Summary
In Panzer v. Panzer (274 App. Div. 940) the court, in setting forth the test to be applied in determining whether severance should be directed, held: "The sole test consonant with the purpose of a counterclaim should be whether or not the counterclaim can be conveniently or justly determined in connection with the plaintiff's cause of action."
Summary of this case from Ippisch v. Moricz-SmithOpinion
November 15, 1948.
Action for a partnership dissolution and accounting, etc., wherein one of the defendants sets forth a counterclaim against the plaintiff to recover on a contract for the sale of stock. Order dismissing the counterclaim, without prejudice to the bringing of a separate action for the cause set forth therein, and the judgment entered on the order, reversed on the law and the facts, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion to dismiss the counterclaim denied, without costs. Plaintiff's time within which to reply to the counterclaim is extended until ten days after the entry of an order hereon. The sole test consonant with the purpose of a counterclaim should be whether or not the counterclaim can be conveniently and justly determined in connection with the plaintiff's cause of action. (Second Annual Report of N.Y. Judicial Council, 1936, pp. 117, 123.) In this case even if it be assumed that the counterclaim does not meet the test, it is not required at this stage to dismiss the counterclaim and relegate the party to the bringing of a separate action. Under section 262 of the Civil Practice Act, the court may sever the causes and order separate trials or, if necessary, direct the priority of the trials. Carswell, Acting P.J., Johnston, Adel, Sneed and Wenzel, JJ., concur.