On appeal, the Supreme Court of Guam reversed. Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11, 2000 WL 263216, at *9 (Guam Mar. 10, 2000). The court held that under section 19 of the Organic Act of Guam (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1423i), the Legislature's failure to adopt adequate procedures for receipt of gubernatorial messages before it adjourned resulted in a pocket veto, despite the Governor's intent to allow Bill 495 to become law without his signature.

Further, determining whether the legislature has authorized the defendant to be punished twice for two violations of the same statute is an issue of statutory interpretation, reviewed de novo. Id. ¶ 9; see also Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11 ¶ 7.IV. ANALYSIS

See Fargo Pac., Inc. v. Korando Corp., 2006 Guam 22 ¶ 20. We review issues of statutory construction and interpretation de novo. Bank of Guam v. Reidy, 2001 Guam 14 ¶ 16; Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11 ¶ 7. IV. ANALYSIS

The Legislature incorrectly assumed that Bill 495 was lawfully enacted and referred to it as Public Law 24- 139. Taxpayers point out, however, that this court held in Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 2000 Guam 11 P 8, that Bill 495 was pocket vetoed and never became law. Further, this court stated in Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2004 Guam 16 P 43, that Guam Public Law 24-272 was invalid because it purported to reenact a law (Bill 495 or Public Law 24-139) that was never lawfully enacted.

In the case sub judice, the lower court issued the writ based on its interpretation of Guam Administrative Regulations enacted pursuant to PEMRA, as well as Guam's Administrative Adjudication Law ("AAL"). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Bank of Guam v. Reidy, 2001 Guam 14, P 16 (citing Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11, AP7, ); Aguon v. Gutierrez, 2002 Guam 14, P 5 (citing Ada v. Guam Tel. Auth. 1999 Guam 10, P10 ). Similarly, the lower court's exercise of jurisdiction in the face of a sovereign immunity challenge is reviewed de novo.

While recognizing the non-binding and extra-judicial nature of other advisory opinion clauses, we are restricted by the plain language of our statute. See Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11, P 23 ("In cases involving statutory construction, the plain language of a statute must be the starting point."). Declaratory judgments are uniformly considered binding.

Thus, the first inquiry is whether it is possible to interpret section 21111(b) (1998), or its predecessor statute, as having, in correlation, a duty on the part of Reidy and a right existing in BOG. We review issues of statutory construction and interpretation de novo. Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11, at P 7. Reidy argues that section 21111(b) (1998) is not applicable because the statute became law after notice of the government's intent to award the banking services contract to Bank of Hawaii. Indeed, there is a presumption against retroactive application of new laws to pending cases.

[7] In reaching its decision, the trial court was faced with interpreting Guam's mandatory automobile insurance law. Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law to be reviewed de novo. Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11, P 7; Ada v. Guam Telephone Authority, 1999 Guam 10, P10; Camacho v. Camacho, 1997 Guam 5, P24. The application of facts to law is reviewed de novo. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11 at P 7; People v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1, P31.[8] An appellate court may affirm the judgment of a lower court on any ground supported by the record.

[36] The plain language of a statute must be the starting point for statutory interpretation. Aguon v. Gutierrez, 2002 Guam 14 ¶ 6 (quoting Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11 ¶ 23); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982). "Absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the plain meaning prevails."

"In cases involving statutory construction, the plain language of a statute must be the starting point." Pangelinan v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 11 ¶ 23 (citation omitted). There are two separate clauses in section 4407(c).