Opinion
No. MMX CV08 400 9254 S
October 14, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On May 18, 2009, the plaintiff Christine I. Pantanella filed her latest amended revised complaint ("complaint") containing ten counts. On June 15, 2009, the defendants Jerry Rowe and Ben Cooper filed a motion for summary judgment as to count five of such complaint, and on August 21, 2009, such defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment as to counts one, two, three, four, seven, eight and ten of such complaint. On August 24, 2009, defendant Jennifer Sadaka, an attorney, filed a motion for summary judgment as to count nine of such complaint. On October 1, 2009, the plaintiff filed objections to each motion for summary judgment. On October 5, 2009, the court heard argument on such motions and objections.
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Neuhaus v. Decholnoky, 280 Conn. 190, 199, 905 A.2d 1135 (2006). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that such party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The test is whether the party moving for summary judgment would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Id.; see also Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist. Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988); Telesco v. Telesco, 187 Conn. 715, 718, 447 A.2d 752 (1982). See also Curley v. Kaiser, 112 Conn.App. 213, 220, 862 A.2d 167 (2009):
A material fact is "a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 379, 260 A.2d 596 (1969). "[I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Precision Mechanical Services, Inc. v. T.J.P. Fund Associates, Inc., 109 Conn.App. 560, 564, 952 A.2d 818, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 940, 959 A.2d 1007 (2008).
On November 12, 2007, the plaintiff, who was not represented by counsel on such date with respect to such Agreement, and the defendant Rowe entered into a so-called Sell-Back Agreement concerning real property owned and occupied by the plaintiff that the plaintiff was worried about losing to foreclosure. The Sell-Back Agreement contains the following:
A. At closing, the buyer is entitled to a reimbursement of $14,250 for a down payment toward the purchase of the plaintiff's real property.
B. In addition to the proceeds to the seller at the closing, additional fees for the transaction are $25,000:
. . . This amount is also taken from the proceeds due to Seller at closing. The allocation of these funds are to be held aside, as Buyer maintains possession of subject property, for a minimum/maximum of one year. These funds are standard payment as fees due a Private Investor for services, and held in case of matters unforeseen, legalities, and finally profit.
C. The defendant Rowe agreed to hold the property for the minimum/maximum time of one year. The plaintiff Pantanella agreed to live in the property and "to maintain living arrangements as normal." She agreed to pay a rental expense in the amount of the new mortgage payment that could include taxes and insurance. She agreed to pay all other property expenses as usual. She agreed "to work hard on the improvement of [her] FICO Score," and she also agreed "NOT to contribute any behavior that may be deemed detrimental towards this improvement." The goal was for the plaintiff to be able to finance a resale to her of the property at the same price as the initial purchase price of $285,000 by the defendant Rowe. The defendant Rowe agreed not to sell the real property to anyone other than the plaintiff unless the defendant defaulted on the agreement.
After the execution of the Sell-Back Agreement and prior to November 28, 2007, the plaintiff became represented by Attorney Sadaka in connection with the closing of the sale of her real property and she executed a warranty deed and other papers prepared by Attorney Sadaka for the closing.
In her first count captioned "Declaratory Judgment as to Rowe" the plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that "the subject [warranty] deed is in reality an equitable mortgage, and that Plaintiff is entitled to all the rights and remedies accorded to mortgagors under Federal and State Law."
In Franchi v. Farmholme, Inc., 191 Conn. 201, 202-03, 464 A.2d 35 (1983), the facts were somewhat similar to this case:
On June 30, 1977, the defendant, Farmholme, Inc. (Farmholme), purchased a 200-acre estate in Stonington for $300,000, financed by $280,000 in mortgages . . . Thereafter, around June 1978, and for some time prior to September 6, 1979, the defendant John W.S. McCormick, a business associate of the defendant Lewis J. Payton, president of Farmholme, was permitted to occupy the premises with the obligation to pay the mortgage together with all costs and expenses incidental to the property. The first mortgage became delinquent. In March 1978, foreclosure proceedings were instituted and a foreclosure by sale was ordered. In August 1979, approximately one month before the scheduled foreclosure sale, the plaintiff, Sergio Franchi, met the defendants McCormick and Payton through Anthony D. Pascucci, a mutual acquaintance of Franchi and McCormick. Discussions and negotiations looking to the purchase of the premises followed. On September 6, 1979, Farmholme, acting by its president, Payton, conveyed the premises by warranty deed to Franchi and Edward Traubner, Franchi's business manager, for $395,000. On February 13, 1980, the plaintiffs, Franchi and Traubner, granted Farmholme the option to repurchase for $475,600 by September 8, 1980, the entire premises sold except for a small parcel of unimproved road frontage. The defendants claim that the transaction was not a sale, but actually a loan and that the deed-option vehicle really masked, under coercive circumstances because of the defendants' financial problem, a usurious arrangement. At trial, they accordingly pressed, inter alia, their claim of an equitable mortgage. See Guilford-Chester Water Co. v. Guilford, 107 Conn. 519, 141 A. 880 (1928).
(Footnotes omitted.)
Because the claim was based on a concept of equitable mortgage, the matter was struck from the jury docket:
Both parties, by subsequent pleadings including the defendants' special defense of equitable mortgage and their counterclaim, claimed "title" to and exclusive possession of the premises. Both parties also sought an order directing the other to vacate the premises. Thereafter, the court, Hendel, J., granted the plaintiffs' motion to strike the case from the jury docket.
Id., 205 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling:
It must be recognized that even under our state constitution no party has a right to trial by jury in an equitable action.
Id., 209.
After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and denied the defense of equitable mortgage:
The case was then tried to the court, Quinn, J., who found for the plaintiffs on their complaint and against the defendants on their counterclaim. In doing so, he observed in his memorandum of decision that the case "resolved itself to the issue of ownership of the premises and which party should be made to vacate the premises." The trial court found, inter alia, that the transaction was a sale of the real estate with an option to repurchase that had expired, that the sale "was executed at arms length with both parties represented by attorneys," and that the defendants had not sustained their burden on their special defense of an equitable mortgage. The plaintiffs were adjudged to have the right of exclusive ownership and possession of the premises as against the defendants . . .
Id., 206.
The Supreme Court explained that the dispute between the parties was over not legal title but the defendant's claim to an equitable interest in such real property:
In this case legal title is not in dispute . . .
The essence of the dispute is contained in the defendants' special defense. Paragraph 1 of the defense alleges that the defendants are "the owners of and in possession of all the premises described in the complaint." Paragraph 2 spells out the quality of that ownership. It alleges that "[t]he deed referred to in paragraph 1 of the complaint was delivered to the plaintiffs for grossly inadequate consideration, was never intended as an absolute conveyance; was, in fact, intended as security for a debt and therefore must be regarded as a mortgage." Here again the defendants concede that they intended to transfer legal title to the plaintiffs but only as security for a debt. They allege that the deed, though absolute on its face, must be regarded as a mortgage.
. . . "In their claims for relief the defendants seek a judgment declaring, inter alia, that the transaction by and between the parties was, in fact, an equitable mortgage and requiring the plaintiffs to reconvey the subject premises to the defendants in the entirety. The defendants' claims are equitable . . .
Id., 214-15. The Supreme Court concluded:
On the evidence before it, the trial court could reasonably have found, as it did, that this transaction was a sale of real estate between the parties with an option to repurchase that had expired rather than an equitable mortgage.
Id., 217.
The plaintiff also seeks another declaratory judgment that any security interest that defendant "Rowe purported to transfer to CitiMortgage, Inc . . . be deemed void."
As illustrated by Franchi, there are genuine issues of material fact at issue so the motion of defendants Rowe and Cooper for summary judgment as to count one is denied.
For example:
"The controlling consideration in determining whether a transaction is a sale or a mortgage is the intention of the parties, ascertained in view of all the circumstances, as to the purpose which the transaction is to effectuate." Guilford-Chester Water Co. v. Guilford, 107 Conn. 519, 527, 141 A. 880 (1928). Intention is an inference of fact. Hughes v. Contemporary Mission, Inc., 180 Conn. 150, 152, 429 A.2d 827 (1980).
Id., 216.
Count two is entitled "Violations of the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. as to Defendant Rowe." The plaintiff alleges that she has "an extended time to rescind the equitable loan held by Rowe . . ." As set forth with respect to count one, there are genuine issues of material fact so the motion of defendants Rowe and Cooper for summary judgment as to count two is denied.
Count three is entitled "Violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. [§ ]45(a)(1), et seq. as to Defendants Rowe and Cooper." In Naulty v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (N.D.Cal.) (Patel, J., September 2, 2009), the district court noted that there is no individual private right of action pursuant to such statute:
The complaint includes a federal unfair competition claim pursuant to the Deceptive Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. section 45 et seq. That statute does not create a private right of action; remedial power is vested in the Federal Trade Commission. Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981).
See also Dial A Car v. Transportation and Barwood, 82 F.3d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1996). With respect to count three there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants Rowe and Cooper are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, so summary judgment as to count three is granted.
Count four is entitled "Connecticut Abusive Home Loan Lending Practices Act ("CAHLPA") C.G.S. § 36a-746 et seq. As to Defendants Rowe and Cooper." The statutes encompassing CAHLPA are contained in Chapter 669, the activities regulated by the Bank Commissioner under the Banking Law of Connecticut. Such Act became effective in October 2001, and pursuant to General Statutes § 36a-50, the Commissioner has the following authority:
(a)(1) Whenever the commissioner finds as the result of an investigation that any person has violated any provision of the general statutes within the jurisdiction of the commissioner, or any regulation, rule or order adopted or issued thereunder, the commissioner may send a notice to such person by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or by any express delivery carrier that provides a dated delivery receipt. The notice shall be deemed received by the person on the earlier of the date of actual receipt or seven days after mailing or sending. Any such notice shall include: (A) A statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing; (B) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; (C) a reference to the particular sections of the general statutes, regulations, rules or orders alleged to have been violated; (D) a short and plain statement of the matters asserted; (E) the maximum penalty that may be imposed for such violation; and (F) a statement indicating that such person may file a written request for a hearing on the matters asserted within fourteen days of receipt of the notice.
(2) If a hearing is requested within the time specified in the notice, the commissioner shall hold a hearing upon the matters asserted in the notice unless such person fails to appear at the hearing. After the hearing, if the commissioner finds that the person has violated any such provision, regulation, rule or order, the commissioner may, in the commissioner's discretion and in addition to any other remedy authorized by law, order that a civil penalty not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars per violation be imposed upon such person. If such person does not request a hearing within the time specified in the notice or fails to appear at the hearing, the commissioner may, as the facts require, order that a civil penalty not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars per violation be imposed upon such person.
(3) Each action undertaken by the commissioner under this subsection shall be in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54.
(b) Whenever it appears to the commissioner that any such person has violated, is violating or is about to violate any such provision, regulation, rule or order, the commissioner may, in the commissioner's discretion and in addition to any other remedy authorized by law: (1) Bring an action in the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford to enjoin the acts or practices and to enforce compliance with any such provision, regulation, rule or order. Upon a proper showing, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or writ of mandamus shall be granted and a receiver or conservator may be appointed for such person or such person's assets. The court shall not require the commissioner to post a bond; (2) seek a court order imposing a penalty not to exceed one hundred thousand dollars per violation against any such person found to have violated any such provision, regulation, rule or order; or (3) apply to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford for an order of restitution whereby such person shall be ordered to make restitution of any sums shown by the commissioner to have been obtained by such person in violation of any such provision, regulation, rule or order, plus interest at the rate set forth in section 37-3a. Such restitution shall, at the option of the court, be payable to the receiver or conservator appointed pursuant to this subsection, or directly to the person whose assets were obtained in violation of any such provision, regulation, rule or order. Whenever the commissioner prevails in any action brought under this subsection, the court may allow to the state its costs.
See also P.A. 01-34 and P.A. 03-259. Compare General Statutes § 36a-53.
Given the focus on regulatory enforcement set forth above and the absence of any statutory indication that the legislature intended any private right of action, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants Rowe and Cooper are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, so summary judgment as to count four is granted.
Count five is entitled "Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (`CUTPA') C.G.S. § 42-110 et seq., as to Defendants Rowe and Cooper." As set forth above, in her first count captioned "Declaratory Judgment as to Rowe" the plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that "the subject [warranty] deed is in reality an equitable mortgage, and that Plaintiff is entitled to all the rights and remedies accorded to mortgagors under Federal and State Law." The plaintiff has also alleged fraud and statutory theft. Thus, there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment so the motion of defendants Rowe and Cooper for summary judgment as to count five is denied.
Count six is entitled "Fraud as to Defendants Rowe and Cooper." Count seven is entitled "Unjust Enrichment as to Defendants Rowe and Cooper." Count eight is entitled "Statutory Theft C.G.S. § 52-564 as to Defendants Rowe and Cooper." Count ten is entitled "Rescission under the Truth In Lending Act as to Defendant Rowe." For the reasons previously set forth, with respect to each of these counts summary judgment is denied.
Count nine is entitled "Negligence as to Defendant Sadaka." The plaintiff's allegations of the acts of negligence of Attorney Sadaka are as follows:
34. At all relevant times herein there existed an attorney-client relationship between Sadaka, as attorney, and the plaintiff as client.
35. At all relevant times herein Sadaka knew or should have known about the Sell-Back Agreement entered into between the Plaintiff and Defendant Rowe.
36. At all relevant times herein Sadaka knew or should have known that the Sell-Back Agreement was in violation of Regulation Z, Regulation AA and CAHLPA.
37. At all relevant times Sadaka knew or should have known that the Plaintiff had not herself signed the HUD-1 Settlement Statement and did not accurately reflect the true nature of the transaction.
38. At all relevant times Sadaka knew or should have known that defendant Rowe would not occupy the Premises as his principal dwelling, or otherwise acquire possession of the Premises.
39. Sadaka's actions violated the fiduciary duties of care and competence and the responsibilities that would ordinarily be expected of a client from her attorney.
40. The plaintiff acted in reliance on the fact that Sadaka, as her attorney, was representing the Plaintiff's interests. As a result of Sadaka's actions, the Plaintiff has suffered financial damages.
The plaintiff Pantanella admits or does not dispute, inter alia, the following:
A. She entered into the so-called Sell-Back Agreement as a last resort so she could keep her house. She could not obtain bank financing. Her goal was to find a way to keep the real property because it had been owned by her grandmother and it was her home.
B. The Sell-Back Agreement was executed by the plaintiff and the defendant Rowe and is dated November 12, 2007.
C. The plaintiff does not claim that the defendant Jennifer Sadaka contacted or represented her before she executed the Sell-Back Agreement on or about November 12, 2007.
D. Attorney Sadaka initially contacted the plaintiff to represent her in connection with the closing. The plaintiff did not seek out Attorney Sadaka to represent her. After Attorney Sadaka contacted the plaintiff, the plaintiff accepted her as her attorney for the closing and worked with her in connection with the closing of the sale of the plaintiff's real property.
E. Attorney Sadaka prepared the warranty deed and other documents related to the closing of the sale of the plaintiff's real property.
F. The plaintiff did not show the recently executed Sell-Back Agreement to Attorney Sadaka, nor did she tell Attorney Sadaka that such agreement existed or discuss it with Attorney Sadaka.
G. The plaintiff instead assumed that Attorney Sadaka knew about "everything that was going on . . ."
H. The plaintiff voluntarily negotiated a $62,586.96 check drawn against Attorney Sadaka's real estate clients fund account representing the net proceeds of the sale of the plaintiff's real property to the defendant Rowe, and she understood that would be the approximate amount she received from the closing of the sale.
I. She voluntarily issued a check to the defendant Rowe in the approximate amount required by the Sell-Back Agreement. Attorney Sadaka asserts, admits or does not dispute, inter alia, the following:
AA. Attorney Richard Novak, who represented the defendant Rowe in connection with the closing of the sale of the real property, referred the plaintiff to her and he provided the plaintiff's telephone number. Each attorney was a solo practitioner.
BB. Attorney Sadaka did not become aware of the Sell-Back Agreement until she saw it as an exhibit to the complaint in this case.
CC. Attorney Novak told her the sale terms and she confirmed them with the plaintiff.
DD. Attorney Sadaka contacted the plaintiff, reviewed with the plaintiff (a) the warranty deed she prepared, (b) a draft of a HUD-1 settlement statement based on the plaintiff's side of the transaction and thus with no figures from the buyer/borrower, (c) a non-foreign person affidavit ("FERPTA"), (d) a 1099 form and (e) the real estate conveyance tax return.
EE. The plaintiff signed the warranty deed (the defendant attorney was the sole witness present although she was aware that two witnesses were required), the FERPTA form, the 1099 form and the real estate conveyance tax return. The final HUD-1 settlement statement was not prepared and thus was not available at the time these documents were signed by the plaintiff.
FF. Attorney Sadaka stated that the plaintiff told her about an $8,500.00 credit she had agreed to give to the defendant Rowe at the closing. Attorney Sadaka also stated that the plaintiff stated to her that she could not attend the closing. She was going to be out of town. In fact the closing took place on November 28, 2007, and neither the plaintiff nor the defendant Sadaka attended, but Attorney Novak and the defendant Rowe were present at the closing.
GG. Attorney Sadaka averred that she did not add a witness signature to the warranty deed and that the signature of her name as attorney in fact on the final HUD-1 settlement statement was not made by her.
Both the defendants Rowe and Cooper averred that they do not know, have never met and have never communicated with the defendant Jennifer Sadaka.
The documents relied on by the plaintiff and/or the defendant Sadaka in connection with the summary judgment motion and objection include the following:
AAA. The so-called Sell-Back Agreement.
BBB. The final HUD-1 settlement statement executed on or about November 28, 2007, by the defendant Rowe as the "Borrower" and Attorney Novak as "Settlement Agent," and also containing a signature of the defendant Sadaka as attorney in fact for the plaintiff as the "Seller." Such final HUD-1 settlement statement was faxed by Attorney Novak on December 3, 2007.
CCC. Check no. 1403 dated November 30, 2007, two days after the November 28, 2007, closing, to Christine Pantanella, drawn on the Law Offices of Jennifer A. Sadaka real estate clients fund account in the amount of $62,586.96 (the final HUD-1 settlement statement reflects a "cash to seller" amount due of $63,051.95, but Attorney Sadaka was entitled to an attorneys fee although it is not clear how and when that was paid to her). Such check contains the notation "Pantanella to Rowe cash to seller." It also reflects a bank processing date of December 3, 2007.
DDD. Check no. 311745 dated December 12, 2007, drawn on Connecticut State Employees' Credit Union, Inc., to Christine Pantanella or Jerry Rowe in the amount of $41,574.32 and endorsed by Jerry Rowe.
EEE. Portions of the deposition transcripts of the plaintiff and the defendant Sadaka.
The November 12, 2007, Sell-Back Agreement contains the following:
A. At closing, the buyer is entitled to a reimbursement of $14,250 for a down payment toward the purchase of the plaintiff's real property.
B. In addition to the proceeds to the seller at the closing, additional fees for the transaction are $25,000:
. . . This amount is also taken from the proceeds due to Seller at closing. The allocation of these funds are to be held aside, as Buyer maintains possession of subject property, for a minimum/maximum of one year. These funds are standard payment as fees due a Private Investor for services, and held in case of matters unforeseen, legalities, and finally profit.
C. The defendant Rowe agreed to hold the property for the minimum/maximum time of one year. The plaintiff Pantanella agreed to live in the property and "to maintain living arrangements as normal." She agreed to pay a rental expense in the amount of the new mortgage payment that could include taxes and insurance. She agreed to pay all other property expenses as usual. She agreed "to work hard on the improvement of [her] FICO Score," and she also agreed "NOT to contribute any behavior that may be deemed detrimental towards this improvement." The goal was for the plaintiff to be able to finance a resale to her of the property at the same price as the initial purchase price of $285,000 by the defendant Rowe (although the amount of the new mortgage was $270,750). The defendant Rowe agreed not to sell the real property to anyone other than the plaintiff unless the defendant defaulted on the agreement.
The final HUD-1 settlement statement reflects that the defendant Rowe paid off the plaintiff's first mortgage to an entity referred to as Ocwen in the amount of $210,385.79. Such Settlement Agreement also reflects that Attorney Sadaka received a legal fee of $750 for her services related to the closing. The amount of the new mortgage is stated on the final HUD-1 settlement statement as $270,750.
In connection with the summary judgment motion and objection neither the plaintiff nor the defendant Sadaka referred to the presence or absence of any written agreement between them or document from Attorney Sadaka setting forth the scope of her representation of the plaintiff.
See Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(b):
The scope of the representation, the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible, shall be communicated to the client, in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client in writing before the fees or expenses to be billed at higher rates are actually incurred . . .
There is no genuine issue of material fact that the closing was completed and that the plaintiff voluntarily negotiated a $62,586.96 check drawn against Attorney Sadaka's real estate clients fund account representing the net proceeds of the sale of her real property that was about to be foreclosed to the defendant Rowe, and she understood that would be the approximate amount she received from the closing of the sale. After the plaintiff's deposit of check no. 1403 dated November 30, 2007, drawn on the Law Offices of Jennifer A. Sadaka real estate clients fund account in the amount of $62,586.96, and her eventual receipt of good funds from the negotiation of such check, the plaintiff obtained check no. 311745 dated December 12, 2007, drawn on Connecticut State Employees' Credit Union, Inc., to Christine Pantanella or Jerry Rowe in the amount of $41,574.32 and turned it over to the defendant Rowe.
No genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Attorney Sadaka breached the standard of care due to the plaintiff with respect to the closing or that any such breach, if it existed, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged damages.
There is also no genuine issue of material fact on this record that the defendant did not know of the previously executed Sell-Back Agreement or of its terms until she saw it attached to the complaint served upon her, or that she should have known about it prior to the closing of the sale of the plaintiff's real property.
Even if the defendant Sadaka reasonably should have known about an agreement executed before she became the plaintiff's attorney for the closing of the sale of the plaintiff's real property, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that there is any genuine issue of material fact as to whether Attorney Sadaka breached the standard of care due to the plaintiff with respect to her representation of the plaintiff on the closing of the sale or that any such breach, if it existed, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged damages arising out of the Sell-Back Agreement or the plaintiff's activities or arrangements with the defendants Rowe and Cooper.
Shortly before the plaintiff was contacted by Attorney Sadaka to represent her in the closing of the sale of her real property, she had executed the Sell-Back Agreement. The plaintiff did not show or mention it to Attorney Sadaka. It is thus disingenuous for the plaintiff to argue that Attorney Sadaka should have known about it although the plaintiff, who did know about it, did not show or mention it to her.
On count nine summary judgment is granted to the defendant Jennifer Sadaka.