Several cases have addressed a condemning agency's failure to properly consider alternatives. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lange v. Superior Court for King County, 61 Wn.2d 153, 377 P.2d 425 (1963); Wagle v. Williamson, 51 Wn. App. 312, 315-16, 754 P.2d 684 (1988); State v. Burch, 7 Wn. App. 657, 501 P.2d 1239 (1972); State Parks Recreation Comm'n v. Schluneger, 3 Wn. App. 536, 475 P.2d 916 (1970). In these cases, alternatives were proffered by the property owner, but the condemning agency rebutted the testimony.
" 71 Wn.2d at 750, 430 P.2d at 978.See also State, Parks and Recreation Com'n v. Schluneger, 3 Wn. App. 536, 475 P.2d 916 (1970) and State v. Superior Court, 70 Wn.2d 630, 424 P.2d 913 (1967). The foregoing cases from the State of Washington are of particular significance since our supreme court in Solana Land Co. v. Murphey, 69 Ariz. 117, 124, 210 P.2d 593, 597 (1949), stated:
[1] A condemnation action consists of three phases: (1) adjudication of public use and necessity, (2) determination of damages to be awarded to the owner and (3) payment of the amount of the award and entry into possession. State ex rel. Lange v. Superior Court, 61 Wn.2d 153, 156, 377 P.2d 425 (1963); State Parks Recreation Comm'n v. Schluneger, 3 Wn. App. 536, 538, 475 P.2d 916 (1970). This appeal relates solely to the first phase.