony aggravated battery.
[¶15] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.