The Illinois School Code provides that a tenured teacher may only be discharged for cause and is entitled upon request to a hearing prior to discharge. Panzella v. River Trails Sch. Dist. 26, Cook County, 313 Ill. App. 3d 527, 532, 729 N.E.2d 954, 958-959 (Ist Dist. 2000) (citing 105 ILCS 5/10-22.4). At any hearing, the teacher has the right to be present, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present her own evidence and witnesses in defense of the charges. Id. Those protections comport well with federal due process guarantees that before terminating a government employee who has a property interest in her job, the government must provide: (1) notice of the charges; (2) an explanation of the employer's evidence; and (3) an opportunity for the employee to respond to the charges.
This statute is rationally related to the public interest in that it seeks to protect the public from potentially dangerous health care workers and to maintain the integrity of the health care professions (see Consiglio, 2013 IL App(1st) 121142, ¶ 40); it is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. While Rodrigues argues that the Department had previously determined that she did not pose a threat to the public, the legislature has determined otherwise and now prohibits her from continuing in her profession. Panzella v. River Trails School District 26, Cook County, 313 Ill.App.3d 527, 534, 246 Ill.Dec. 303, 729 N.E.2d 954 (2000) (regarding a statute's amendment affecting school code, “the legislature has an ongoing right to amend a statute”); Gersch, 308 Ill.App.3d at 655–56, 242 Ill.Dec. 51, 720 N.E.2d 672 (the legislature may regulate a profession if the regulation has a rational basis to a legitimate legislative purpose that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory). The same due process argument that Rodrigues raises was rejected in the case of Bhalerao v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulations, because a rational basis for the Act was “readily discernible” as the government has a strong interest in regulating health care workers and protecting the public from those health care workers with convictions triggered by the Act.
[Citation.]" Panzella v. River Trails School District 26, 313 Ill. App. 3d 527, 535 (2000). Respondent contends, without citing authority, that "[t]here is no question that the impairment was substantial" since he was ordered to pay $150,000 to petitioner's counsel under section 501(c-1).
Plaintiffs also argue that application of the 1996 amendment would impair plaintiffs' contracts with ComEd. See Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 16; Panzella v. River Trails School District 26, 313 Ill.App.3d 527, 535, 246 Ill.Dec. 303, 729 N.E.2d 954 (2000) (Illinois Constitution prohibits the legislature from enacting laws that impair the obligation of contracts). Plaintiffs allege they possessed an "unquestioned right" under the ComEd contracts to sell electricity to ComEd at the retail rate for a period of 20 years.
It is well settled that "[t]he legislature has an ongoing right to amend a statute" and that "there is no vested right in the mere continuance of a law." Panzella v. River Trails School District 26, 313 Ill. App. 3d 527, 534, 729 N.E.2d 954, 960 (2000). Likewise, "[e]stoppel against public bodies is generally not favored and is allowed in only rare and unusual circumstances.