Papageorge v. Banks

4 Citing cases

  1. In re Quivus Sys., LLC

    Case No. 17-00119 (Bankr. D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2017)

    (1) the . . . fee [of the person who would seek to enforce the allegedly champertous agreement] must come from the recovery in a successful lawsuit; (2) [that person] must have no independent claim to the recovery fund; and (3) the costs and expenses must be borne by [that person] with no expectation of reimbursement from the [other party to the allegedly champertous agreement].Papageorge v. Banks, 81 A.3d 311, 318 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Marshall v. Bickel, 445 A.2d 606, 609 (D.C. 1982)). An agreement meeting these three elements is termed "champertous" and deemed unenforceable.

  2. Papageorge v. Stuckey

    196 A.3d 426 (D.C. 2018)   Cited 1 times
    Noting that "when TOPA rights are effectively assigned, the assignee can ‘effectively become’ a tenant of the unit for purposes of applying the statute"

    Papageorge sued the Bankses for a portion of the proceeds from their settlement with ESB; the trial court granted summary judgment for the Bankses, but this court reversed and remanded. SeePapageorge v. Banks , 81 A.3d 311, 324 (D.C. 2013).More than nine months passed until, on or about October 30, ESB agreed to give a real estate broker the exclusive right to sell the property.

  3. Papageorge v. Zucker

    169 A.3d 861 (D.C. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    The trial court granted summary judgment against Mr. Papageorge, but this court reversed. SeePapageorge v. Banks , 81 A.3d 311, 313 (D.C. 2013). After our remand, Mr. Papageorge and Mr. Banks reached a settlement under which Mr. Banks gave Mr. Papageorge $20,000 in exchange for Mr. Papageorge's dismissal of the lawsuit with prejudice and release of his claims against Mr. Banks. The following month, Mr. Papageorge sued Mr. Banks's attorneys for conversion and, in the alternative, negligence.

  4. Atkins v. 4940 Wisconsin, LLC

    93 A.3d 1286 (D.C. 2014)   Cited 5 times

    ANALYSISMr. Atkins argues that the trial court erred by: (1) concluding that the Bankruptcy Trustee “abandoned” the personal injury claim; (2) failing to recognize that “[t]he Trustee has ratified Mr. Atkins' pursuit of the claim on behalf of the [bankruptcy] estate” rather than “as the debtor”; and (3) finding judicial estoppel applicable against the Trustee while failing to recognize that application of the judicial estoppel doctrine would be inequitable because it harms Mr. Atkins' creditors. “We review de novo [Mr. Atkins'] claim that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of [the LLC].” Papageorge v. Banks, 81 A.3d 311, 319 (D.C.2013) (citing Onyeoziri v. Spivok, 44 A.3d 279, 283 (D.C.2012)). Our analysis is guided by the following legal principles.