Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (2 ed. 1983) at 879; emphasis supplied. This conclusion finds further support in the cases of Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687 (App.Ct. 1951) and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ince, 27 S.W.2d 476 (Missouri App.Ct. 1930) involving the concept of a hospital in varying contexts. In Parker defendant contended that its proposed doctors' office building which included space and facilities for four doctors, treatment rooms, nurses workroom, recovery room and an x-ray room was a hospital.
"`An amendatory ordinance which selects one lot, owned by one person, and creates for it a particular zoning classification different from that of the surrounding property, constitutes "spot zoning." Parker v. Rash (1951) 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687. "`"Spot zoning," as usually defined, signifies a carving out of one or more properties located in a given use district and reclassifying them in a different use district.
It is not enough, however, that the intended use of the property will be of benefit to the community. Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609. The requirement of consistent zoning treatment throughout the community is basic to the local zoning power and may not be disregarded.
We quote: "An amendatory ordinance which selects one lot, owned by one person, and creates for it a particular zoning classification different from that of the surrounding property, constitutes `spot zoning.' Parker v. Rash (1951) 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687. "`Spot zoning,' as usually defined, signifies a carving out of one or more properties located in a given use district and reclassifying them in a different use district.
It is not enough, however, that the intended use of the property will be of benefit to the community. Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609. The requirement of consistent zoning treatment throughout the community is basic to the local zoning power and may not be disregarded.
"'Spot zoning' is process of singling out small parcel of land for use classification totally different from that of surrounding area, for benefit of owner of such property and to detriment of other owners, and, as such, is very antithesis of planned zoning." In Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687, it was held that: "Amendment to city zoning ordinance reclassifying lot so as to permit erection and construction thereon of modern well equipped doctors' office building constituted 'spot zoning', since it simply selected one lot, owned by one person, and created for it a particular zoning classification different from that of surrounding property."
The rule in Georgia and Kentucky appears to entitle individual property owners residing in zoned area where violation occurs to enjoin violation even though substantial financial loss is not shown. See Snow v. Johnston, 197 Ga. 146, 28 S.E.2d 270; Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687. In the bill of complaint we find the general averment of special damage to the complainants resulting from the extension and alterations made by respondent to his nonconforming structure in violation of the zoning ordinance.
He relied, among other things, on a case from another jurisdiction which dealt with a proposed medical office building that had no physical or other connection with any hospital. Not surprisingly, the project was determined to be a professional office building and not a hospital. Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609 (1951). The trial judge also relied on the definition of "hospital" in G.L.c. Ill, § 52, as appearing in St. 1967, c. 891, § 2, which provides, for licensing purposes, that a hospital is "any institution, however named, whether conducted for charity or for profit, which is advertised, announced, established or maintained for the purpose of caring for persons admitted thereto for diagnosis, medical, surgical or restorative treatment which is rendered within said institution."
Nor, is he required to show pecuniary damage. See Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687 (1951). In Fiscal Court of Cumberland County v. Board of Education of Cumberland County, 191 Ky. 263, 230 S.W. 57, 60 (1921), we note the following statement:
We so observed in Byrn v. Beechwood Village, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 395 (1952). Other cases in which spot zoning has been condemned are Polk v. Axton, 306 Ky. 498, 208 S.W.2d 497 (1948); Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687 (1951); Mathis v. Hannan, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 278 (1957); and Fritts v. City of Ashland, Ky., 348 S.W.2d 712 (1961). In the Fritts case we expressed the hope that zoning authorities would recognize that "an essential feature of zoning is planning".