The appellate court found these damages to be appropriate and stated its opinion to be that the cost of remedying the defects or deficiencies is the proper measure of the damages for the defective or deficient construction. ( Hanavan, at 580.) To the same effect is the holding in Park v. Sohn (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 794, which also involved water seepage damage, as did the case of Garcia v. Hynes Howes Real Estate, Inc. (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 479. In Weck v. A:M Sunrise Construction Co. (1962), 36 Ill. App.2d 383, 396, the appellate court held that the proper measure of damages was the reasonable charges "necessary to make the house habitable."

After a bench trial in the circuit court of Tazewell County, the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on both counts. The appellate court reversed the judgment as to count I. The court reversed as to count II and remanded the cause for a new trial as to damages only. ( 90 Ill. App.3d 794.) We granted the defendants' petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (73 Ill.2d R. 315).

This has been recognized in Tassan v. United Development Co. (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 581, 584 (in which one of the defects claimed was `[t]here was inadequate drainage of the surface waters in front of the building'); Kramp v. Showcase Builders (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 17, 21 (defects in the septic system). See also Park v. Sohn (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 794, 798, aff'd [ in part, rev'd in part] (1982), 89 Ill.2d 453, as here material (faulty septic system and drain tiles). * * * We perceive no real distinction between the buildings and the common land in the application of the public policy protecting a purchaser of a new or reasonably new home from latent defects in the building or the required amenities since the purchaser in a substantial degree must rely in either case on the expertise of the building-vendor creating the defect.

In fact, prior to Petersen, the warranty of habitability was found to be violated only where a home did not keep out the elements, did not provide a reasonably safe place to live, or was not structurally sound. See Park v. Sohn, 90 Ill. App.3d 794, 797-98 (1980), aff'd in part rev'd in part on other grounds, 89 Ill.2d 453 (1982). Consequently, in order to clarify the implied warranty of habitability, we stated that the meaning of habitability in the context of a new home purchase might more accurately be conveyed through language similar to that used in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) warranties of merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose.

In fact, prior to Petersen, the warranty of habitability was found to be violated only where a home did not keep out the elements or provide a reasonably safe place to live. Park v. Sohn, 90 Ill.App.3d 794, 797–98, 46 Ill.Dec. 279, 414 N.E.2d 1, 3–4 (1980). The supreme court therefore suggested that the meaning of the warranty would be more accurately conveyed through language similar to the language used in the Uniform Commercial Code's warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

In fact, prior to Petersen, the warranty of habitability was found to be violated only where a home did not keep out the elements or provide a reasonably safe place to live. Park v. Sohn, 90 Ill. App. 3d 794, 797-98, 414 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1980). The supreme court therefore suggested that the meaning of the warranty would be more accurately conveyed through language similar to the language used in the Uniform Commercial Code's warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

This has been recognized in Tassan v. United Development Co. (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 581, 584 (in which one of the defects claimed was "[t]here was inadequate drainage of the surface waters in front of the building"); Kramp v. Showcase Builders (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 17, 21 (defects in the septic system). See also Park v. Sohn (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 794, 798, aff'd (1982), 89 Ill.2d 453, as here material (faulty septic system and drain tiles). • 3 Under the terms of the purchase agreement, the Declaration was to be delivered to the purchaser of a townhouse together with the deed.

Nevertheless, cases decided both before and after Petersen have held that the measure of damages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability is the cost of repair. ( Colsant v. Goldschmidt (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 53, 57-58, 421 N.E.2d 1073; Park v. Sohn (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 794, 799, 414 N.E.2d 1, appeal allowed, October 19, 1981, Docket 54568); Hanavan v. Dye (1972), 4 Ill. App.3d 576, 580, 281 N.E.2d 398; Weck v. A:M Sunrise Construction Co. (1962), 36 Ill. App.2d 383, 396, 184 N.E.2d 728.) Unlike the instant case, however, the repairs in these cases did not entail unreasonable destruction of the premises, nor was the cost of repairs grossly disproportionate to the results obtained.

Separation of the chimney and wall from the rest of the house, with the resulting invasion of the elements, violates that warranty. ( Park v. Sohn (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 794, 414 N.E.2d 1.) Recovery for the patio is based on negligence only. Unless he has disclaimed the warranty ( Petersen), a builder should be liable until expiration of the applicable statute of limitations for the cost of repairing a house that is falling apart.