Parisi v. Leppard

17 Citing cases

  1. Park Place at Malta, LLC v. Berkshire Bank

    148 A.D.3d 1414 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    Plaintiff's mere speculation that Matejek "must have" told Rosen about LeCesse's purported $7.5 million "offer" was patently insufficient to defeat the summary judgment motion (see Lichtman v. Mount Judah Cemetery, 269 A.D.2d 319, 321, 705 N.Y.S.2d 23 [2000], lv. dismissed and denied 95 N.Y.2d 860, 714 N.Y.S.2d 704, 737 N.E.2d 946 [2000] ; Parisi v. Leppard, 237 A.D.2d 419, 420, 655 N.Y.S.2d 546 [1997] ). Even assuming, arguendo, that defendants delayed the meeting with plaintiff and LeCesse and disclosed LeCesse's "offer" to Rosen to encourage Juno Malta to purchase the loan, plaintiff failed to show how such disclosure and sale injured it or what its injuries were.

  2. Universal v. Dan McKinnon

    37 A.D.3d 705 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 2 times

    In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the motion for summary judgment was not premature since the plaintiff failed to show that the discovery it sought would lead to relevant evidence that would raise a triable issue of fact ( see Schatz v St. Paul Fire Mar. Ins. Co., 269 AD2d 380; Parisi v Leppard, 237 AD2d 419, 420; Carrington v City of New York, 201 AD2d 525, 527).

  3. Water Club Homeowner's v. Town Board

    16 A.D.3d 678 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 5 times

    Accordingly, paragraph 9 of the Restrictive Covenant is not illegal and the Town Board was entitled to a declaration to that effect. With respect to the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a fourth cause of action for a declaration that the ad valorem taxes levied for the maintenance and improvement of the Park District were illegal in light of the Restrictive Covenant, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion as the claim was patently lacking in merit ( see Whitney-Carrington v. New York Methodist Hosp., 289 AD2d 326, 327; Parisi v. Leppard, 237 AD2d 419). Not only are the restrictions on the use of certain facilities within the Park District self-imposed, but the plaintiffs concede that they have the right to use the beach and the shuttle-bus service. An ad valorem tax will not be deemed invalid unless the taxpayer's benefit received from the imposition of the tax is reduced "`to the point where it is, in effect, nonexistent'" ( Sysco Corp. v. Town of Hempstead, 227 AD2d 544, 545, quoting Matterof Sperry Rand Corp. v. Town of N. Hempstead, 53 Misc 2d 970, 973, affd 29 AD2d 968, affd 23 NY2d 666).

  4. Johnson v. Huff Enterprises

    303 A.D.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)

    The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit (see CPLR 3025[b], [c]; Labor Law § 200; Parisi v. Leppard, 237 A.D.2d 419, 420; Monaco v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 213 A.D.2d 167; Comes v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876; O'Gorman v. Gold Shield Sec. Investigation, 221 A.D.2d 325; Bernal v. Pinkerton's Inc., 52 A.D.2d 760, affd 41 N.Y.2d 938). RITTER, J.P., McGINITY, TOWNES and MASTRO, JJ., concur.

  5. Whitney-Carrington v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp

    289 A.D.2d 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 12 times
    Denying motion to amend to add EMTALA claim where patient was admitted and operated on due to pregnancy complications

    The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint to allege a cause of action against the defendant New York Methodist Hospital based upon the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (42 U.S.C. — 1395dd). While CPLR 3025(b) provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just", if the proposed amendment is "patently lacking in merit", it will not be permitted, and leave should be denied as a matter of law (Parisi v. Leppard, 237 A.D.2d 419, 419-420; see, Zabas v. Kard, 194 A.D.2d 784). In this case, the proposed amendment was patently without merit (see, Reynolds v. MaineGeneral Health, 218 F.3d 78, 83; Vickers v. Nash General Hosp., 78 F.3d 139, 145; Lear v. Genesee Mem. Hosp., 254 A.D.2d 707).

  6. Bonnen v. Chiang

    (N.Y. App. Div. May. 17, 2000)

    The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs' cross motion to amend their complaint and bill of particulars. While it is recognized that leave to amend a pleading may be freely granted (see, CPLR 3025[a]), leave should be denied as a matter of law where, as here, the proposed amendment is plainly lacking in merit (see, Parisi v. Leppard, 237 A.D.2d 419; McKiernan v. McKiernan, 207 A.D.2d 825). In addition, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

  7. BONNEN v. CHIN HUA CHIANG

    272 A.D.2d 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 5 times

    The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs' cross motion to amend their complaint and bill of particulars. While it is recognized that leave to amend a pleading may be freely granted (see, CPLR 3025[a]), leave should be denied as a matter of law where, as here, the proposed amendment is plainly lacking in merit (see, Parisi v. Leppard, 237 A.D.2d 419; McKiernan v. McKiernan, 207 A.D.2d 825). In addition, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

  8. Schatz v. St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance

    269 A.D.2d 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)

    Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The grant of summary judgment was not premature since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that further discovery would uncover any triable issue of fact (see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562;Parisi v. Leppard, 237 A.D.2d 419; Carrington v. City of New York, 201 A.D.2d 525, 527). Moreover, the evidence submitted by the defendant demonstrated a lack of coverage for which no prompt disclaimer was required (see, Handelsman v. Sea Ins. Co., 85 N.Y.2d 96, 99; Zappone v. Home Ins. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 131, 132).

  9. Perrini v. City of New York

    262 A.D.2d 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 10 times

    The Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiffs' request to amend the complaint and bill of particulars to allege a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b)(1). While it is well settled that leave to amend shall be freely given in the absence of prejudice to the opponent ( see, CPLR 3025[b]; Edenwald Contr. Co. v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 957), permission to amend should be denied where the proposed amendment clearly lacks merit ( see, Parisi v. Leppard, 237 A.D.2d 419; ICC Bridgeport Ltd. Partnership v. Primrose Dev. Corp., 221 A.D.2d 417; McKiernan v. McKiernan, 207 A.D.2d 825). Since both the hazardous condition contemplated by 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b)(1) and the safety precautions mandated therein are clearly inapplicable to the situation presented in this case, the proposed amendment patently lacks merit and permission to amend should have been denied ( see generally, Finch v. Conrail, 241 A.D.2d 952; Farrell v. Dick Enters., 227 A.D.2d 956).

  10. Jara v. City of New York

    2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 31718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)

    , 81 NY2d 494, 601 NYS2d 49, 618 NE2d 82 (1993); DeHaen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 NY 350, 179 NE 764; Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison, Co., 78 NY2d 509, 577 NYS2d 219 (1991); DelVecchio v. State of New York, 246 AD2d 498, 667 NYS2d 401 (2nd Dept., 1998); Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 NY2d 487, 634 NYS2d 35 (1995); Paredes v. 1668 Realty Associates, LLC, 110 AD3d 700, 972 NYS2d 304 (2nd Dept., 2013); Mendoza v. Bayridge Parkway Associates, LLC, 38 AD3d 505, 831 NYS2d 485 (2nd Dept., 2007); Baker v. Barron Educational Service Corp., 248 AD2d 655, 670 NYS2d 587 (2nd Dept., 1998); Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 NY2d 259, 727 NYS2d 37 (2001); Rudnik v. Brogor Realty Corp., 45 AD3d 828, 847 NYS2d 141 (2nd Dept., 2007); Blake v. Neighborhood Housing Services of New York City, 1 NY3d 280, 771 NYS2d 484 (2003); Sung Kyu-To v. Triangle Equities, LLC, 84 AD3d 1058, 923 NYS2d 628 (2nd Dept., 2011); Laquidara v. HRH Const. Corp., 283 AD2d 169, 724 NYS2d 53 (1st Dept., 2001); Parisi v. Leppard, 237 AD2d 419, 655 NYS2d 546 (2nd Dept., 1997); Avant v. Cepin Livery, 74 AD3d 533, 904 NYS2d 381 (2nd Dept., 2010); Garcia v. Lenox Hill Florist III, Inc., 120 AD3d 1296 (2nd Dept., 2014); Norero v. 99-105 Third Avenue Realty, LLC, 96 AD3d 727, 945 NYS2d 720 (2nd Dept., 2012) [Plaintiff 1, Exhs. A-P; Plaintiff 2 Memorandum of Law; Defendants Opposition 3, Exhs. A-D; Plaintiff Reply Affirmation 4, Exhs. A-B]. In their Affirmation in Opposition, dated November 15, 2018, Defendants City, NYCDOE and NYCSCA emphasize that Court of Appeals and Second Department decisions require the denial of Plaintiff's motion as premature because it is a Labor Law Section 249(1) case.