Parker v. Rash

12 Citing cases

  1. New Brunswick v. Rutgers Community Health Plan, Inc.

    7 N.J. Tax 491 (Tax 1985)   Cited 17 times
    Distinguishing HMO clinic from hospital

    Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (2 ed. 1983) at 879; emphasis supplied. This conclusion finds further support in the cases of Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687 (App.Ct. 1951) and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ince, 27 S.W.2d 476 (Missouri App.Ct. 1930) involving the concept of a hospital in varying contexts. In Parker defendant contended that its proposed doctors' office building which included space and facilities for four doctors, treatment rooms, nurses workroom, recovery room and an x-ray room was a hospital.

  2. Dent v. City of Kansas City

    519 P.2d 704 (Kan. 1974)   Cited 4 times
    Zoning amendment not invalidated because petitioner did not pay the filing fee

    "`An amendatory ordinance which selects one lot, owned by one person, and creates for it a particular zoning classification different from that of the surrounding property, constitutes "spot zoning." Parker v. Rash (1951) 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687. "`"Spot zoning," as usually defined, signifies a carving out of one or more properties located in a given use district and reclassifying them in a different use district.

  3. Willey v. Town Council of Barrington

    106 R.I. 544 (R.I. 1970)   Cited 12 times

    It is not enough, however, that the intended use of the property will be of benefit to the community. Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609. The requirement of consistent zoning treatment throughout the community is basic to the local zoning power and may not be disregarded.

  4. Waterstradt v. Board of Commissioners

    203 Kan. 317 (Kan. 1969)   Cited 16 times
    In Waterstradt v. Board of Commissioners, 203 Kan. 317, 454 P.2d 445, wherein a rezoning ordinance was challenged, we quoted these definitions of "spot zoning:"

    We quote: "An amendatory ordinance which selects one lot, owned by one person, and creates for it a particular zoning classification different from that of the surrounding property, constitutes `spot zoning.' Parker v. Rash (1951) 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687. "`Spot zoning,' as usually defined, signifies a carving out of one or more properties located in a given use district and reclassifying them in a different use district.

  5. D'Angelo v. K. of C. Bldg. Assn

    89 R.I. 76 (R.I. 1959)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that there is a presumption that "zoning enactments were 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan.'"

    It is not enough, however, that the intended use of the property will be of benefit to the community. Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609. The requirement of consistent zoning treatment throughout the community is basic to the local zoning power and may not be disregarded.

  6. Grant v. McCullough

    196 Tenn. 671 (Tenn. 1954)   Cited 11 times
    In Grant v. McCullough, the Supreme Court of Tennessee found that "[n]o basis" for the zoning change could be "conjured" other than a desire to help the property owner.

    "'Spot zoning' is process of singling out small parcel of land for use classification totally different from that of surrounding area, for benefit of owner of such property and to detriment of other owners, and, as such, is very antithesis of planned zoning." In Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687, it was held that: "Amendment to city zoning ordinance reclassifying lot so as to permit erection and construction thereon of modern well equipped doctors' office building constituted 'spot zoning', since it simply selected one lot, owned by one person, and created for it a particular zoning classification different from that of surrounding property."

  7. Moore v. Pettus

    260 Ala. 616 (Ala. 1954)   Cited 32 times
    In Moore v. Pettus, 260 Ala. 616, 71 So.2d 814 (1954), this Court stated: "The intention of zoning laws as regards a use of nonconforming property is to restrict rather than extend it. Fulford v. Board of Zoning of City of Dothan, 256 Ala. 336, 54 So.2d 580 [(1951)].

    The rule in Georgia and Kentucky appears to entitle individual property owners residing in zoned area where violation occurs to enjoin violation even though substantial financial loss is not shown. See Snow v. Johnston, 197 Ga. 146, 28 S.E.2d 270; Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687. In the bill of complaint we find the general averment of special damage to the complainants resulting from the extension and alterations made by respondent to his nonconforming structure in violation of the zoning ordinance.

  8. Pellegrino v. City Council of Springfield

    22 Mass. App. Ct. 459 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 10 times

    He relied, among other things, on a case from another jurisdiction which dealt with a proposed medical office building that had no physical or other connection with any hospital. Not surprisingly, the project was determined to be a professional office building and not a hospital. Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609 (1951). The trial judge also relied on the definition of "hospital" in G.L.c. Ill, § 52, as appearing in St. 1967, c. 891, § 2, which provides, for licensing purposes, that a hospital is "any institution, however named, whether conducted for charity or for profit, which is advertised, announced, established or maintained for the purpose of caring for persons admitted thereto for diagnosis, medical, surgical or restorative treatment which is rendered within said institution."

  9. Stratford v. Crossman

    655 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 1 times
    Providing that mandamus will issue only where the duty of the defendant is clear

    Nor, is he required to show pecuniary damage. See Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687 (1951). In Fiscal Court of Cumberland County v. Board of Education of Cumberland County, 191 Ky. 263, 230 S.W. 57, 60 (1921), we note the following statement:

  10. Aylor v. Sun Oil Company

    453 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970)

    We so observed in Byrn v. Beechwood Village, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 395 (1952). Other cases in which spot zoning has been condemned are Polk v. Axton, 306 Ky. 498, 208 S.W.2d 497 (1948); Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687 (1951); Mathis v. Hannan, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 278 (1957); and Fritts v. City of Ashland, Ky., 348 S.W.2d 712 (1961). In the Fritts case we expressed the hope that zoning authorities would recognize that "an essential feature of zoning is planning".