Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc.

10 Citing cases

  1. Fara Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Fara Estates, Ltd.

    134 F.3d 377 (9th Cir. 1998)

    However, the case law which does touch on the burden of proof issue appears to allocate the burden to the defendant. Saratoga cites Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc., 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 349-350 (Cal.App.1992), to support its contention that the Association bears the burden of proving its ignorance. The case is of little help.

  2. Jacques v. Bank of America Corporation

    Case No. 1:12-cv-0821-LJO-SAB (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014)   Cited 1 times
    Holding that vague allegation that defendant stated plaintiff had "engaged in internal security fraud" was "too vague" to be anything but opinion

    Plaintiff relies upon Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc., 3 Cal. App. 4th 512 (1992), in support of his argument. In Parker, the court recognized that under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 474, a plaintiff may sue a defendant by a fictitious designation, such as "Doe."

  3. Carrera v. Mead Aircraft Servs., Inc.

    No. C075032 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2016)

    The amended pleading relates back to the filing of the original complaint so as to satisfy the statute of limitations if it involves the same general set of facts. (Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 512, 516 (Parker).) "[T]he purpose of section 474 is to enable a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations when he [or she] is ignorant of the identity of the defendant.

  4. Christ v. Dep't of Forestry & Fire Prot.

    No. C076957 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 27, 2016)

    On page 9, second full paragraph, after the last sentence add the following: "(Contra, Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 512, 516-517 [the plaintiff was unaware of the factual basis for a cause of action against the respondent -- i.e., that the respondent was the general contractor -- when he filed the original complaint]; Barrows v. Am. Motors Corp. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 1, 5, 10 [no showing that the plaintiffs knew, at the time the original complaint was filed, that the defendants later named as Doe defendants were responsible for the alleged defective design and manufacture of the subject vehicle and its distribution]; Hollister Canning Co. v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 186, 189-191, 198 [the plaintiff named George E. Swett Co., a corporation, as a defendant in the original complaint but later named James E. Swett, individually and doing business as George E. Swett & Co., in place of a Doe defendant; the Doe amendment was allowed because, although it knew that Swett performed work in connection with the subject equipment, the plaintiff did not know Swett was a sole proprietorship and not a corporation, S

  5. General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court

    48 Cal.App.4th 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 55 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (Jeffrey), 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 (1996), decided some eight months after the district court's order granting Saratoga's motion for summary judgment was entered, the court focused only on the defendant's attempt to show that plaintiff had actual knowledge of her cause of action against the defendant prior to filing the complaint.

    (5) In keeping with this liberal interpretation of section 474, it is now well established that even though the plaintiff knows of the existence of the defendant sued by a fictitious name, and even though the plaintiff knows the defendant's actual identity (that is, his name), the plaintiff is "ignorant" within the meaning of the statute if he lacks knowledge of that person's connection with the case or with his injuries. ( Wallis v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 782, 786 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 631]; Oakes v. McCarthy Co. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 231, 253 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 127] [plaintiff knew soils engineer was involved but did not know his connection to earth compacting operation]; Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 512, 518 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 347] [even where a defendant is named in the original complaint by his true name, then dismissed because the plaintiff believed his capacity relieved him of liability, he may later be added (returned to the action) as a Doe defendant based on the plaintiff's discovery that he occupied a different legal capacity].) The fact that the plaintiff had the means to obtain knowledge is irrelevant.

  6. Jacques v. Bank of America Corporation

    Case No. 1:12-cv-00821-LJO-SAB (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2015)

    Plaintiff argues that Early Warning was named as a Doe defendant in the original complaint and, under California law, the complaint may be amended to substitute the Doe defendant's true name if Plaintiff was ignorant of the facts giving rise to a cause of action against that defendant. See Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc., 3 Cal.App.4th 512, 516(1992).          However, the magistrate judge properly concluded that relation back did not apply because Plaintiff was not ignorant of the facts giving rise to a cause of action against Early Warning because Plaintiff actually raised a cause of action against Early Warning in the original complaint.

  7. Lynch v. Chao

    No. B296755 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 8, 2020)

    Nonetheless, where an order sustaining a demurrer fully disposes of a case and the parties treat the order as a judgment, appellate courts routinely " 'deem[ ] the order sustaining the demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal and interpret[ ] plaintiffs' notice of appeal as applying to such dismissal.' " (O'Grady v. Merchant Exchange Productions, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 771, 776, fn. 3 (O'Grady); see also Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1396 [deeming an order on a demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal where "[t]he only step left to make the order appealable was the formal entry of a dismissal order or judgment"]; Villery v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 407, 412 [unsigned minute order sustaining demurrer without leave to amend deemed to include appealable final judgment]; Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 512, 514, fn. 1 [construing order sustaining demurrer to include a judgment "[i]n the interest of judicial economy"].)

  8. Cochran v. Cochran

    89 Cal.App.4th 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 21 times

    In the interests of judicial economy, we will order entry of judgment nunc pro tunc on the fraud cross-complaint and deem the appeal to be taken from that judgment. ( Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 512, 514, fn. 1; Dominguez v. City of Alhambra (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 237, 242.) In November 1999 respondent moved for summary judgment on the Cochran I complaint, contending appellant could not prevail on her remaining Marvin claims because: (1) the parties were not cohabiting when the agreement was made; (2) the alleged promise of support was made under circumstances which made it unreasonable to believe the statements were a contractual offer; (3) the alleged promise to support was too uncertain to be enforced; and (4) in any event, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

  9. Davis v. Marin

    80 Cal.App.4th 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 29 times
    Treating the filing of a defective Doe amendment as the filing of an amended complaint, thereby suggesting the date of filing the Doe amendment is the operative date from which the statute of limitations is calculated

    The cases discussing section 474 deal with whether the plaintiff was truly ignorant of the identity of the person brought into the case as a Doe defendant because if that requirement is met, the amendment to the complaint relates back to the date the complaint was filed and the statute of limitations is preserved. ( Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 512, 514; Balon v. Drost (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 483; Hazel v. Hewlett, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d 1458; Munoz v. Purdy (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 942.) For example, in Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176, the court stated: "If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed.

  10. Hood v. Hacienda La Puente Unified School District

    65 Cal.App.4th 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 31 times
    Affirming order of dismissal on demurrer renders antecedent discovery ruling moot

    Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend on January 2, 1997. That order is not appealable. (Code of Civ. Proc., ยง 904.1; Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 699; Beazell v. Schrader (1963) 59 Cal.2d 577, 579-580; Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695; Parker v. Robert E. McKee, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 512, 514, fn. 1.) On April 15, 1998, plaintiff filed an amended notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal entered on April 13, 1998.