not concern itself with the mere lapse of time, but with the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced.Chesapeake Operating, 116 P.3d at 216 (quoting Winn v. Shugart, 112 F.2d 617, 622 (10th Cir. 1940) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Parker v. Ryan, 287 P. 1006, 1008 (Okla. 1930) (explaining that a plaintiff cannot "wait several months, and, after a well had been discovered that greatly enhanced the value of the land, then be permitted to have his contract specifically enforced"); see also Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 335 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1964) (applying Oklahoma law) (where parties are engaged in enterprises such as oil and gas leases, which fluctuate rapidly and substantially in value, a plaintiff cannot demand specific performance unless it asserts its rights diligently and without unreasonable delay); Marken v. Goodall, 478 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (10th Cir. 1973) (applying Wyoming law and holding laches prevented plaintiff from obtaining specific performance of a preferential right to purchase various oil and gas leases where, after the plaintiff learned of the proposed sale, he "remained silent with regard to his right of refusal while defendants entered upon the costly and risky . . . [venture] which ultimately resulted in greatly enhancing the

Pfister v. Cow Gulch Oil Co., 10 Cir., 189 F.2d 311, cert. denied 342 U.S. 887, 72 S.Ct. 177, 96 L.Ed. 665; Shell v. Strong, 10 Cir., 151 F.2d 909; Hoehn v. Crews, 10 Cir., 144 F.2d 665, aff'd 324 U.S. 200, 65 S.Ct. 600, 89 L.Ed. 870. Whether a delay has been injurious to a party depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Phelan v. Roberts, 182 Okla. 202, 77 P.2d 9; Carnes v. Thomas, 280 P.2d 474, (Okla. 1955). It has been held that where the value of the subject matter of a contract such as oil and gas property changes rapidly, or where there has been a substantial change in its value, specific performance is available only where the rights are asserted diligently and without unreasonable delay. Nelson v. Hamra, 127 Okla. 141, 259 P. 838; Parker v. Ryan, 143 Okla. 187, 287 P. 1006; Pfister v. Cow Gulch Oil Co., supra; Texas Co. v. Herring, 8 Cir., 19 F.2d 56; Taylor v. Salt Creek Cons. Oil Co., 8 Cir., 285 F. 532. In any event, the defense of laches is available only when there has been some detrimental result from the delay in asserting rights.

49 Am.Jur. (Spec. Per.) 78, 79; Pomeroy's Equitable Remedies, 2d Ed., § 2219; Annotation, 65 A.L.R. 72.'" The appellants rely on Parker v. Ryan, 143 Okla. 187, 287 P. 1006 and Atteberry v. Aulick, 204 Okla. 540, 231 P. 993. These cases are not in point because in both cases the party seeking specific performance was guilty of laches in pursuing his remedy and it was only after the property greatly increased in value because of an oil play that he became interested in completing the purchase.

Laches has been sustained where only one and a half years intervened, Davis v. Godwin-Barclay Co., 120 Okla. 274, 251 P. 1042, and where two years elapsed, Brown v. Privett, 109 Okla. 1, 234 P. 577. The fluctuating character of oil and gas properties particularly require that people claiming interests therein assert them promptly and take their part of the risk, rather than decide to come in if and when the property has become valuable; Twin Lick Oil Co., v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 592, 23 L.Ed. 328; Washington v. Morton, 90 Okla. 142, 216 P. 457; Nickel v. Janda, 115 Okla. 207, 242 P. 264, and Parker v. Ryan, 143 Okla. 187, 287 P. 1006. We hold that plaintiff and R.A. Lathrop are barred by laches from prosecution of the instant action.

We think this principle is well settled by the authorities. The Twin-Lick Oil Co. of West Virginia v. William Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 23 L.Ed. 328. And by this court's decision in Thompson v. Johnson-Kemnitz Drilling Co., 193 Okla. 507, 145 P.2d 422; Parker et ux. v. Ryan, 143 Okla. 187, 287 P. 1006. It is our opinion that the trial court considered all the evidence and determined all the issues properly raised by the evidence, though, at the time, plaintiff had not formally presented its supplemental petition to conform to its proof.

It has nothing to do with the time of performance such as heretofore considered on the first appeal. However, in view of express contract provision in the only lease to the lots introduced in evidence, wherein express provision was made for expiration thereof, time might have been considered of the essence of the contract. Garfield Oil Co. v. Champlin, 103 Okla. 209, 229 P. 824; Parker et ux. v. Ryan, 143 Okla. 187, 287 P. 100; Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 23 L.Ed. 328. No reversible error occurred by reason of the trial court's failure to formally make findings of fact separately from conclusions of law.

Equity will not aid a party who, with full knowledge of the facts, and without risk to himself, stands by an unreasonable length of time and sees another assume all the risks in an uncertain venture in which said party might have shared, and, after success of the venture, seeks to share in the benefits thereof. That rule applies as between parties entitled to share in the production of oil. Parker v. Ryan, 143 Okla. 187, 287 P. 1006. When considering a similar claim the court in the latter case held:

In construing the above section of the statute, we have held that where the nature of the subject-matter in the contract fluctuates rapidly up and down so that the mere efflux of time materially affects the value, then time is of the essence of the contract and the performance must be completed at the earliest practicable period. See Nelson v. Hamra, 127 Okla. 141, 259 P. 838; Parker v. Ryan, 143 Okla. 187, 287 P. 1006; Muir v. McCullah, 148 Okla. 52, 297 P. 257. Otherwise, generally speaking, what is a reasonable time is considered to be a question of fact depending upon all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction and is for the determination of the court or jury as the case may be. Under all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction involved herein, we are not prepared to say that the delay on the part of the plaintiff in procuring the release of the mortgage in question was unreasonable. Since actions speak louder than words, from the record before us it appears that the defendant was not interested in the procurement of this release either at the time that he received his attorney's opinion or at any other date. It appears that he went to the bank on the 29th day of October without notice to the plaintiff and drew down his certified check and apparently abandoned the transaction, and in so doing it appears that the mortgage lien existing on the property in question constitutes an

"Equity will not aid a party who, with full knowledge of the facts, and without risk to himself, stands by an unreasonable length of time and sees another assume all the risks in an uncertain venture in which said party might have shared, and, after success of the venture, seeks to share in the benefits thereof. That rule applies as between parties entitled to share in the production of oil. Parker v. Ryan, 143 Okl. 187, 287 P. 1006, 1008. When considering a similar claim the court in the latter case held: 'The injustice, therefore, is obvious, of permitting one holding the right to assert an ownership in such property to voluntarily await the event, and then decide, when the danger which is over has been at the risk of another, to come in and share the profit.

“Equity will not aid a party who, with full knowledge of the facts, and without risk to himself, stands by an unreasonable length of time and sees another assume all the risks in an uncertain venture in which said party might have shared, and, after success of the venture, seeks to share in the benefits thereof. That rule applies as between parties entitled to share in the production of oil. Parker v. Ryan, 143 Okl. 187, 287 P. 1006, 1008. When considering a similar claim the court in the latter case held: ‘The injustice, therefore, is obvious, of permitting one holding the right to assert an ownership in such property to voluntarily await the event, and then decide, when the danger which is over has been at the risk of another, to come in and share the profit.