Pankratz v. Hoff

6 Citing cases

  1. Coffey v. Coffey

    2016 S.D. 96 (S.D. 2016)   Cited 20 times

    Further, considering Debra's contractual right to pay the debt over the entire length of the mortgage, the home-sale clause can be reasonably interpreted to simply enable a sale of the home by satisfying recorded mortgages without affecting Debra's ultimate liability for the mortgage debt. Because the agreement is subject to different, reasonable interpretations, it is ambiguous. See Pankratz v. Hoff, 2011 S.D. 69, ¶ 16, 806 N.W.2d 231, 237.[¶ 26.] The Court determines that the contract unambiguously discharges Debra's obligation and transfers the mortgage liability to Michael only by adding two unwritten "conditions" to the agreement.

  2. Roseth v. Roseth

    2013 S.D. 27 (S.D. 2013)   Cited 14 times
    Stating that contract interpretation is a question of law

    ” Duran v. Duran, 2003 S.D. 15, ¶ 7, 657 N.W.2d 692, 696 (quoting Pesicka v. Pesicka, 2000 S.D. 137, ¶ 6, 618 N.W.2d 725, 726). “Contract interpretation is a question of law reviewable de novo.” Pankratz v. Hoff, 2011 S.D. 69, ¶ 10 n. 1, 806 N.W.2d 231, 235 n. 1 (quoting Ziegler Furniture & Funeral Home, Inc. v. Cicmanec, 2006 S.D. 6, ¶ 14, 709 N.W.2d 350, 354). “Because we can review the contract as easily as the trial court, there is no presumption in favor of the trial court's determination.” Id. (quoting Ziegler Furniture, 2006 S.D. 6, ¶ 14, 709 N.W.2d at 354).

  3. Detmers v. Costner

    2012 S.D. 35 (S.D. 2012)   Cited 14 times

    “Whether the language of a contract is ambiguous is ... a question of law.” Pankratz v. Hoff, 2011 S.D. 69, ¶ 10 n. *, 806 N.W.2d 231, 235 n. *. Even if this Court were to decide that the contract was ambiguous, the language of the contract, in addition to the findings of the circuit court, support judgment for Costner.[¶ 18.] The circuit court concluded as a matter of law that the regular meaning of the term “elsewhere” applied.

  4. White v. Sunoco, Inc.

    870 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2017)   Cited 68 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that where the laws of two jurisdictions lead to the same result, "there is no actual conflict and [the court] should avoid the choice-of-law question."

    Sunoco has identified no ambiguity on the face of the Card Agreement that would suggest that parol evidence of the promotional materials is admissible to construe the meaning of the Card Agreement's arbitration clause. See, e.g., Pankratz v. Hoff, 806 N.W.2d 231, 236 (S.D. 2011) (noting that absent fraud or mistake, "parol testimony of prior or contemporaneous negotiations ... which tend to substitute a new and different contract from the one evidenced by the writing, is incompetent" (quoting Neal v. Marrone, 239 N.C. 73, 79 S.E.2d 239, 242 (1953) )); Knabb v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 144 Fla. 110, 131–32, 197 So. 707, 715 (1940) ("[W]here the language of a contract is susceptible to more than one construction ... the court will consider ... facts and circumstances leading up to and attending its execution .... This rule does not apply, however, where the language of the contract leaves no doubt as to the meaning of the parties and in such a case the contract is to be construed without regard to extraneous facts."). There is no evidence of some broader contract between all three entities consisting of both the promotional materials and the Card Agreement. The Card Agreement is an unambiguous and complete contract between White and Citibank; we are aware of

  5. Absolute Resolutions Invs. v. Citibank

    22 Civ. 2079 (VM) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2024)

    (See Dkt. No. 34-2 at 3.) Generally speaking, an integration clause is intended to clarify that any understandings between the parties are not binding unless they are memorialized in the text of the final contract itself - in particular, preliminary agreements or oral representations made during contract negotiations. See, e.g., Pankratz v. Hoff, 806 N.W.2d 231, 236 (S.D. 2011) (holding that an integrated contract is a “complete and final expression” of the parties' agreements and that the agreement does not include “prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations inconsistent with the writing”); accord Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran, 828 F.3d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying Pennsylvania law) (“An integration clause which states that a writing is meant to represent the parties' entire agreement is [] a clear sign that the writing is meant to be just that and thereby expresses all of the parties' negotiations, conversations, and agreements made prior to its execution.”); Volt Elec. NYC Corp. v. A.M.E., Inc., 586 F.Supp.3d 262, 281 (applying New York law) (“[A]n integration, or merger, clause, where effective, can require full application of the parol evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary or contra

  6. Atmosphere Hospitality Mgmt., LLC v. Shiba Invs., Inc.

    CIV. 13-5040-KES (D.S.D. Dec. 18, 2013)

    Because the agreements are ambiguous, parol evidence may be introduced to determine the intent of the parties. Pankratz v. Hoff, 806 N.W.2d 231, 237 (S.D. 2011). The parties testified at length during the hearing regarding Atmosphere's fraudulent inducement claim.