Moreover, in the Etheridge case the Court said, "We have never understood that, in law, either a tenant or cropper is a servant of the landlord." See also Parker v. Brown, 136 N.C. 280, 48 S.E. 657. And in Tucker v. Yarn Mill Co., supra, in opinion by Connor, J., it is declared: "It is well settled by the decisions of this Court that ordinarily a landlord owes no duty to the tenant to repair the premises, and is not liable for personal injuries sustained by the tenant, although such injuries are caused by the negligent breach of an agreement to repair."
Mr. J.W. LeGrand, for appellant, cites: Sec. 1754 of thestatute law of North Carolina: 93 N.C. 47; 126 N.C. 136; 88 N.C. 101; 93 N.C. 43; 139 N.C. 326. Messrs. Stevenson, Stevenson Prince, for respondent, cite: As to the right in North Carolina of a tenant to sellhis crop: Revised Statutes of North Carolina, sections 1993-94 and 98; 136 N.C. 280; 104 N.C. 229; sec. 2052 of the Revised Statutes; 78 N.C. 100; 93 N.C. 87; 120 N.C. 75; 90 N.C. ___; 98 N.C. 214; 139 N.C. 526. March 20, 1918.
It would not be right, nor is it the law, as we think, that (153) plaintiff should be charged with the value of work done upon the land, except to the extent that she has received a benefit therefrom. If the contract provided specifically that defendant should receive back exactly what she had paid out, or the value of the work and labor and of the improvements, without regard to the enhancement in value of the land, the case would be different. But the deed says that she should have pay for all she has done for the plaintiff — that is, the value of the service rendered to her in work, labor, and improvements. Gorman v. Bellamy, 82 N.C. 497; Tussey v. Owen, 139 N.C. 457; Chamblee v. Baker, 95 N.C. 100; Parker v. Brown, 136 N.C. 280. It could not properly be said to have been done for her, in a legal sense, if of no benefit to her. If she had contracted for the particular work and a wage or price was stated, she would be liable for it; but if none was expressed, the law will imply a promise to pay the reasonable value of the work and labor, that being the measure of recovery, as upon a quantum meruit. It follows, therefore, that in adjusting the difference between the parties the plaintiff will recover the land and its rental value during the occupancy of defendant, and the latter will recover the value of all services rendered, including any increase in value of the land by reason of the improvements placed thereon by her. This is the fair and equitable rule, and the more so as the deed was not annulled by the sole act of the plaintiff, but by the concurrence of both.
In Cotton v. Willoughby, 83 N.C. 75, Smith, C. J., said: "If the plaintiffs recover, they will hold as trustees, and, as all interested in the fund are before the Court, we see no reason why in the present proceedings the mortgage may not be foreclosed, the equities involved adjusted and the whole matter finally adjudicated in the action." In Parker v. Brown, 136 N.C. 280, an action in several respects like this, we said: "If she had a legal right, of which the defendant has deprived her, the Court will find and administer a remedy corresponding to her right." What, therefore, was the plaintiff's right in respect to the crop?
The trial court's entry of judgment in accordance with the jury's finding that the defendant was obligated to the plaintiff to the extent of the market value of plaintiff's labor was error. It is true that a "cropper" who, through no fault of his own, surrenders the leasehold before harvesting the crop has been held to have an interest in the proceeds of the sale of the crop. Parker v. Brown, 136 N.C. 280, 48 S.E. 657 (1904). However, the case at bar is distinguishable on its facts from Parker in that no crop had been planted in which plaintiff could claim an interest at the time he surrendered the leasehold.
Lichtenfels v. Bank, 260 N.C. 146, 148, 132 S.E.2d 360, 362; accord, Dobbs, supra, 4.3, at 252-53. See also Parker v. Brown, 136 N.C. 280, 48 S.E. 657, for application to an agricultural tenancy. The appropriate method for determining the exact amount which may be due the plaintiff, if anything, is to require the defendant, who is in possession of the essential information, to render an accounting.