" See, also, Parker v. Faust, 222 Or. 526, 529-530, 353 P.2d 550 (1960). For a succinct statement see Restatement, 2 Agency 2d, 208, § 390, and quoted with approval in Prall v. Gooden, supra, at 563.

Plaintiffs assert that the substantive law in this state dictates a result in plaintiffs' favor. It is true that in cases involving breach of fiduciary duty by a broker in which we have discussed allocation of burden of proof, this court has consistently placed the burden of proving full disclosure on the broker, whether the broker is plaintiff or defendant to an action. Starkweather v. Shaffer, 262 Or. 198, 497 P.2d 358 (1972); Widing v. Jensen, Real Estate Com., 231 Or. 541, 373 P.2d 661 (1962); Prall v. Gooden, 226 Or. 554, 360 P.2d 759 (1961); Parker v. Faust, 222 Or. 526, 353 P.2d 550 (1960). Close scrutiny of these cases and the authority cited therein reveals, however, that in each case it was alleged and proved that the broker was engaged in self-dealing or was otherwise involved in a conflict of interest with the principal.

The same principle has been repeated several times. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 1963, 235 Or. 7, 383 P.2d 107, 383 P.2d 1002; Parker v. Faust, 1960, 222 Or. 526, 353 P.2d 550; L.B. Menefee Lumber Co. v. MacDonald et al, 1927, 122 Or. 579, 260 P. 444."

In response, plaintiff notes that if the trial court did consider the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court nevertheless "did not heed the most important consequence of the breach of fiduciary duty claim — it did not place the burden of proving full disclosure on the defendants." Plaintiff relies on Starkweather v. Shaffer, 262 Or. 198, 497 P.2d 358 (1972); Widing et al v. Jensen, Real Estate Com., 231 Or. 541, 373 P.2d 661 (1962); Prall v. Gooden, 226 Or. 554, 360 P.2d 759 (1961); and Parker v. Faust, 222 Or. 526, 353 P.2d 550 (1960), for the proposition that in an action where a fiduciary relationship is shown to exist, the burden of proving complete disclosure of material facts is on the fiduciary. At oral argument, defendants suggested "in passing" that plaintiff's assignment of error did not properly raise this issue because plaintiff did not actually assign as error the court's misallocation of the burden of proof.

Although much of the foregoing testimony was contrary to testimony by the defendant, who also testified that plaintiff had "verbally accepted" the offer by his partner, the trial court was not required to believe his testimony. On this state of the record we agree with the trial court in holding that defendant failed to satisfy the burden of proof imposed upon him as a real estate broker under the rule stated by this court in Parker v. Faust, 222 Or. 526, 353 P.2d 550 (1960), to show that he had performed his fiduciary duty to plaintiff to make a full disclosure of all material information concerning the prospective sale of plaintiff's property. It follows that defendant was not entitled to demand payment of a commission on that sale. Affirmed.

We have held that pleadings are not fatally defective merely because they are not artfully drawn. Parker v. Faust, 222 Or. 526, 532, 353 P.2d 550 (1960). The complaint was sufficient to apprise the defendants of what they must meet both as to the pleadings and the evidence.

This court has held that pleadings are not fatally defective merely because they are not artfully drawn. Parker v. Faust, 222 Or. 526, 532, 353 P.2d 550 (1960). The complaint in this case was clearly sufficient to apprise the defendant of what plaintiff U.S.F. G. intended to prove and did not thereby prejudice the defendant.

We have held that pleadings are not fatally defective merely because they are not artfully drawn. Parker v. Faust, 222 Or. 526, 532, 353 P.2d 550 (1960). In Investors Ins. Corp. v. Dietz, 264 Or. 164, 504 P.2d 742 (1972), it was contended that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

As real estate brokers they also were in a fiduciary relationship with the owner of the ranch. Parker v. Faust, 222 Or. 526, 529-30, 353 P.2d 550 (1960). 2.

The relationship casts upon the broker the burden of showing that there was a full and complete disclosure and that the broker did not reap a secret profit. Widing et al v. Jensen, Real Estate Com., 231 Or. 541, 544, 373 P.2d 661 (1962); Parker v. Faust, 222 Or. 526, 353 P.2d 550 (1960). Specifically, if the brokers know that "by subdividing the property, a greater price therefor could be obtained, and failed to advise plaintiff of that fact, they [are] guilty of a breach of their duty as real estate brokers."