Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-3435.
May 28, 2004
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of May, 2004, upon consideration of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. Judgement is entered in favor of the defendant, the City of Philadelphia, and this case is closed for administrative purposes.
Plaintiff, Michael Panichelli, alleges that on June 2, 2001, Philadelphia police officers beat him after placing him under arrest. Plaintiff also alleges that the officers yelled derogatory comments about him to pedestrians as they drove him around in a police vehicle. Plaintiff, who is acting pro se in this matter, originally sued the arresting officers, but after defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming only the City of Philadelphia. This court subsequently denied the Motion to Dismiss as moot and issued an Order setting a discovery deadline of May 10, 2004. Now before the court is the City of Philadelphia's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
Plaintiff's pro se Amended Complaint is quite brief and does not articulate particular legal claims. In its Motion and supporting memorandum, the City characterizes plaintiff's claims as attempts to sue the City under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for excessive force as well as state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution; the court agrees with this characterization and will treat plaintiff's claims accordingly. The City maintains that the federal civil rights claims fail because plaintiff has failed to comply with the standards set for civil rights suits by the Supreme Court in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Court held that municipal entities may be sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where the plaintiff proves that the violation resulted from an official policy or a practice that may be fairly said to represent an official policy or custom. See id. at 690-95. The City also argues that it cannot be held liable for alleged intentional torts of its employees, making plaintiff's state law claims untenable and that plaintiff's state law claims are also barred by the Political Subdivision Tort Claim Act. See Mem. in Support of Mot. at 2-3.
A court should grant a Motion for Summary Judgment if the pleadings and evidence supplied though discovery show that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party and a factual dispute is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 424, 249 (1986). Although all inferences and doubts must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party for purposes of considering a Motion for Summary Judgment, the non-moving party must "make a sufficient showing on an element essential of [his] case with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof" in order to survive such a Motion. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The court agrees with the City that the plaintiff has failed to show any evidence that the City has a policy, custom, or practice of encouraging its employees to violate individuals' constitutional rights, which is an essential element that plaintiff would have to prove at trial. As of the close of the discovery period, plaintiff has submitted his disclosures consisting of photographs taken of plaintiff shortly after his arrest showing his injuries; medical records documenting the treatment of those injuries at Temple Hospital on June 3, 2001; and an excerpted transcript of the state criminal proceedings against plaintiff on January 21, 2003. Although plaintiff alleges that the Philadelphia police used excessive force and used defamatory language, even a serious alleged violation such as this cannot withstand a Motion for Summary Judgment unless the plaintiff can show a policy or practice, attribute it to the City, and prove causality between that policy and his constitutional injury. See Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984). Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that suggests that the City had a policy of encouraging its officers to use excessive force in the course of arrests and therefore the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's federal claims. The court also finds that plaintiff's potential state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution are barred by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8541. The Act provides that a local agency is not liable for any damages for personal injury caused by an act of the local agency or an employee thereof unless the injury falls into one of the following exceptions: vehicle liability; care, custody, or control of personal property; real property; trees, traffic controls and street lighting; utility service facilities; streets; sidewalks; and care, custody, or control of animals.See id. § 8542(b)(1)-(8). The court agrees with the City that plaintiff's intentional tort claims do not fall into any of these exceptions to the City's immunity under the Act.