Assuming arguendo that the trial court "told" the clerk of the superior court to remove this case from the court calendar and that it has not been placed back on the calendar since 1994, as "instructed" by the judge, such conduct does not constitute the entry of a "written order" within the meaning of the OCGA § 9-11-41 (e) five-day rule. Cf. Parkerson v. Indies Co., 148 Ga. App. 106 ( 251 S.E.2d 98) (letter assigning case to trial not an order); Ga. Power Co. v. Whitmire, 146 Ga. App. 29 ( 245 S.E.2d 324) (notation by judge as to continuance by agreement does not extend five-year period); Majors v. Lewis, 135 Ga. App. 420 ( 218 S.E.2d 130) (pretrial instructions bearing judge's printed signature but not entered is not an order). Further, "an order as contemplated by [the five-year rule of OCGA §§ 9-2-60 (b) or 9-11-41 (e)] is an order entered by a court in response to a motion initiated by a party.

This court also held in Georgia Power Co. v. Whitmire, 146 Ga. App. 29 ( 245 S.E.2d 324) that neither a notation by the judge as to a continuance "by agreement," nor a trial calendar, designated "order assigning case for trial" were sufficient to avoid operation of the five-year nonaction dismissal rule. In a similar case, Parkerson v. Indies Co., 148 Ga. App. 106 ( 251 S.E.2d 98), we found that a letter sent to the clerk and the attorneys of both parties by the trial judge was not such an order as would toll the running of the five-year period. The ex parte, pro forma, rule signature is similar in nature to the assignment of a case to a trial calendar, which we have held would not toll the running of the five-year period for automatic dismissal.

a notation by the clerk was found not to constitute an order. In like vein, see Majors v. Lewis, 135 Ga. App. 420 ( 218 S.E.2d 130) ("pretrial instructions" with printed signature of the judge but not entered, held not to be order); Salter v. Chatham County, 136 Ga. App. 914 ( 222 S.E.2d 638) (certain acts accomplished after the expiration of the five-year period of Code Ann. § 3-512 and thus subsequent to the automatic dismissal would not serve to revive the action); Harris v. Moody, 144 Ga. App. 656 ( 242 S.E.2d 321) (agreement by counsel to continue did not extend five-year period); Ga. Power Co. v. Whitmire, 146 Ga. App. 29 ( 245 S.E.2d 324) (neither notation by judge as to continuance "by agreement" nor trial calendar designated "order assigning case for trial" was found to be sufficient); Maroska v. Williams, 146 Ga. App. 130 ( 245 S.E.2d 470) (order entered nunc pro tunc after expiration of five-year period would not resuscitate case which was already automatically dismissed); Parkerson v. Indies Co., 148 Ga. App. 106 ( 251 S.E.2d 98) (letter assigning cases to trial did not constitute an order). From a reading of the cases cited plus a consideration of many of the other cases dealing with Code Ann. § 3-512 as well as Code Ann. 81A-141 (e), the conclusion is inescapable that the provisions of the act are mandatory, the plaintiff having the burden of obtaining a written order and having it entered.

The settlement agreement, even though not in writing, may be enforced, because plaintiff has denied only his attorney's authority to settle, not the existence of the settlement itself. Stone Mountain Confederate Monumental Association v. Smith, 170 Ga. 515, 153 S.E. 209, 212; Parkerson v. Indies Co., 148 Ga. App. 106, 251 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1978); Oliver v. Godley, 38 Ga. App. 66, 142 S.E. 566 (1928); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-605, 24-3339. Only if the client had specifically limited his attorney's authority to settle and the opposing attorneys were aware of this limitation would the settlement agreement have been unenforceable.

The settlement agreement, even though not in writing, may be enforced, because plaintiff has denied only his attorney's authority to settle, not the existence of the settlement itself. Stone Mountain Confederate Monumental Association v. Smith, 170 Ga. 515, 153 S.E. 209, 212; Parkerson v. Indies Co., 148 Ga. App. 106, 251 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1978); Oliver v. Godley, 38 Ga. App. 66, 142 S.E. 566 (1928); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-605, 24-3339. Only if the client had specifically limited his attorney's authority to settle and the opposing attorneys were aware of this limitation would the settlement agreement have been unenforceable.