Parker v. Central Kansas Medical Center

35 Citing cases

  1. Walker v. Spina

    No. CIV 17-0991 JB\SCY (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2019)

    On the other hand, a physician who testifies as to an opinion he or she formulated in the course of treating a patient is generally providing factual information."). For instance, in Parker v. Central Kansas Medical Center, 57 F. App'x. 401, 404 (10th Cir. 2003)(unpublished), the Tenth Circuit held that the United States District Court for the District of Kansas did not err in striking the affidavit testimony of the plaintiff's treating physician, "conclud[ing] that [the physician's] opinion as to the standard of care and causation was expert testimony relating to treatment beyond that which was incidental to her personal care and treatment." 57 F. App'x at 404 (noting that the plaintiff's treating physician "should have been identified as an expert" to allow the physician to "testify to the standard of care and causation").

  2. Peshlakai v. Ruiz

    No. CIV 13-0752 JB/ACT (D.N.M. Dec. 7, 2013)

    . The Court finds that Scherer v. U.S. Department of Education, Parker v. Central Kansas Medical Center, 57 F. App'x. 401 (10th Cir. 2003)(unpublished), Hirpa v. IHC Hospitals., Inc., 50 F. App'x 928 (10th Cir. 2002)(unpublished), Searcy v. Social Security Administration., 956 F.2d 278, 1992 WL 43490 (10th Cir. 1998)(unpublished), In re Hopkins, 162 F.3d 1173, 1998 WL 704710 (10th Cir. 1998)(unpublished), and Ellsworth v. Tuttle, 148 F. App'x 653 (10th Cir. 2005)(unpublished), and have persuasive value with respect to material issues and will assist the Court in its disposition of this Memorandum Opinion and Order. "Allegations will not be stricken as immaterial under this rule unless they have no possible bearing on the controversy."

  3. Montoya v. Sheldon

    286 F.R.D. 602 (D.N.M. 2012)   Cited 46 times
    Concluding that the plaintiff's treating physician could testify as a lay witness to the facts and circumstances of the plaintiff's treatment but could not testify that the defendants' alleged unconstitutional conduct caused plaintiff's mental condition because such testimony must be qualified as expert testimony under Rule 702 and because mental disorders are complicated and beyond a lay witness' realm of experience

    Under the amended rule 701, " a treating physician who has not been identified as an expert witness pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) may not provide testimony beyond the scope of her treatment of plaintiff and [the physician's] conclusions must fall within the province of a lay witness." Parker v. Cent. Kansas Med. Ctr., 57 Fed.Appx. 401, 404 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished opinion)(quoting Parker v. Cent. Kansas Med. Ctr., 178 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1210 (D.Kan.2001))(internal quotations omitted). In Parker v. Cent. Kansas Med. Ctr., the Tenth Circuit held that the United States District Court for the District of Kansas did not err in striking the affidavit testimony of the plaintiff's treating physician, " conclud[ing] that [the physician's] opinion as to the standard of care and causation was expert testimony relating to treatment beyond that which was incidental to her personal care and treatment."

  4. Cameron v. Bartel Truck Line, L.L.C.

    Case No. CIV-14-553-R (W.D. Okla. Dec. 2, 2014)

    Weese v. Schukman, No. 91-1481-MLB, 1994 WL 326660, at *2 (D. Kan. June 23, 1994). In contrast, in Parker v. Cent. Kansas Med. Ctr., 57 F. App'x 401, 404 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished), the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to strike a treating physician's affidavit because in that case, "the affidavit related to the standard of care regarding another physician's refusal to treat and to the causation of complications allegedly resulting from delay in treatment" (emphasis added). The Court distinguished Weese by noting that in Weese, Dr. Schukman "testified as to the standard of care and causation regarding his treatment of the plaintiff."

  5. Galuten v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist.

    No. 21-5007 (6th Cir. Jul. 20, 2021)   Cited 4 times

    See Ortiz-Lopez v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo Y Beneficiencia de P.R., 248 F.3d 29, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Without an expert witness through which to enter medical records or provide an opinion in support of their allegations that the defendant failed to 'appropriately screen' and 'stabilize' [the] emergency condition, allegedly causing [the patient's] death, plaintiffs could not satisfy their burden of proving an EMTALA violation."); Parker v. Cent. Kan. Med. Ctr., 57 Fed.Appx. 401, 406 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that a remand in an EMTALA case would be "futile" because the plaintiff "fail[ed] to properly or timely identify a medical expert witness[ or provide] expert medical testimony establishing a nexus between CKMC's . . . alleged violation of EMTALA and Mrs. Parker's medical complications . . . .")

  6. Romine v. St. Joseph Health Sys.

    541 F. App'x 614 (6th Cir. 2013)   Cited 17 times
    In Romine, we affirmed a grant of summary judgment against a plaintiff who cut his hand with scissors, was bleeding profusely, experienced lengthy delays at an emergency room, and was eventually airlifted to another hospital to receive sutures.

    The Tenth Circuit has described a causal "nexus" which a plaintiff must establish between her injury and the alleged EMTALA violation. Parker v. Cent. Kan. Med. Ctr., 57 F.App'x. 401, 406 (10th Cir. 2003). There is no bright line rule that a plaintiff must adduce expert testimony to satisfy the causation burden, though it is often helpful to a jury.

  7. Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exch.

    432 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2005)   Cited 456 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the calculation of the arithmetical mean of 103 numbers was "well within the ability of anyone with a grade-school education" and "aptly characterized as a lay opinion"

    A summary judgment affidavit may not contain expert testimony unless the affiant has first been designated an expert witness under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2). Parker v. Cent. Kan. Med. Ctr., 178 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1210 (D.Kan. 2001), aff'd, 57 Fed. Appx. 401, 404 (10th Cir. 2003). Otherwise, any non-expert testimony in the form of opinions or inferences must be "(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of the fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."

  8. Tyler v. United States

    No. CIV-19-01102-JD (W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2025)

    Under the amended Rule 701, “a treating physician who has not been identified as an expert witness pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) may not provide testimony beyond the scope of her treatment of [the] plaintiff, and [the physician's] conclusions must fall within the province of a lay witness.” Parker v. Cent. Kan. Med. Ctr., 57 Fed.Appx. 401, 404 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Notably, “[t]here is some gray area between lay and expert testimony when the lay witness has expertise and used that expertise to make first-hand observations.”

  9. Labertew v. WinRed, Inc.

    2:21-cv-555-TC (D. Utah Sep. 24, 2024)

    E.g., United States v. Powers, 578 Fed.Appx. 763, 775 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Although the Tenth Circuit has not defined the bounds of permissible testimony for a treating physician as a lay witness, it seems that it is permissible for a treating physician to provide testimony about the treatment of the physician's patients”) (citation omitted); Parker v. Cent. Kansas Med. Ctr., 57 Fed.Appx. 401, 404 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that treating physician's testimony about the scope of treatment is not expert testimony); Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 1999) (a “treating physician is not considered an expert witness if he or she testifies about observations based on personal knowledge, including the treatment of the party” and may, as a lay witness, “state ‘expert' facts . . . to explain his testimony” and use “medical terminology”). Dr. Kagen's declaration, in part, sets out his personal knowledge of his patient's treatment

  10. Waite v. Eduro Healthcare, LLC

    1:22-cv-986 KG/KRS (D.N.M. Jul. 31, 2024)

    s “good cause requirement” to extend their scheduling order deadlines before the court considers whether to allow amendment to a complaint under Rule 15); Okla. ex rel. Doak v. Acrisure Bus. Outsourcing Servs., LLC, 529 Fed.Appx. 886, 891 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding no abuse of discretion when the district court refused to amend the scheduling order to extend all deadlines- including expert designations-because the moving party failed to show good cause for the extension); Parker v. Cent. Kan. Med. Ctr., 178 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1210 (D. Kan. 2001) (denying plaintiff's request to extend expert deadline because “plaintiff offer[ed] no reason, let alone a showing of good cause, why she was unable to procure an expert within the disclosure deadline to testify as to causation and why she should be allowed an additional sixty days in which to obtain an expert”), aff'd on other grounds, 57 Fed.Appx. 401 (10th Cir. 2003).