Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:01-CV-0066-P
January 7, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants the County of Dallas, Texas, Alejandro Garcia, and the Dallas County Constable's Office (collectively, "the Defendants") on September 25, 2003. Plaintiff filed his Response on October 27, 2003, and Defendants filed their Reply on November 24, 2003. After considering the parties' arguments and briefing, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Factual Background
On April 6, 1998, Plaintiff Manek R. Panthaky ("Plaintiff) was indicted by a Grand Jury in Midland County, Texas on a charge of criminal non-support. Appendix to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J."), Ex. 2. That same day, as a result of his indictment, a warrant for Plaintiffs arrest (the "Arrest Warrant") was issued by the 238th District Court of Midland County. App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 3.
Defendant Alejandro Garcia ("Garcia") is employed as a Deputy Constable with the Dallas County Constable's Office (the "Constable's Office"). App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 4 Order GRANTING Motion for Summary Judgment ("Garcia Aff."). On January 13, 1999, at approximately 4:00 PM, Garcia and another officer from the Constable's Office went to Plaintiffs apartment to execute the Arrest Warrant (the "January 13 Arrest"). Id. The facts surrounding the January 13 Arrest are largely in dispute. According to Garcia, the arrest was executed as follows. First, Garcia arrived at Plaintiffs apartment and knocked on the door. Id. Plaintiff answered the door, and Garcia identified himself as a peace officer and informed Plaintiff of the Arrest Warrant. Id. Plaintiff then "immediately turned away from the front door, and ran back into the apartment." Id. Garcia attempted to restrain Plaintiff by placing his hand on Plaintiffs shoulder. Id. Plaintiff then turned and headed back toward the front door, where he was met by the accompanying officer. Id. The accompanying officer instructed Plaintiff to stop, but Plaintiff "continued toward the door with his hands outstretched in a threatening manner." Id. Garcia then restrained Plaintiff and placed him in handcuffs. Id. Plaintiff was then transported to Dallas County Jail. Id.
According to Plaintiff, Garcia obtained a key to his apartment from the apartment manager "under a threat of arrest," and used the key to enter into his apartment. Appendix to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("App. to Pl.'s Resp."), Ex. 1 ("Pl.'s Aff.") at ¶ 2. Plaintiff maintains that he was "unaware of why armed officers" were in his apartment, and "[o]ut of instinct" turned and stepped away from the officers. Id. According to Plaintiff, as soon as he turned away from the officers, Garcia stripped his pants down, leaving him naked. Id. at ¶ 3. Then, "[i] n a matter of seconds," Garcia grabbed him from behind, threw him to the ground, and "placed . . . handcuffs too tight around [his] wrists." Id. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff claims that Garcia got onto his back, and the accompanying officer put a gun to his head. Id. at ¶ 4. "[D]ue to tremendous fear of imminent death," Plaintiff then involuntarily urinated all over his body, and experienced "some sort of convulsion." Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was then dragged by Garcia into the bedroom, and that it "appeared from what [he] could see that the officers were searching the apartment for something." Id. Plaintiff claims that, afterwards, his wrists were "swollen and injured," and his "entire body was sore and battered from the arrest." Id. at ¶ 6. In addition, the next day, Plaintiff claims to have "experienced another, more significant seizure." Id. at ¶ 7.
As noted by Defendants, Plaintiffs stances on his state of dress are contradictory. In his affidavit, Plaintiff claims that "Garcia stripped my pants down and I became naked." Pl.'s Aff. at ¶ 2. On the other hand, in his Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff asserts that "[a] t the time the officers came into the apartment, [I] was nude and was not expecting visitors." PL's Resp. at p. 2. Of the two scenarios, the Court will accept the version contained in Plaintiffs affidavit as the more accurate, and will assume for purposes of deciding Defendant's Motion that Plaintiffs pants were stripped off during the course of his arrest.
Plaintiff also claims that, on January 27, 1999, he was "wrongfully arrested . . . on the false charge of resisting arrest" on January 13, 1999 (the "January 27 Arrest"). Plaintiffs Original Complaint ("Pl.'s Orig. Compl.") at ¶ 13. According to Plaintiff, the January 27 Arrest was in retaliation for his threats to sue the officers involved with the January 13 Arrest. Plaintiff was acquitted of the resisting arrest charge in October 2000. Id.
II. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint pro se on February 9, 2001, asserting claims against twelve defendants: (1) the County of Dallas, (2) the Dallas County Constable's Office, Precinct Six, (3) Constable Aurelia Castillo, (4) Chief Connie Kirby, (5) Deputy Jimmy Douglas Gilliand, (6) Deputy Alejandro Garcia, (7) Officer Robert Rudolph Salazar, and (8)-(12) John Does 6-10. As a result of Plaintiff's failure to serve Defendants Castillo, Kirby, and Gilliand, those three Defendants were dismissed from the litigation on November 19, 2002 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). It also appears as though service has not been effectuated on Defendants Salazar or John Does 6-10.
Although Plaintiff asserts eight counts in his Original Complaint, his claims against the remaining Defendants maybe grouped into four categories. First, Plaintiff asserts civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") against Defendant Garcia for the violation of his constitutional rights during the January 13 Arrest. Second, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for assault and battery against Defendant Garcia, also arising out of the January 13 Arrest. Third, Plaintiff asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional duress against the Defendants, arising out of both the January 13 and January 27 Arrests. Finally, Plaintiff asserts a common law claim for malicious abuse of process against the Defendants, claiming that the Defendants maliciously used the incarceration process against him "in order to coerce and dissuade [him] from asserting [his] rights against [the] Defendants." Pl.'s Orig. Compl. at ¶ 34. The Defendants now move for summary judgment as to each of Plaintiff's claims.
Although Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and wrongfully imprisoned on January 27, 1999, he has not formally brought a claim against any of the Defendants with respect to these allegations. Accordingly, although Defendants' brief addresses a § 1983 claim for false arrest, the Court will not reach the issue.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The moving party bears the burden of informing the district court of the basis for its belief that there is an absence of a genuine issue for trial, and of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate such an absence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party defending against the motion for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion unless she provides specific facts that show the case presents a genuine issue of material fact, such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict in her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Mere assertions of a factual dispute unsupported by probative evidence will not prevent summary judgment. Id. at 248-50; Abbott v. Equity Group, 2 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1993). In other words, conclusory statements, speculation and unsubstantiated assertions will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to her case, and on which she bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Finally, the Court has no duty to search the record for triable issues. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). "The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which the evidence supports his or her claim." Id. A party may not rely upon "unsubstantiated assertions" as competent summary judgment evidence. Id.
IV. Plaintiffs § 1983 Claim Against Garcia
Plaintiff claims that Garcia is liable under § 1983 for the use of excessive force during his arrest on January 13, 1999. Garcia, however, contends that summary judgment should be granted because he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim.
a. Qualified Immunity
Garcia argues that he is shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity from Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against him. "Qualified" or "good faith" immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability "unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). This shield of qualified immunity is generally available to peace officers, such as Garcia, sued under § 1983. See Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623-24 (5th Cir. 2003).
In Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991), the Supreme Court set forth the analytical framework for determining whether a plaintiff s allegations are sufficient to overcome a defendant's defense of qualified immunity. As a threshold matter, the Court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Id. at 231-32. "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). However, if the plaintiff is successful, the Court must then determine whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the "clearly established" law at the time of the alleged violation. Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law. Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore, "even law enforcement officials who `reasonably but mistakenly commit a constitutional violation' are entitled to immunity." Id. see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
b. Plaintiff Has Not Established the Violation of a Clearly Established Constitutional Right
Plaintiff alleges that Garcia used excessive force in effecting his arrest on January 13, 1999. It is "clearly established" that the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right "to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures," protects citizens from the use of excessive force in the context of an arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Thus, the qualified immunity analysis begins with a determination of whether Garcia in fact violated Plaintiffs constitutional right to be free from excessive force. See Id. at 395. In order to state a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege "(1) an injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable." Spann, 987 F.2d at 1115. The amount of injury necessary to satisfy the Fifth Circuit's requirement of "some injury" and establish a constitutional violation is directly related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible under the circumstances. Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the injury must be more than a de minimis injury, evaluated in the context in which the force was deployed. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff has neither asserted an injury that is more than de minimis, nor demonstrated that the force used by Garcia was objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff has alleged that Garcia stripped his pants, threw him on the ground, and handcuffed him too tightly. As a result, Plaintiff claims that he suffered "swollen and injured" wrists, and a "sore and battered" body. In addition, Plaintiff contends that he experienced "some sort of convulsion" during his arrest, and had "another, more significant seizure, the very next day." However, Plaintiff has provided no summary judgment type evidence (other than his own affidavit) to support these allegations, nor has he established that they were the direct result of Garcia's actions. Further, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence concerning the severity of his physical and psychological "injuries," and Plaintiff does not appear to have required medical treatment for any of them.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff did suffer an injury which resulted from Garcia's use of "excessive force," Plaintiff has not shown that Garcia's actions were "objectively unreasonable." It is undisputed that Plaintiffs first reaction to the officers was to turn and move away from them. See Pl.'s Aff. at ¶ 2 ("Out of instinct, I turned and stepped away from Garcia."). Such a reaction is consistent with attempting to evade or resist arrest, and the Court does not find Garcia's subsequent use of force to stop and immobilize him to be "objectively unreasonable."
Plaintiff also alleges that he was held at gunpoint during the January 13 Arrest. However, it is well established that, under § 1983, a defendant is liable only if he was "either personally involved in the constitutional violation or [his] acts [were] causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged." Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Alton v. Texas AM Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1999); Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995). The record clearly establishes that Garcia was not the officer who held a gun to Plaintiffs head, and Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to show that Garcia's actions were "causally connected" to the accompanying officer's actions. See PL's Aff. at ¶ 4. Accordingly, even if the accompanying officer's actions constituted a constitutional violation, Garcia cannot be held liable for those actions.
c. Garcia's Conduct Was Objectively Reasonable
Again, assuming Plaintiff can establish that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, Garcia is still entitled to qualified immunity because his actions were objectively reasonable in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law. The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has "long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1968)). In determining whether an officer is protected by qualified immunity, the "objectively reasonable conduct" determination requires a balancing of "the nature and intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) (internal quotations omitted). Factors relevant to this determination include "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officers or others, and whether he [was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. "The fact that police officers are required to make split second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation" is also considered. Id. Even if the officer reasonably but mistakenly used excessive force, he is entitled to qualified immunity. See id.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff knew Garcia and the accompanying officer were peace officers. See PL's Aff. at ¶ 2; Garcia Aff. at p. 2. Further, Plaintiff has not contested the fact that, upon entering the apartment, Garcia informed Plaintiff about the warrant for his arrest. See Garcia Aff. at p. 2. Finally, as discussed supra, it is also undisputed that Plaintiffs reaction to Garcia and the accompanying officer was to turn and move away from them. See PL's Aff. at ¶ 2; Garcia Aff. at p. 2. In light of the totality of the circumstances, Plaintiff appeared to be resisting or evading arrest, and Garcia used an objectively reasonable amount of force to stop and arrest him. The Court finds that Garcia is protected by qualified immunity, and hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim for excessive force.
V. Plaintiffs Claims Against the Dallas County Constable's Office
Plaintiff has also asserted claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious abuse of process against the Dallas County Constable's Office. Defendants assert that summary judgment should be granted with respect to these claims because the Constable's Office is not a jural entity. The Fifth Circuit has held that "unless the true political entity has taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural authority, the agency cannot engage in any litigation except in concert with the government itself." Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't, 939 F.2d 311, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1991). The Constable's Office is a servient agency which has not been granted separate jural authority, and, as such, Plaintiff may not assert claims directly against it. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court hereby DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE all of Plaintiff's claims against the Constable's Office.
VI. Plaintiffs Remaining Claims
Although the Defendants raise other immunity defenses to Plaintiffs remaining state law claims against Garcia and Dallas County, Plaintiff states in his Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment that he "agrees with Defendants that his state law claims should be dismissed without prejudice" if the Court grants Defendant's Motion with respect to the § 1983 excessive force claim. Pl.'s Resp. at p. 7. In fact, the only claim Plaintiff briefs in his Response is the § 1983 claim. Accordingly, as the Court has found that Defendant Garcia is protected by qualified immunity and has granted summary judgment as to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs remaining claims against the Defendants are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs § 1983 excessive force claim against Defendant Alejandro Garcia. hi addition, Defendant Dallas County Constable's Office is not a jural entity, and Plaintiffs claims against it are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Further, Plaintiffs remaining claims against Defendants Dallas County and Alejandro Garcia are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Finally, as service has never been effectuated on Defendants Robert Rupert Salazar and John Does 6-10, all of Plaintiffs claims against them are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for want of prosecution.
It is so ordered.