Opinion
CV-24-08177-PCT-JAT
10-10-2024
Martine Park, Plaintiff, v. Brenda Halvorson, Defendant.
ORDER
James A. Teilborg Senior United States District Judge
This case was recently reassigned to the undersigned because it is related to CV 24-8176-PCT-JAT, which was also assigned to the undersigned. In fact, the complaint that is the basis for the notice of removal in CV 24-8176 is nearly identical to the complaints in CV 24-8177 and CV 24-8178. These three cases were removed from a state court; it is unclear why these cases were not consolidated as a single case.
In CV 24-8176, this Court concluded that there was not federal subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the Court stated:
Plaintiff, pro se, filed this case in Flagstaff Justice Court. Plaintiff's complaint is in a narrative form that generally alleges that Defendant, Lon Halvorson, is responsible for Plaintiff's unpaid medical debts. (Doc. 1-1 at 14). Plaintiff claims she “worked hard” for Defendant's company, which the Court interprets as an allegation that Plaintiff formerly worked for Defendant and that her claim for payment of her medical bills arises from that relationship. (Id.).
Defendant removed this case to federal court claiming it arises under ERISA. (Doc. 1 at 2). Specifically, although the narrative complaint does not say this, Defendant asserts: “Plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim for benefits under a Group Medical Plan (‘the Plan') provided by Defendant's former employer. The Plan is an employee welfare benefit plan established by the employer and is governed by ... ERISA.” (Id.).
Notwithstanding his argument that this case arises under ERISA,
Defendant claims that he cannot be sued under ERISA because he is not a proper Defendant under ERISA. (Doc. 6 at 1-2). Specifically, Defendant states, “Defendant denies that he is a proper defendant in this matter, denies having any legal responsibility for the losses alleged to be incurred by Plaintiff, and denies that any of the actions or decisions alleged in the Complaint can legally be imputed to him.” (Id.). Defendant's denials undercut his argument that this case arises under ERISA because, typically, when a case really “arises” under ERISA, a defendant who is responsible for payment of benefits under an ERISA plan is sued.
Additionally, the Court has read the complaint multiple times, and while the legal basis for the complaint is unclear, what is clear is that Plaintiff claims Lon Halvorson owes the money for her unpaid medical debt. (Doc. 1-1 at 14). Specifically, Plaintiff claims, “[Lon Halvorson was] to pay $6500 of the medical bills and I was to pay around 600....” (Id.). In other words, Plaintiff does not suggest that an insurance company (through an ERISA plan or otherwise) improperly denied her benefits. Thus, it is not at all clear to this Court that Plaintiff is making a claim for benefits that would invoke ERISA Jurisdiction.
Based on the foregoing, the Court is doubtful it has subject matter jurisdiction because it is unclear that this case actually arises under ERISA.Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass 'n, 479 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, the Court is not inclined to read into Plaintiff's complaint claims that are not present solely to create federal subject matter jurisdiction. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Defendant's interpretation of the complaint is very favorable to him because he claims he cannot be liable under ERISA.
Moreover, if this case in fact arises under ERISA, the Court is in a procedural conundrum. Defendant answered the complaint and did not move to dismiss, which triggers a scheduling order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. Typically, an ERISA scheduling order requires the defendant to file the administrative record, then the parties file opening, response and reply briefs regarding the claim for benefits based on the administrative record. Here, however, based on Defendant's answer, Defendant presumably does not have the administrative record and would argue he is not the proper party to brief the benefits issue. Conversely, if this Court issued a traditional scheduling order setting deadlines for completing discovery and disclosing experts, that would be inconsistent with an ERISA case. There is no realistic way for this Court to process a case in which Defendant claims the case arises under ERISA while simultaneously claiming (via the answer) that this case cannot proceed under ERISA.
Finally, it is the burden of the party asserting federal subject matter jurisdiction to establish jurisdiction. Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990). In this case, Defendant removed the case to federal court and, thus, has the burden. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to sustain his burden of showing that this case arises under ERISA. If at any point Plaintiff amends her complaint to make a claim for benefits that more clearly invokes ERISA, Defendant can re-removed to federal court. But on this record, the Court cannot conclude that this case arises under ERISA.Park v. Halvorson, CV 24-8176-PCT-JAT (October 2, 2024) (footnotes in original).
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94, (1998) (federal courts may raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte).
See generally Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (discussing who qualifies as a proper defendant under ERISA).
CV 24-8178-PCT-JJT was also remanded to state court. Specifically, that Court stated:
Federal courts may exercise removal jurisdiction over a case only if subject matter jurisdiction exists. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). The removing party is required to provide a signed notice of removal that contains a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The removing party carries the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, and doubts about federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The district court must remand the case if it appears before final judgment that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
As Judge Teilborg found in a sister case in this District, the allegations in the Complaint do not lead the Court to the conclusion that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. (See Case No. CV-24-08176-PCT-JAT, Doc. 7.) Plaintiff brings her claim for payment of a portion of her medical bills against Defendant as an individual based on an alleged contractual agreement; Plaintiff does not allege an insurance company or other ERISA plan administrator improperly denied her medical benefits to which she was entitled. Plaintiff is the master of her Complaint and, as Judge Teilborg observed, the Court cannot read allegations into Plaintiff's Complaint that are not present to establish subject matter jurisdiction. (Case No. CV-24-08176-PCT-JAT, Doc. 7.) Accordingly, the Court must remand this case to Flagstaff Justice Court.(Doc. 7 in CV 24-8178).
This Court reaches the same conclusion, for the same reason, in this case. Specifically, the complaint indicates that Brenda Halvorson personally owes Plaintiff the money for unpaid medical debts. (Doc. 1-1 at 12). Plaintiff does not claim that she was denied benefits through an ERISA plan or otherwise. Thus, Defendant has failed to sustain its burden, on removal, of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED remanding this case to the Flagstaff Justice Court, County of Coconino, due to lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
ORDER
I. Procedural History
On August 12, 2024, Plaintiff Gabriel Vanier-Pop, who is represented by counsel, filed a Complaint (Doc. 1-1 at 6-13) in the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, against the State of Arizona, Caleb Williams, and fictitiously named individuals. On August 29, 2024, Defendants State of Arizona and Caleb Williams filed a Notice of Removal and removed the case to this Court. On September 5, 2024, Defendants State of Arizona and Williams answered the Complaint.
The citation refers to the document and page number generated by the Court's Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system.
II. Removal
A state court defendant may remove to federal court any civil action brought in the state court over which the federal district courts would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. This Court's jurisdiction extends to such claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a federal court has original jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). The Notice of Removal was filed within 30 days of Defendants State of Arizona and Caleb Williams being served, and the Removing Defendants indicate that all properly served Defendants consent to the removal. It therefore appears this case was timely and properly removed.
III. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity, regardless of whether the prisoner is represented by counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (“District courts are required to screen all civil cases brought by prisoners, regardless of whether the inmate paid the full filing fee, is a pauper, is self-represented, or is represented by counsel, as [§ 1915A] does not differentiate between civil actions brought by prisoners.”). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
Plaintiff's two-count Complaint adequately states an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Williams and a negligence claim against Defendant State of Arizona.
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against unknown corrections staff, which Plaintiff has identified as “Building Three Doe Defendants” and “Building Two Doe Defendants,” consists of vague and conclusory allegations against groups of Defendants, without any factual specificity as to what any particular Defendant did or failed to do. This is insufficient. See Marcilis v. Twp. of Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding dismissal of Bivens complaint that referred to all defendants “generally and categorically” because the plaintiff had failed to “‘allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.'” (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008))); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Given the complaint's use of either the collective term ‘Defendants' or a list of the defendants named individually but with no distinction as to what acts are attributable to whom, it is impossible for any of these individuals to ascertain what particular unconstitutional acts they are alleged to have committed.”). Moreover, Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to include the names of the parties in the action. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice the fictitiously named Defendants.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Defendants Does 1-100, which includes “Building Three Doe Defendants” and “Building Two Doe Defendants,” are dismissed without prejudice.
(2) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
(3) This matter is assigned to the standard track pursuant to Rule 16.2(b)(3) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure.