Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 99-1139.
April 19, 2002
MINUTE ENTRY
Before the court is the "Motion for Summary Judgment" filed by Defendant, Santa Fe Snyder Corporation, moving for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Santa Fe. Plaintiffs, Keith Parker and Charlynn Parker, filed a memorandum in opposition. The motion, set for hearing on Wednesday, April 17, 2002, is before the court on briefs, without oral argument.
Having reviewed the memoranda of counsel and the applicable law, the court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and Santa Fe is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this matter, Plaintiff Keith Parker alleges that while working as a welder for Dynamic Industries, he was injured on a production platform (owned or operated by SOCO Offshore, Inc.), when the rotor wash from a helicopter (owned and operated by Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.) descending onto the heliport of the platform blew the windbreak which Plaintiff was holding.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq., extends the law of the adjacent state, which becomes the law of the United States, to actions arising from injuries on outer continental shelf platforms. In Plaintiffs original Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the subject incident occurred on the outer continental shelf adjacent to Louisiana. But in his Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Alabama law should apply. Whether this case is analyzed under Louisiana or Alabama law, the courts decision is the same.
The relationship between Santa Fe (the successor in interest to SOCO) and Plaintiff's employer, Dynamic Industries, was that of a principal (Santa Fe) and independent contractor (Dynamic). ( See "SOCO Offshore Master, Inc. Master Service Agreement", ¶¶ 2, 3, 7 15, attached to Santa Fe's Exhibit A). Further, the summary judgment evidence submitted by the parties establishes that Santa Fe exercised no operational or supervisory control over any aspect of the work performed by Plaintiff and Dynamic. Rather, at all times pertinent to the dispute, Plaintiff was acting under the direct supervision of the Dynamic supervisor, Stanley Walker.
In order to ensure that the results of Dynamic's work were in compliance with Dynamic s contractual obligations to Santa Fe, Santa Fe employed Lowe Offshore to provide a contract construction foreman (David Cestia) aboard the platform. The court previously granted Lowe Offshore's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Lowe (and Cestia) owed any legal duty to Plaintiff that was breached. ( See Minute Entry, entered on March 21, 2002, Doc. No. 158).
Thus, under Alabama law, Santa Fe owed no duty to Plaintiff because it did not (through contract or its actions) retain or reserve the right to control the manner in which Plaintiff/Dynamic performed its work. Similarly, under Louisiana law, Santa Fe owed Plaintiff no duty to intervene and change the work practices selected by Dynamic (namely, Stanley Walker) or to protect Plaintiff from the hazards created by Dynamic.
Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 2000 WL 351605 (E.D.La. 2000) (Clement, J.); Ramierez v. Alabama Power Co., 898 F. Supp. 1537, 1542 (M.D.Al. 1995), quoting Weeks v. Alabama Elec. Co-Op, Inc., 419 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Al. 1982).
Under Louisiana law, a principal can be liable for the acts of its independent contractor if: (1) the principal retains operational control or the right to supervise or control the work; or (2) the work performed by the contractor is ultrahazardous. Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1997). Here, there is no suggestion that the type of welding work performed by Dynamic/Plaintiff was ultrahazardous; thus the second exception is inapplicable.
Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d 548, 551 (5th Cir. 1987).
Dupre v. Chevron, 109 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1997).
Despite Santa Fe's lack of operational or supervisory control over the welding work being performed by Dynamic/Plaintiff, Plaintiff nevertheless argues that Santa Fe had a non-delegable duty to provide him with a safe work place. More specifically, Plaintiff argues that "because of fire hazard presented by production equipment and over crowding of equipment and housing units on the platform, there was no place else for Parker to work other than underneath the helicopter landing pad, an unsafe area due to helicopter rotor wash. Moreover, neither Parker nor his employer, Dynamic Industries, Inc., knew or warned of rotor wash dangers." (Plaintiff's Opp. at 2).
However, "in the absence of retention by [owner] of control over the manner in which [the independent contractor] performed its work, [owner] may not be held liable for failure to provide a safe work environment for the plaintiff." Ramirez, 898 F. Supp. at 1546 (applying Alabama law); see also, Graham v. Amoco Oil Co., 21 F.3d 643 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Louisiana law in finding that owner of platform had no duty, whether contractually or extra-contractually, to provide a safe work place to independent contractor's employees, and "company man" did not affirmatively assume any duty to provide independent contractor's employees with a safe work place simply by observing their unsafe work habits).
Further, the deposition testimony of Stanley Walker, Dynamic's own supervisor on the job, is fatal to Plaintiff's attempt to hold Santa Fe responsible for either failing to provide a safe work place or failing to warn of the rotor wash dangers. Mr. Walker testified that he did not know the condition of the top deck of the platform before Dynamic arrived, but that "I'm pretty sure it was crowded after I got all my equipment and materials up there." (Walker Dep. at 23, emphasis added). He further admitted that it was his duty to place Dynamic's equipment and materials on the platform top deck, and that he could have moved this equipment and materials around to create different work areas. ( Id. at 53, 61-62).
Mr. Walker also readily conceded that he was responsible for the safety of the Dynamic employees aboard the platform. ( Id. at 69). And during a safety analysis performed by Dynamic after the accident, a committee (which included Mr. Walker) made only one recommendation for remedial action to prevent recurrence of the incident, and that was to secure the wind screens to the platform deck. Mr. Walker, his welder and fitter were the responsible parties for this safety precaution, and Mr. Walker admitted this action was feasible and practical before the incident. ( Id. at 34-35, 60-61).
Finally, under the circumstances presented here, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) and regulations issued by the Coast Guard or the Department of Interior's Minerals Management Service neither impose an independent duty on a platform owner to maintain a safe workplace, nor provide a basis for an implied cause of action against Santa Fe from the mere breach of regulations adopted pursuant to OCSLA. Dupre v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1997), affirming, Dupre v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.La. 1996) (Vance, J.); Romero v. Mobile Exploration and Producing, 939 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1991).
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the "Motion for Summary Judgment" filed by Defendant, Santa Fe Snyder Corporation, be and is hereby GRANTED, dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Santa Fe.