Parker v. State

17 Citing cases

  1. State v. Gent

    887 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App. 1994)   Cited 4 times
    Declining to follow Parker because Shannon is controlling in cases involving negotiated pleas

    We disagree. Gent cites the court to Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982), which held that the adjudication of guilt for the lesser included offense of robbery operated as an acquittal of the greater offense of aggravated robbery, so that Article 37.14 precluded conviction for aggravated robbery after the trial court allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. The Court of Criminal Appeals later disavowed as misleading dicta the pronouncement in Parker that permitting withdrawal of a guilty plea was in effect the granting of a new trial.

  2. Windom v. State

    961 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. App. 1997)   Cited 4 times
    Stating that “as an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals even when they lead to manifestly unjust results, as in the present case” and following a high court precedent, while at the same time urging the high court to reexamine it

    Both the Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court have held that this factual difference does not make a legal difference; an appellant acquitted as a result of a plea bargain is nevertheless protected from reprosecution. Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (op. on reh'g); Boulos v. State, 775 S.W.2d 8, 10-11 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref'd). The Court of Criminal Appeals in Parker pointedly refused to hold, unlike the Beaumont Court of Appeals later in Gent, that no bar to reprosecution results when a charge is reduced as part of a plea bargain that is later set aside by the granting of a new trial.

  3. Wilson v. State

    698 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)   Cited 20 times
    In Wilson, the defendant appeared before a magistrate, waived his right to trial by jury, and entered a plea of no contest.

    Appellant then waived the reading of the indictment and evidence was heard by the trial court and he was found guilty. In reversing appellant's conviction, the Court of Appeals relied on Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981), and Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981). The Court of Appeals held that a change of a plea to not guilty revoked the prior jury waiver.

  4. Oseguera-Garcia v. State

    No. 04-11-00896-CR (Tex. App. May. 29, 2013)   Cited 1 times
    Concluding trial counsel not ineffective for not investigating or presenting mitigation testimony where defendant "failed to provide any contact information or have the witnesses call [counsel]"

    We review the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738, 739-40 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Watson v. State, 974 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd). A decision by the trial court is arbitrary only if it lies outside the "zone of reasonable disagreement."

  5. Franklin v. State

    992 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App. 1999)   Cited 10 times
    Holding trial court did not err by refusing misdemeanor deadly conduct charge when all of the evidence showed appellant's conduct with reference to use of the weapon was intentional conduct

    A guilty plea constitutes a trial within the meaning of Article 37.14. See Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981). The question is whether his prior conviction has any significance under these facts.

  6. Lowery v. Estelle

    696 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1983)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that a conviction for a lesser offense that is subsequently set aside on appeal does not prevent prosecution of a greater charge not considered at the first trial, because there had been no acquittal of the greater offense at the first trial

    At the very moment the allegation was stricken, Lowery was under sentence for murdering Morris Patterson during the Cities Service robbery by shooting him with a gun.Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) is not to the contrary. Parker, decided by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals after Lowery's petition was denied, held that the former jeopardy provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Vernon's Ann.C. C.P. art. 37.14, deems an adjudication of guilt on the lesser offense of robbery, in that case through acceptance of a guilty plea, to operate as an acquittal for the higher grade of offense, aggravated robbery.

  7. Windom v. State

    968 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)   Cited 7 times

    I. The Court of Appeals relied on Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (Op. on Reh'g), to hold art. 37.14 barred reprosecution for the greater offense of aggravated robbery. In Parker, the trial judge had granted the State's motion to reduce the charge from aggravated robbery to robbery "prior to trial."

  8. Ostrander v. State

    NO. 02-12-00159-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 20, 2013)   Cited 1 times
    Modifying a judgment sua sponte to make a clerical correction

    We could assume that when the record states "(indicating)," the State made a cutting gesture, but we cannot add this information to the record on our own supposition. See Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (op. on reh'g) (stating factual assumption improper because appellate court bound by the record). --------

  9. Konchar v. State

    938 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding that defendant convicted of lesser-included offense is implicitly acquitted of greater offense and may be retried for lesser offense only upon filing of new charging instrument for that offense

    The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from more than one prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. U.S. CONST. amend. V. A defendant cannot be tried again for an offense after having been either explicitly or impliedly acquitted of that offense. Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981). "If a defendant, prosecuted for an offense which includes within it lesser offenses, be convicted of an offense lower than that for which he is indicted, and a new trial be granted him, . . . the verdict upon the first trial shall be considered an acquittal of the higher offense.

  10. State v. Evans

    817 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App. 1992)   Cited 6 times

    We distinguish the court's action on Evans's motion, which came after sentence was imposed, from cases where defendants were allowed to withdraw pleas after the judgment was entered but before sentence was pronounced. See Wilson v. State, 698 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981). Evans cites the provisions of article 42.12, section 23, as authority for the proposition that "the legislature has not intended to terminate a trial court's authority to grant a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea immediately after sentencing."