"These principles govern all mandamus actions, even those involving presumed approvals of site plans." Summitwood Associates Phase IV v. Planning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 391584 (August 7, 1998, Blue, J.) (22 Conn. Law. Rptr. 660, 664) citing Par Developers, Ltd. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 37 Conn.App. 348, 353-54, 655 A.2d 1164 (1995). Jalowiec argues that it is entitled to a certificate of approval for its application under General Statutes §§ 8-3(g) and 8-7d(b).
The legislature's adoption of Public Act 92-191 manifests an intention to limit the circumstances under which a planning commission can refuse to process and reach the merits of an application. The decision in Winchester Woods Associates is consistent with our decision in Par Developers, Ltd. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 37 Conn. App. 348, 655 A.2d 1164 (1995). In Par Developers, Ltd., § 4.7 of a town's subdivision regulations provided that, if land in a proposed subdivision was located in a wetlands or watercourse area, a copy of the application must be filed with the wetlands commission.
Next, we address the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly decided that the site plan application violated city zoning regulations. Relying on the Appellate Court's decision in Par Developers, Ltd. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 37 Conn. App. 348, 655 A.2d 1164 (1995), the trial court declined to issue a writ of mandamus because it found that the plaintiff's application violated § 720.12.2 of the city zoning regulations. See id., 354 ("[w]here the effect of automatic approval would result in a questionable certificate of approval because another law is violated, the plaintiff's right to have the duty performed is far from clear").
In hearing administrative appeals such as the present one, the Superior Court acts as an appellate body. See General Statutes § 4–183 (j) ; see also Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council , 286 Conn. 57, 85, 942 A.2d 345 (2008) (noting that Superior Court sits "in an appellate capacity" when reviewing administrative appeal); Par Developers, Ltd. v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 37 Conn. App. 348, 353, 655 A.2d 1164 (1995) (distinguishing administrative appeals in which Superior Court "reviewed the agency's decision in an appellate capacity").The relevant facts, as gleaned from the amended return of record that was submitted by agreement of the parties, are largely undisputed.
In hearing administrative appeals such as the present one, the Superior Court acts as an appellate body. See General Statutes § 4–183(j) ; see also Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council , 286 Conn. 57, 85, 942 A.2d 345 (2008) (noting that Superior Court sits "in an appellate capacity" when reviewing administrative appeal); Par Developers, Ltd. v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 37 Conn. App. 348, 353, 655 A.2d 1164 (1995) (distinguishing administrative appeals in which Superior Court "reviewed the agency's decision in an appellate capacity").The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute.
In hearing administrative appeals such as the present one, the Superior Court acts as an appellate body. See General Statutes § 4-183 (j); see also Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 85, 942 A.2d 345 (2008) (noting that Superior Court sits "in an appellate capacity" when reviewing administrative appeal); Par Developers, Ltd. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 37 Conn. App. 348, 353, 655 A.2d 1164 (1995) (distinguishing administrative appeals in which Superior Court "reviewed the agency's decision in an appellate capacity"). The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute.
In hearing appeals from decisions of a planning and zoning commission, the Superior Court acts as an appellate body. See General Statutes § 8–8; see also Par Developers, Ltd. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 37 Conn.App. 348, 353, 655 A.2d 1164 (1995) (noting zoning appeals in which Superior Court “reviewed the agency's decision in an appellate capacity”).The relevant facts largely are undisputed. The plaintiff owns a 9.
In hearing appeals from decisions of a planning and zoning commission, the Superior Court acts as an appellate body. See General Statutes § 8–8; see also Par Developers, Ltd. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 37 Conn.App. 348, 353, 655 A.2d 1164 (1995) (noting zoning appeals in which Superior Court “reviewed the agency's decision in an appellate capacity”). At all relevant times, the defendant owned a 4.027 acre parcel of land known as 579 Main Street in Monroe (property).
In hearing appeals from decisions of a planning and zoning commission, the Superior Court acts as an appellate body. See General Statutes § 8–8; see also Par Developers, Ltd. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 37 Conn.App. 348, 353, 655 A.2d 1164 (1995) (noting zoning appeals in which Superior Court “reviewed the agency's decision in an appellate capacity”).At all relevant times, the defendant owned a parcel of land known as 240 Universal Drive North in North Haven (town) that abuts the plaintiff's property located at 100 Universal Drive North. The two parcels were separated by an access road located on the defendant's property, over which the plaintiff had an access easement.
In hearing the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the zoning board of appeals, the Superior Court acts as an appellate body. See General Statutes § 8-8; see also Par Developers, Ltd. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 37 Conn. App. 348, 353, 655 A.2d 1164 (1995) (noting zoning appeals in which Superior Court "reviewed the agency's decision in an appellate capacity"). At issue in this appeal is the storage of numerous motor vehicles and related debris on 64 Old Town Park Road, which is located in an R-40 residential zone of the town and at all relevant times was owned by the plaintiff.