Parks v. Parks

7 Citing cases

  1. Harbolt v. Pelletier

    291 Ga. App. 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 6 times

    In the absence of a trial transcript, Harbolt and Vision Holdings cannot show that the award was not supported by any evidence. See Kopp v. First Bank of Ga., 235 Ga. App. 520, 523-524 (3) ( 509 SE2d 384) (1998); Hill Aircraft c. Corp. v. Flanders, 143 Ga. App. 504, 504-505 (1) ( 239 SE2d 155) (1977); Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 732 (3) ( 80 SE2d 837) (1954). See City of Gainesville v. Waters, 258 Ga. App. 555, 559 (4) ( 574 SE2d 638) (2002).

  2. Voxcom, Inc. v. Boda

    472 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times

    See also Force v. McGeachy, 186 Ga. App. 781, 783 (1) ( 368 S.E.2d 777) (1988). A jury's verdict is presumed to be valid and should, if possible, be construed as such. Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 728 (1) ( 80 S.E.2d 837) (1954). In this case, it is clear that the jury intended to award interest, but found that Boda was entitled to less than the maximum amount the court charged could be awarded. Although Boda asserted in his appellate brief that the trial court ruled the breach occurred on a certain date, as noted above, this assertion was not supported by reference to the transcript.

  3. Colonial Stores v. Fishel

    288 S.E.2d 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 14 times
    In Colonial Stores there was again a separate basis for holding the owner liable when no damages were assessed against the employee.

    However, Colonial Stores urges that the verdict could also be interpreted as indicating neither of these two defendants was liable since no damages were awarded against either of them but were assessed only against Colonial Stores. Though this may be a possible interpretation of the verdict, "[w]here a verdict is ambiguous and susceptible of two constructions, one of which would uphold it and one of which would defeat it, it `will not on this account be set aside, but will be given a construction which will uphold it.'" Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 728 ( 80 S.E.2d 837) (1954). Further, any inconsistency in the verdict should be harmonized or avoided if reasonably possible without destroying the whole.

  4. Greene v. Gulf Oil Corporation

    166 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 8 times

    4. The item of $1.75, illegal as a part of the judgment, is nevertheless a separable item and this court is authorized to direct a modification of the judgment by deleting it and allowing the legal part to stand. Davis v. Davis, 206 Ga. 559 (2) ( 57 S.E.2d 673); Taylor v. Gilmore, 3 Ga. App. 93 ( 59 S.E. 325); Finley v. Southern R. Co., 5 Ga. App. 722 ( 64 S.E. 312); Lovelady v. Moss, 50 Ga. App. 652 (3) ( 179 S.E. 168); Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 728 ( 80 S.E.2d 837); McLaurin v. Henry, 90 Ga. App. 864 (2) ( 84 S.E.2d 713). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with direction that the sum of $1.75 be written off or the judgment be modified to exclude it. Although this amount is small and would not ordinarily be regarded as a substantial modification of the judgment, yet it is the whole of the amount that was contested in the trial court and, for that reason, we regard the writing off of that amount a substantial modification under these circumstances.

  5. Lloyd c. Inc. v. O'Neal Steel, Inc.

    160 S.E.2d 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 1 times

    I would reverse the order and judgment of the trial court with direction that the demurrer or equivalent motion to dismiss under the Civil Practice Act be heard and determined on the merits, having regard to the fact that either procedure seeks the same relief as the other, and also that the Civil Practice Act is intended, as stated in Sec. 81A-101, "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." See Finley v. Southern R. Co., 5 Ga. App. 722, 724 ( 64 S.E. 312); Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 729 ( 80 S.E.2d 837).

  6. Spicer v. American Home Assurance Company

    292 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Ga. 1967)   Cited 11 times
    In Spicer v. American Home Insurance Co., 292 F. Supp. 27 (N.D.Ga. 1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946, 89 S.Ct. 1275, 22 L.Ed.2d 479 (1969), a tractor-trailer had been involved in a multiple-vehicle collision.

    Apparently relying on that part of the section which allows attorneys' fees if the defendant has caused the plaintiff "unnecessary trouble and expense", the same are sought here. Generally, such provision can apply to suits in both contract and tort. See Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 80 S.E.2d 837 (1954). However, there is considerable doubt in the court's mind as to whether the bond/indemnity provisions of § 68-612 would cover more than actual damages.

  7. Maday v. Elview-Stewart Sytems Co.

    324 N.W.2d 467 (Iowa 1982)   Cited 22 times
    Stating a trial court may not assess attorney's fees under Iowa Code section 91A.8 “until liability has been established”

    See 20 C.J.S. Cost § 218 (1940) ("It has been held that attorney fees even when allowable under statutory authority, may not be a part of the costs, as where the statute deals with them as a separate matter of recovery and does not specifically make them a part of the costs; but according to other authorities, they are to be awarded as part of the costs, and not separate and distinct therefrom."). When considered as damages, the amount of fees is determined by a jury, if a party so requests. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 50(b) (1966) (expenses of litigation or attorney fees may be allowed as damages where statutory provision is made therefor and determination of attorney fees is a matter for the jury); Dyche Real Estate Fund v. Graves, 55 Ohio App.2d 153, 155, 380 N.E.2d 767, 769 (1978) (the award of attorney fees under a landlord-tenant act is in effect a part of the damage awarded to the tenant for proving the landlord's proscribed act and is to be submitted to the jury); Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 732, 80 S.E.2d 837, 842 (1954) (expense of litigation is solely a matter for the jury to determine from the evidence under a statute that prohibits stubborn litigiousness). When a statute provides for attorney fees but is silent as to their ascertainment, we find the better rule to be that "[w]here attorneys' fees are allowed to the successful party, they are in the nature of costs and are taxable and treated as such."