Opinion
C.A. No. 99M-06-005.
DATE SUBMITTED: June 9, 2000.
DATE DECIDED: August 10, 2000.
ORDER
On this 23rd day of August, 2000, upon consideration of the petition seeking a writ of mandamus ("the petition") which petitioner Victor Parker ("petitioner") has filed; the record in this case; the Commissioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations dated August 10, 2000; and Petitioner's Opposition to Commissioner's Recommendations and Findings of Fact; it appears that:
1) Petitioner has filed a petition requesting that the Court restore any good time/meritorious good time lost as a result of his job termination due to a reclassification resulting from disciplinary action. The named respondents are Richard Kearney, Warden, Sussex Correctional Institution ("SCI"); William Post, Chairman, Institutional Based Classification Committee at SCI; Howard R. Young, Director, Special Programs, Department of Corrections, Smyrna, Delaware; and Garland Messick, Records Office Supervisor, SCI (collectively referred to as "respondents") Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition.
2) The Court referred the petition to Superior Court Commissioner Alicia B. Howard pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512 (b) and Superior Court Civil Rule 132(a)(4) for purposes of making findings of fact and reaching conclusions of law. The Commissioner has filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations wherein she recommends that the Superior Court dismiss the petition because petitioner has failed to state a claim which entitles him to a writ of mandamus.
3) Petitioner has filed an appeal from the Commissioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations. Petitioner argues that the Commissioner's conclusions were wrong and reasserts his contention that the action taken against him was racially motivated. Petitioner's claims, including the racial-based claims, constitute constitutional claims which are not subject to mandamus relief. A mandamus action is extremely limited; unless the requisites are met, petitioner does not state a claim for mandamus. In this case, as the Commissioner concluded, petitioner has not stated a claim for mandamus.
NOW, THEREFORE, after careful and de novo review of the record in this action, and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations dated August 10, 2000,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1) The Court adopts the well-reasoned Commissioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations;
2) The Court concludes petitioner has not stated a claim which entitles him to a writ of mandamus; and
4) The Court dismisses the petition.
COMMISSIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MOTION TO DISMISS
Howard, Commissioner
Victor Parker ("petitioner") has filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus ("the petition"). The named respondents are Richard Kearney, Warden, Sussex Correctional Institution ("SCI") William Post, Chairman, Institutional Based Classification Committee at SCI; Howard R. Young, Director, Special Programs, Department of Corrections, Smyrna, Delaware; and Garland Messick, Records Office Supervisor, SCI (collectively referred to as "respondents"). Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The Superior Court assigned the motion to the Commissioner, and the motion was presented on May 19, 2000. Thereafter, the parties submitted memoranda of law on the issue of whether the petition should be dismissed. The matter now is ripe for decision, and this constitutes my proposed findings of fact and recommendations on the motion to dismiss.
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
In developing the facts, I draw from the allegations of the petition as well as documents to which petitioner refers in the petition.
Petitioner, who is serving a New Jersey sentence, is housed in Delaware's prison system pursuant to an Interstate Corrections Compact agreement. See 11 Del. C. § 6571.
On September 28, 1998, he was given an institutional disciplinary write-up for a Class 1 infraction. He was found guilty of the infraction on or about October 1, 1998. His punishment was twenty-four (24) hours loss of privileges and forty-eight (43) hours of probation.
On or about the first week of December, 1998, petitioner was reviewed and classified by the M.D.T. The M.D.T. gave approval for petitioner to continue working in the institution's laundry and to enroll in mental health classes.
"M.D.T." never is defined.
On or about December 28, 1998, petitioner received a "Denial Form" from the Institutional Based Classification Committee ("13CC"). Therein, the IBCC informed him that it had reviewed his job placement and had disapproved of his placement in the laundry due to his recent Class 1 write-up. The denial form was signed by W. Post for the 13CC. Petitioner alleges this action resulted from a "new" rule of the 13CC; and the prison, contrary to its standards of operation, did not provide notice of this new rule to the inmates.
On or about December 31, 1998, petitioner appealed the IBCC's action. He appealed to respondent Howard Young, Director of Special Programs, Department of Corrections, Smyrna, Delaware. On or about February 2, 1999, petitioner filed another appeal with William Post, Chairman of the 13CC. Petitioner has not received a response to this appeal.
On or about February 23, 1999, petitioner sent another appeal to SCI Warden Kearney. On or about March 8, 1999, Warden Kearney replied to this appeal as follows:
I am in receipt of your letter dated February 23, 1999. The loss of your job in the laundry was not in addition to the sanction you received for the Class One offense. The classification result was due to your conviction of the Class One offense. Oftentimes disciplinary action renders a person inappropriate for their classification resulting in reclassification. You should continue to work with your counselor to develop a treatment and employment plan.
On or about January 4, 1999, petitioner filed a grievance regarding the 13CC action. In a letter dated January 13, 1999 Staff Lieutenant Brenda Brasure, the SCI Grievance Chairperson informed him that his complaint was not grievable and "the classification procedure has its own appeal process."
Petitioner complains as follows. First, his removal from the institutional job based upon the write-up was arbitrary and capricious and violated his due process rights. Furthermore, his due process rights were violated in that the infraction and writeup occurred three months prior to his being removed from his job. In addition, the sanction of removing him from his job constituted double jeopardy; petitioner previously had been sanctioned for the infraction. Further, the infraction was totally unrelated to the job.
Petitioner makes the following additional complaints. The 13CC set forth new rules, and in doing so, it failed to comply with 11 Del. C. § 6502 and Department of Corrections Penal Code of Discipline, l00:l2. He has taken the appropriate steps by filing the appeals noted above.
A copy of this statute is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
According to petitioner, this provision states:
This code will be construed according to the fair meaning of its terms, to promote justice and to accomplish the following general objectives. In part
(c) To define what conduct is prohibited in the institution and state the sanctions that may be imposed to punish such conduct.
(d) To prevent arbitrary or retalitory treatment of inmates accused or convicted of offenses.
(e) To prescribe penalties that are proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.
Petitioner then asserts the following. He is to be disciplined pursuant to Delaware Department of Corrections Penal Code of Discipline. However, Delaware's actions violate his rights as provided by New Jersey law. He cites to the following New Jersey statutes: NJSA 30:4-92 and NJSA 30:4-l40. NJSA 30:4-92 addresses the employment of inmates and NJSA 30:4-140 addresses deductions for good behavior.
Copies of these statutes are attached as Exhibits B and C.
Petitioner argues that since he is an interstate compact transferee, certain laws and rules that govern his sentence cannot be disregarded. He maintains that the action of the 13CC "circumvents his due process/double jeopardy rights, under his state's Statues [sic]. . . ." He argues that these statutes govern his sentence, and Delaware's statutes and rules should not place him at a disadvantage.
Finally, in his response to the motion to dismiss, petitioner makes an additional allegation. He maintains that black inmates are removed from their jobs for rule infractions while white inmates are not so removed.
Petitioner concludes in his petition that he is entitled to good time credit which was illegally denied him due to the 13CC decision to not allow him to work. He requests that the Court restore any good time/meritorious good time lost as a result of the job termination during the period of time he was removed from work.
As noted above, respondents have filed a motion to dismiss. They argue the petition should be dismissed because the Petition was not served on the Attorney General, the State Solicitor or the Chief Deputy Attorney General as 10 Del. C. § 3103 (c) requires. In the alternative, respondents argue the petition should be dismissed because mandamus is not appropriate since petitioner cannot show that he has a right to either classification or employment. The argument proceeds as follows. Since petitioner has no right to his job through mandamus, he cannot obtain the good time credit for the time period after he was terminated from his employment; he can only obtain good time for a period of actual participation in work. Respondents further argue that since petitioner is seeking a reduction in his sentence, a mandamus is not the appropriate remedy. Furthermore, they argue, to the extent petitioner claims violations of his constitutional rights, his remedies lie within the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § l983.
In 10 Del. C. § 3103 (c), it is provided:
No service of summons upon the State, or upon any administrative office, agency, department, board or commission of the state government, or upon any officer of the state government concerning any matter arising in connection with the exercise of his or her official powers or duties, shall be complete until such service is made upon the person of the Attorney General or upon the person of the State Solicitor or upon the person of the Chief Deputy Attorney General.
In its reply memorandum, the State also argues that petitioner was provided his due process rights in that he was provided a hearing with regard to the disciplinary matter. This argument, however, does not address petitioner's claims and accordingly, I do not consider it.
In response to the motion to dismiss, petitioner argues that the underlying issue does not involve his classification. Instead, it involves punishment. He is being punished twice for an infraction, and that punishment constitutes double jeopardy, due process and equal protection violations.
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The first question concerns the procedural treatment of the pending motion. It was filed as a motion to dismiss. However, petitioner has submitted documents outside the pleadings. Normally, the motion would evolve into a summary judgment motion. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(c). However, petitioner referenced these documents in his petition, and they should have been attached to the petition as exhibits. Consequently, I will consider the documents to be a part of the petition and I will treat the motion as one to dismiss rather than as one for summary judgment.
In examining a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations of fact as true. Malone v. Brincat, Del. Supr., 722 A.2d 5, 9 (1998). "A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim only when it appears `with a reasonable certainty that a plaintiff would not be entitled to the relief sought under any set of facts which could be proven to support the action.' [Citation and footnote omitted.]" Id.
The issue before the Court is whether mandamus is the appropriate remedy for the claims asserted.
A writ of mandamus is a command that may be issued by the Superior Court to an inferior court, public official or agency to compel the performance of a duty to which the petitioner has established a clear legal right.Paczkowski v. Haller, Del. Supr., No. 154, 2000, Veasey, C.J. (July 14, 2000). As further explained in Guy v. Greenhouse, Del. Supr., No. 285, 1993, Walsh, J. (December 30, 1993)
Under Delaware law, the basis for issuance and the scope of relief available through a writ of mandamus under Delaware law are both quite limited. Mandamus is issuable not as a matter of right, but only in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Moreover, when directed to an administrative agency or public official, mandamus will issue only to require performance of a clear legal or ministerial duty. For a duty to be ministerial and thus enforceable by mandamus, the duty must be prescribed with such precision and certainty that nothing is left to discretion or judgment. [Citations omitted.]Accord Taylor v. State, Del. Supr., 716 A.2d 975 (1998); Washington v. Snyder, Del. Supr., 713 A.2d 932 (1998). In addition, a writ of mandamus is inappropriate where a petitioner has an adequate remedy at law available to him. Paczkowski v. Haller, supra.
Initially, I note that the claim that the Department of Corrections' rules were arbitrarily enforced does not state a clear right invoking mandamus relief. Inmate Gary Iverson v. The Bureau of Adult Corrections, Del. Super., C.A. No. 88M-NO-16, Babiarz, J. (March 2, 1989). I turn to the basic dispute: whether petitioner was entitled to work.
Petitioner was not working due to his reclassification. In order to be entitled to the remedy of mandamus, petitioner must show that he had a clear right not to be reclassified and/or he had a clear right to his job.
I assume, for purposes of this motion, that if petitioner had been working, then he would have been entitled to receive good time credits. See NJSA 30:4-92; 11 Del. C. § 4381 (d)
Petitioner has no protected interest in his classification status.Nicholson v. Snyder, Del. Supr., No. 320, 1992, Walsh, J. (October 19, 1992) at 3; Riley v. Taylor, Del. Super., C.A. No. 98C-09-247, Quillen, J. (March 1, 1999) at 2; Ross v. Board of Corrections, Del. Super., C.A. No. 96M-03-065, Del Pesco, J. (December 9, 199G) at 5, rev'd and remanded on other grounds, Del. Supr., 697 A.2d 377 (1997). Furthermore, "placement of inmates within the prison system has traditionally been within the wide spectrum of discretionary actions of prison administrators, rather than of the courts." Ross v. Board of Corrections, supra. Accord Bagwell v. Prince, Del. Supr., 683 A.2d 58 (1996) ; Riley v. Taylor, supra. Thus, petitioner's reclassification is a discretionary matter, and accordingly, it is not a matter subject to a mandamus action.
Petitioner is not otherwise entitled to his job. As explained inAbdul-Akbar v. Department of Corrections, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 1735-S, Allen, C. (March 30, 1995) at 5, aff'd, Del. Supr., No. 139, 1995, Veasey, C.J. (October 5, 1995)
Given the conditions of their confinement, ordinarily prisoners can claim no legitimate expectation of continued employment in their prison work assignments.
Petitioner has a claim he is clearly entitled to his job only if a statute or regulation provides such a right. See Abdul-Akbar v. Department of Corrections, supra at 5-6; Dutton v. Risley, Del. Supr., No. 190, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (November 15, 1994). There is no absolute right to a job pursuant to NJSA 30:4-92. Lorusso v. Pinchak, N.J. Super., 701 A.2d 974 (1997). Petitioner has advanced nothing to show that a Delaware rule or statute provides him with an absolute right to the laundry job. Since petitioner has no clear right to his job, he has no right to a mandamus. Saunders v. Kearney, Del. Super., C.A. No. 99M-05-011, Stokes, J. (May 25, 1999), aff'd, Del. Supr., 746 A.2d 277 (2000).
Finally, petitioner claims various constitutional violations occurred as a result of the denial of his job. The appropriate remedy for these violations is an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, petitioner has an adequate remedy at law, and the mandamus action is inappropriate.
Based on the foregoing, I recommend that the Court conclude petitioner has failed to state a claim for a writ of mandamus. Because the mandamus action cannot proceed, the ground for dismissal asserting lack of service is moot, and I further recommend that the Court not consider that ground.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, I recommend that the Court conclude petitioner has not stated a claim which entitles him to a writ of mandamus and that the Court dismiss the petition.
Commissioner
§ 6502. Purposes and construction; custody of inmates.
(a) A Department of Correction is established to provide for the treatment, rehabilitation and restoration of offenders as useful, law-abiding citizens within the community. To achieve these par-poses more effectively in a coordinated and united manner, the Department shall be completely responsible for the maintenance, supervision and administration of adult detention and correctional services and facilities of the State, which include institutional facilities and probation and parole services. These institutions and services shall be diversified in program, construction and staff to provide effectively and efficiently for the maximum study, care, custody, training and supervision and treatment of those persons committed to the institutional facilities or on probation or parole, so that they may be prepared for release, aftercare, discharge or supervision in the community. This chapter shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.
(b) The Department shall accept custody of all persons committed to it by courts of competent jurisdiction. Persons committed to the custody of the Department shall not be released from custody except in accordance with this title or by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
(c) Nothing in this title shall be construed to require the release of persons committed to the custody of the Department, nor shall anything in this title be construed as a limitation on the in.mate population at any of the facilities maintained by the Department.
Nothing in any regulation promulgated by the Department shall be construed as a limitation on the inmate population at any of the facilities maintained by the Department.
(d) In the event that: (1) The number of persons housed by the Department at any of its facilities exceeds the design capacity of that facility; and (2) because the inmate population at that facility exceeds the design capacity of that facility the Department is unable to provide conditions of confinement as may otherwise be required by this title or by the regulations promulgated by the Department, then the Department shall not be required to provide said conditions of confinement to the extent it is unable to do so because of the innate population at that facility The Commissioner shall determine the design capacity of each of the facilities maintained by the Department.
(e) For purposes of this section, the term "inmate population" shall include both convicted and pretrial detentioners. (11 Del. C. § 1953, § 8501; 54 Del. Laws, c. 349, § 1; 62 Del. Laws, c. 61, §§ 1, 2.)
EXHIBIT A
30:4-92. Inmates of Institutions to be employed in productive, capacity: compensationThe inmates of all correctional and charitable, hospital, relief training institutions within the jurisdiction of the State Board shall be employed in such productive occupations as are consistent with their health, strength and mental capacity and shall receive such compensation therefor as the Stare Board shall determine.
Compensation for inmates of correctional institutions may be in the form of cash or remission of time from sentence or both. Such, remission from the time of sentence shall not exceed one day for each five days Of productive occupation, but remission granted under. this Section shall in no way affect deductions for good behavior or provided by law.
From moneys paid to inmates of correctional institutions, the superintendent of the institution shall withdraw sufficient moneys, in an amount not to exceed one-third of the inmate's total income, as may be required to pay any assessment, restitution or fine ordered as part of any sentence, and is authorized to withdraw from the remainder of the inmate's total income an amount not to exceed one-third of the total income as may be required to pay costs and fees charged or owing, pursuant to section 2 of P1. 1995, c. 254 (C. 30:7E-2).
In addition, all inmates classified as minimum security and who are considered sufficiently trustworthy to be employed in honor camps, farms or details shall receive further remission of time from sentence at the rate of three days per month for the first year of such employment and five days per month for the second and each subsequent year of such employment.
Amended by L. 1956, c. 38, § 1, eff. June 1, 1956; L. 1959, c. 52, § 1, eff. July 1, 1959: L.l9Z5, c. 251, § 3, eff. July 31, 1985: L. 1991, c. 329, § 17, eff. Dec. 23. 1991; L. 1995, c. 254, § 10, eff. March 1, 1996.
EXHIBIT B
30:4-140. Deductions for good behavior: calculation of time credits; effect on eligibility for parole
For every year or fractional part of a year of sentence imposed upon any person committed to any State correctional institution for a minimum-maximum term there shall be remitted to him from both the maximum and minimum term of his sentence, for continuous orderly deportment, the progressive time credits indicated in the schedule herein. When a sentence contains a fractional part of a year in either the minimum or maximum thereof, then time credits in reduction of such fractional part of a year shall be calculated at the rate set out in the schedule for each full month of such fractional part of a year of sentence. No time credits shall be calculated as provide for herein on time served by any person in custody between his arrest and the imposition of sentence. In case of any flagrant misconduct the board of managers may declare a forfeiture of the time previously remitted, either in whole or in part, as to them shall seem just.
SCHEDULE
A B C Minimum Progressive Credits and Credits for for Each Maximum Minimum and Full Sentences Maximum Month in Years Sentences of in Years Fractional (days) Part of a Year in Excess of column A (days)
1 72 7 2 156 8 3 232 8 4 348 8 5 444 8 6 540 8 7 636 10 8 756 10 9 876 10 10 996 10 11 1,116 10 12 1,236 11 13 1,368 11 14 1,500 11 15 1,632 11 16 1,764 11 17 1,896 12 18 2,040 12 19 2,184 12 20 2,328 12 21 2,472 12 22 2,616 13 23 2,772 13 24 2,928 13 25 3,084 15 26 3,264 15 27 3,444 15 28 3,624 15 29 3,804 15 30 3,984 16
Any sentence in excess of 30 years shall be reduced by time credits for continuous orderly deportment at the rate of 192 days for each such additional year or 16 days for each full month of any fractional part of a year. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to limit or affect a convict's eligibility for parole consideration as provided for in section 10, chapter 84, P, L. 1948, as amended, in any situation where the sentence or consecutive sentences imposed upon a convict shall exceed 25 years.
Former § 30:4-123.10, now repealed.
Amended by L. 1957, c. 27, § 1, eff. July 28, 1957.
EXHIBIT C
In developing the facts, I draw from the allegations of the petition as well as documents to which petitioner refers in the petition.
"M.D.T." never is defined.
A copy of this statute is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
According to petitioner, this provision states:
This code will be construed according to the fair meaning of its terms, to promote justice and to accomplish the following general objectives. In part
(c) To define what conduct is prohibited in the institution and state the sanctions that may be imposed to punish such conduct.
(d) To prevent arbitrary or retalitory treatment of inmates accused or convicted of offenses.
(e) To prescribe penalties that are proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.
Copies of these statutes are attached as Exhibits B and C.
In 10 Del. C. § 3103 (c), it is provided:
No service of summons upon the State, or upon any administrative office, agency, department, board or commission of the state government, or upon any officer of the state government concerning any matter arising in connection with the exercise of his or her official powers or duties, shall be complete until such service is made upon the person of the Attorney General or upon the person of the State Solicitor or upon the person of the Chief Deputy Attorney General.
In its reply memorandum, the State also argues that petitioner was provided his due process rights in that he was provided a hearing with regard to the disciplinary matter. This argument, however, does not address petitioner's claims and accordingly, I do not consider it.
I assume, for purposes of this motion, that if petitioner had been working, then he would have been entitled to receive good time credits. See NJSA 30:4-92; 11 Del. C. § 4381 (d).