Opinion
No. 05-01-01031-CV
Opinion Filed April 4, 2002. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. cc-00-10151-c.
Before Justices, MORRIS, WHITTINGTON, and RICHTER.
Opinion By Justice RICHTER.
OPINION
Dallas County Hospital District d/b/a Parkland Health Hospital System ("Parkland") appeals the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Jason Wiley, by and through his Next Friend, Duane Pat Wiley. In six issues, Parkland generally contends the trial court erred in granting Wiley's motion for summary judgment and in denying Parkland's motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part the trial court's judgment.
Background
In November 1998, an uninsured motorist struck Jason Wiley's vehicle, causing Wiley to be hospitalized at Parkland for ten days. Neither Wiley, a minor at the time, nor his family had sufficient medical insurance to pay for the $67,636 hospital bill. Consequently, Parkland filed a hospital lien pursuant to the Texas Property Code. Wiley sued Southern Farm Bureau, his father's insurer, to recover uninsured motorist proceeds, which resulted in a settlement of $100,000 in favor of Wiley. Parkland then filed this suit to recover on its hospital lien and, alternatively, on a quantum meruit claim. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Wiley's motion and denied Parkland's motion. This appeal followed.
Hospital Lien Statute
The first issue before us is whether Parkland's hospital lien attaches to proceeds Wiley recovered in a suit for uninsured motorist proceeds. The Texas Property Code provides a hospital lien does not attach to "the proceeds of an insurance policy in favor of the injured individual or the injured individual's beneficiary or legal representative, except public liability insurance carried by the insured that protects the insured against loss caused by an accident or collision." Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 55.003 (Vernon 1995). The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted this language to specifically exclude proceeds recovered under an uninsured motorist insurance policy from the attachment of a hospital lien. See Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hermann Hosp., 664 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. 1984). Because the legislature specifically excluded uninsured motorist insurance proceeds from attachment by a hospital lien, Parkland was not entitled to foreclose on its hospital lien. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Wiley on this basis.
Quantum Meruit
Parkland also asserted a right to summary judgment, based on the theory of quantum meruit. The elements of a quantum meruit claim include (1) valuable services that were rendered or materials furnished; (2) for the person sought to be charged; (3) which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to be charged, used, and enjoyed by him; (4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff in performing such services was expecting to be paid by the person sought to be charged. Bashara v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985). In its motion for summary judgment, Parkland simply listed the elements of a quantum meruit claim without any additional argument or evidence. Therefore, Parkland failed to establish it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its quantum meruit claim. See Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).
We now review whether Wiley either disproved at least one element of the quantum meruit claim or conclusively established an affirmative defense. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 679 (Tex. 1979). In his own motion for summary judgment, Wiley only contended any claim for quantum meruit should be against Wiley's father, because Wiley was a minor at the time the hospital services were rendered and Wiley's father had the duty to pay for any medical expenses. In this case, Parkland sued Wiley "by and through his Next Friend, Duane Pat Wiley." Wiley cites no cases, and we find none, stating that a minor can not be sued by and through his parent for medical expenses he incurred. Therefore, Wiley did not disprove at least one element of the quantum meruit claim. We conclude the trial court erred in granting Wiley's motion for summary judgment on Parkland's quantum meruit claim.
Res Judicata
Wiley asserted the defense of res judicata and both parties requested summary judgment on the defense. According to Wiley, Parkland had notice of his lawsuit against Southern Farm Bureau and should have intervened in that lawsuit. Wiley contends Parkland's failure to intervene in that suit bars the hospital from asserting claims in the current suit.
Res judicata "precludes relitigation of claims that have been finally adjudicated, or that arise out of the same subject matter and that could have been litigated in the prior action." Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996). The elements of res judicata include (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action. Id. In this case, the prior lawsuit involved Wiley suing his father's insurance company to recover uninsured motorist benefits. Parkland has a right to assert the quantum meruit claim regardless of any recovery of Wiley's in the earlier lawsuit. Further, we have already concluded that Parkland did not have a right to recover on its hospital lien for proceeds in this earlier lawsuit. Therefore, this lawsuit is not based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first lawsuit. Further, Parkland was neither a party to the lawsuit nor was it in privity with either Wiley or Southern Farm Bureau. For these reasons, we conclude the trial court erred in granting Wiley's motion for summary judgment and in failing to grant Parkland's motion on the res judicata defense.
Laches
Wiley also asserted the affirmative defense of laches and both parties asserted a right to summary judgment on the defense. Laches is an equitable remedy that prevents a plaintiff from asserting a claim because of a lapse of time. Fadia v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 830 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied). The two essential elements of laches are (1) an unreasonable delay by one having legal or equitable rights in asserting them, and (2) a good faith change of position by another to his detriment because of the delay. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989). "Laches should not bar an action on which limitations has not run unless allowing the action would work a grave injustice." Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tex. 1998). Wiley's laches defense is based on his argument that Parkland should have asserted these rights in the prior lawsuit against Southern Farm Bureau. We have already concluded that Parkland was not required to intervene in that suit. Further, Wiley also contends he has made plans to use the money from his settlement with Southern Farm Bureau for plastic surgery. We fail to see how this meets the requirements of laches. In addition, Parkland filed the suit within the statute of limitations and Wiley did not establish that allowing the suit to continue would work a "grave injustice." For these reasons, we conclude the defense of laches is improper and the trial court erred in granting Wiley's motion for summary judgment and in failing to grant Parkland's motion on this defense.
Waiver
Wiley also asserted the affirmative defense of waiver. This defense is based on the same arguments made regarding res judicata and laches. Mainly, Wiley contends Parkland waived its right to assert claims in this lawsuit because he did not assert these rights in the lawsuit against Southern Farm Bureau. We have already concluded that Parkland is not precluded from asserting claims on this basis. Therefore, we conclude the defense of waiver is improper in this case and the trial court erred in granting Wiley's motion for summary judgment and in failing to grant Parkland's motion on this defense.
Conclusion
We conclude the trial court did not err in granting Wiley's motion for summary judgment on Parkland's claim based on the hospital lien statute and therefore affirm the trial court's judgment on this claim. However, the trial court erred in granting Wiley's motion for summary judgment on Parkland's claim for quantum meruit. The trial court also erred in granting Wiley's motion for summary judgment and in failing to grant Parkland's motion for summary judgment on the defenses of res judicata, laches, and waiver. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings only as to Parkland's claim for quantum meruit.