Opinion
C.A. No. 04C-05-037 WLW.
Submitted: January 23, 2006.
Decided: April 27, 2006.
Upon Defendant's Emergency Motion for Stay of Execution on Court's Order in Ejectment and Motion to Reopen. Granted.
Frederick A. Townsend, III, Esquire of Schmittinger and Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Benjamin A. Schwartz, Esquire of Schwartz Schwartz, Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Defendant.
ORDER
Defendant, Emily Bray, filed a motion to reopen or vacate the default judgment along with an emergency motion for a stay of execution, which this Court granted on December 5, 2005. In support of her motion to reopen, Defendant claims that process was defective because it was addressed to Emily Brady, as opposed to Emily Bray. Also, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's mother, Gertrude Parker ("Gertrude"), sold the property to Plaintiff because the Justice of the Peace Court Number 16 told her that she would face civil sanctions if she filed another suit on the same issues, because she had four previous suits dismissed. Defendant alleges that she attempted to seek assistance from court personnel, the Attorney General's office, and a legal aid office to defend this matter on the merits. Finally, Defendant claims that if she is allowed to reopen the case, she will be successful in proving that she is the true owner of the property at issue, both because she purchased the property and by adverse possession.
Defendant also sent a letter to this Court providing another reason for reopening this case on January 23, 2006. In the letter, Defendant argues that upon review of the metes and bounds of the property at issue, it appears that her home is not on the property belonging to Plaintiff. Defendant also points out that a description of the property is not included in any of the pleadings or moving papers, except in the deed from Gertrude Parker to Plaintiff. Thus, Defendant asserts that discovery is necessary.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is mischaracterizing the Justice of the Peace Court Order instructing Gertrude not to file any more cases on these issues. Plaintiff claims that the only reason for the Court's order was that she was filing an ejectment action, and the Court did not have jurisdiction. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant had notice because she wrote a letter to this Court dated October 4, 2004. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant did not establish excusable neglect, or that the outcome will be different should this Court vacate the default judgment.
Discussion
Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b)(1) states, "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . . ."
In Young v. Reynoso, this Court opined:
2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 280, at *4.
A motion to set aside a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) lies within the reasoned discretion of the Court. However, liberality is highly favored where the opening of default judgments is concerned because of a basic underlying policy preferring determination of an action on the merits. If a judgment is sought to be reopened on the ground of excusable neglect, such excusable neglect is demonstrated when the conduct of the moving party is the conduct of a reasonably prudent person.
Additionally, in Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Baldwin Line Constr. Co., this Court stated:
2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 124, at *3-4.
[a]lthough Delaware courts afford Rule 60(b) `liberal construction,' the movant still must satisfy three elements before a motion under that rule will be granted: (1) excusable neglect in the conduct that allowed the default judgment to be taken; (2) a meritorious defense to the action that would allow a different outcome to the litigation if the matter was heard on its merits; and (3) a showing that substantial prejudice will not be suffered by the plaintiff if the motion is granted.
Based on the foregoing statute and case law, it is within the discretion of this Court to decide whether to reopen the case. Defendant contends that she attempted to seek legal assistance concerning this matter. While her efforts to defend and retain counsel may be too little and too late, I am inclined to weigh on the side of preference for a hearing on the merits. She affirmatively alleges that she is the owner of the property either through a sale or adverse possession. If proven, this may be a defense to the cause of action. The case of Justice v. McGinn is a case decided on the merits and is not helpful. I find that in the exercise of this Court's discretion it would be appropriate to allow the default judgment to be vacated. There is no evidence that Plaintiff would be substantially prejudiced if the case were reopened. Thus, the requirements for reopening the case are met.
1998 Del. Ch. WL 229436.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion to Reopen is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.