A compromise or a consent judgment is a bilateral contract wherein the parties adjust their differences by mutual consent. . . ."Continental Insurance Company v. Bayless Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 295 (Alaska 1980) quoting from Parkerson v. R-5 Inc., 305 So.2d 592, 595 (La.App. 1974). While parties may give an agreement the attributes of a judgment by having it entered as such, that does not eliminate the need to interpret the agreement in order to determine what it, and therefore the judgment, requires the parties to do.
A compromise or consent judgment is a bilateral contract wherein the parties adjust their difference by mutual consent, thereby putting an end to a lawsuit with each party balancing the hope of gain against the fear of loss. [Citations omitted.]Parkerson v. R-5, Inc., 305 So.2d 592, 595 (La.App. 1974). See generally Comment, Consent Judgments, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 1314, 1316 (1959).
We granted certiorari primarily because the court of appeal opinion incorrectly implied that a confession of judgment must be preceded by a written contract. The court of appeal relied on Parkerson v. R — 5, Inc., 305 So.2d 592 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974) to set aside the consent judgment in the trial court, it allegedly not being in accordance with the agreement of the parties. The Parkerson case is readily distinguishable.
Because an ambiguous judgment does not provide certainty regarding of the rights and liabilities of the parties, it is not valid – and does not provide the basis for an exception of res judicata. Id. ; Davis v. Farm Fresh Food Supplier, 2002-1401 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/03), 844 So. 2d 352 ; Parkerson v. R-5, Inc. , 305 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1974), writ denied 309 So.2d 679 (La. 1975). Thus, to dispose of Mr. Moore's exception of res judicata, we must determine whether Mr. Moore's FMCF award in the prior judgment is contradictory or ambiguous.
It therefore lacks the quality of a thing adjudged. See Parkerson v. R-5, Inc., 305 So.2d 592, 595 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974), writ denied, 309 So.2d 679 (La. 1975). Because of this defect, we hereby vacate the judgment, dismiss the appeal without prejudice, and remand this case for further proceedings, including entry of a proper judgment in conformity with the evidence presented.
A compromise or consent judgment is a bilateral contract . . ." Parkerson v. R — 5, Inc., 305 So.2d 592, 595 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974) writ denied 309 So.2d 679 (La. 1975), citing Lytle v. Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark, N.J., 285 So.2d 289 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1973); and Bielkiewicz v. Rudisell [sic, Rudisill], 201 So.2d 136 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1967), and the cases cited therein. "A compromise is a legal agreement, a contract.
This court has recognized that, "By its very nature, a consent or compromise judgment is a bilateral contract wherein the parties adjust their differences by mutual consent, thereby putting an end to litigation (or anticipated litigation) with each party balancing the hope of gain against the fear of loss. Parkerson v. R-5, Inc., 305 So.2d 592 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974), writ denied 309 So.2d 679 (La. 1975)." Braning v. Braning, 449 So.2d 670, 672 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1984).
This Court has held that a judgment obtained by the consent of all parties to a suit gets its binding force and effect from the consent the parties give, rather than from adjudication by a competent court. City of New Orleans v. VanLangendonck, 433 So.2d 432 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983); Ritchey v. Azar, 383 So.2d 360 (La. 1980). In effect, a consent judgment is a bilateral contract between the parties and must be based on consent, an essential element of every contract. Chaisson v. Chaisson, 454 So.2d 890 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1984); Parkerson v. R-5, Inc., 305 So.2d 592 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974), writ den., 309 So.2d 679 (La. 1975). CBT has a valid judgment rendered by a competent court, but it is binding only on those parties who consented to the judgment.
A consent judgment is in effect a bilateral contract between the parties and must be based on consent, an essential element of every contract. La.C.C. Arts. 1819, 3071; City of New Orleans v. Vanlangendonck, supra; Bagby v. Dillon, 434 So.2d 654 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1983), writ denied, 440 So.2d 150 (La. 1983); State, Department of Transportation and Development v. K.G. Farms, Inc., 402 So.2d 304 (La.App. 1st. Cir. 1981), writ denied, 406 So.2d 625 (La. 1981); Parkerson v. R-5, Inc., 305 So.2d 592 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974), writ denied, 309 So.2d 679 (La. 1975). Every contract or modification of a previously concluded agreement requires the concurrence of the consent of the parties.
We find it unnecessary, however, to delay this matter to include same. By its very nature, a consent or compromise judgment is a bilateral contract wherein the parties adjust their differences by mutual consent, thereby putting an end to litigation (or anticipated litigation) with each party balancing the hope of gain against the fear of loss. Parkerson v. R-5, Inc., 305 So.2d 592 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974), writ denied 309 So.2d 679 (La. 1975). Appellant is correct in the cases he cites that a divorce judgment terminates previously awarded alimony, but those cases all refer to alimony pendente lite. It is quite clear from a reading of the separation judgment of December 23, 1981 that the parties intended the permanent alimony to be $350.00 per month at the time of the divorce, for the language states ". . . beginning the date of the judgment".