Opinion
# 2016-041-508 Claim No. 118670
09-30-2016
LUIS PANEZO v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
LUIS PANEZO Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Belinda Wagner, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claim by inmate alleging use of excessive force, medical malpractice and wrongful confinement resulting from recreation yard fight involving multiple inmates, and consequent inmate disciplinary hearing, is dismissed after trial where the allegation of excessive force is unsupported by preponderance of the trial evidence, claimant presented no expert medical proof to establish medical malpractice cause of action and claimant presented no proof corroborating his assertion that a false statement was provided at the disciplinary hearing, while a correction officer offered sworn testimony that he observed claimant striking a fellow inmate.
Case information
| UID: | 2016-041-508 |
| Claimant(s): | LUIS PANEZO |
| Claimant short name: | PANEZO |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 118670 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
| Claimant's attorney: | LUIS PANEZO Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Belinda Wagner, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | September 30, 2016 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
On July 15, 2008, Luis Panezo (claimant) was an inmate at Clinton Correctional Facility (Clinton). On that date, inmates armed with weapons were involved in a disturbance in the recreation yard at Clinton. Claimant was ordered to the ground during the disturbance and he complied with that order. Mechanical restraints were applied to claimant, and he was handcuffed. As a consequence of that disturbance, claimant was issued an administrative misbehavior report charging him with fighting, weapon possession, creating a disturbance and violent conduct.
As a result of being issued the misbehavior report, an administrative Tier III disciplinary hearing was conducted, and claimant was determined to be guilty of all four charges and penalized by, among loss of other privileges, confinement to a special housing unit (SHU) for a period of two years. Eventually, claimant spent those two years confined to SHU without ever having administratively challenged that determination.
Beyond the administrative actions described above, a Clinton County Grand Jury criminally indicted claimant for conduct related to the events of July 15, 2008, an indictment which a court of competent jurisdiction in Clinton County subsequently dismissed "with leave to represent to the Grand Jury."
Claimant filed a claim on July 19, 2010, alleging that defendant's administrative determination of guilt was procured by a false statement, that the handcuffs applied were placed upon him in a "very brutal way," and that a resulting injury to his finger received substandard medical care. Although the claim's allegations are set forth in the barest of bones manner, they arguably describe causes of action founded in wrongful confinement, excessive force and medical malpractice.
The legal underpinnings of each cause of action will be considered in turn.
To establish that he was wrongfully confined, claimant must prove that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929; Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d 979 [3d Dept 2008]).
With respect to whether a confinement is privileged, Holmberg v County of Albany (291 AD2d 610, 612 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]), instructs that: "Generally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged . . . and everyone connected with the matter is protected from liability for false imprisonment."
In the context of a prison involuntary confinement proceeding, such confinement will be "privileged to the extent that it was under color of law or regulation, specifically in accordance with regulations" (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]).
It is also well-settled law that where employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, in commencing and conducting formal inmate disciplinary (or involuntary confinement) proceedings, "act under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations . . . their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; Varela v State of New York, 283 AD2d 841 [3d Dept 2001]). This immunity attaches even if the determination is later reversed administratively or as the result of a successful CPLR Article 78 proceeding (see Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 215).
If, however, prison officials fail to comply with a rule or regulation governing such hearings, absolute immunity may be lost and liability for money damages may be imposed if it is proven that the regulatory violation caused actual prejudice or injury to the inmate (see Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d 1089, 1089 [3d Dept 2009]; Vasquez v State of New York, 10 AD3d 825 [3d Dept 2004]).
The use of physical force against an inmate is governed by statute, regulation and case law. Correction Law § 137 (5) provides as follows:
"No inmate in the care or custody of the department shall be subjected to degrading treatment, and no officer or other employee of the department shall inflict any blows whatever upon any inmate, unless in self defense, or to suppress a revolt or insurrection. When any inmate, or group of inmates, shall offer violence to any person, or do or attempt to do any injury to property, or attempt to escape, or resist or disobey any lawful direction, the officers and employees shall use all suitable means to defend themselves, to maintain order, to enforce observation of discipline, to secure the persons of the offenders and to prevent any such attempt or escape."
Corrections officers may use physical force to maintain order and discipline in correctional facilities, but "[w]here it is necessary to use physical force, only such degree of force as is reasonably required shall be used" (7 NYCRR 251-1.2 [b]).
The limited circumstances in which use of force is permitted by corrections officers are set forth at 7 NYCRR 251-1.2 [d]: "[F]or self-defense; to prevent injury to person or property; to enforce compliance with a lawful direction; to quell a disturbance; or to prevent an escape."
In claims involving inmate allegations of excessive force by corrections officers, the credibility of the witnesses is generally the dispositive factor (Davis v State of New York, 203 AD2d 234 [2d Dept 1994]). To determine whether the use of force was necessary and, if so, whether the force used was excessive or unreasonable, a court must examine the specific circumstances confronting the officers (see Wester v State of New York, 247 AD2d 468 [2d Dept 1998]; Lewis v State of New York, 223 AD2d 800 [3d Dept 1996]; Quillen v State of New York, 191 AD2d 31 [3d Dept 1993]; Arnold v State of New York, 108 AD2d 1021 [3d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 723 [1985]).
A correctional facility superintendent has discretion to "provide for such measures as he may deem necessary or appropriate for the safety, security and control of correctional facilities" (see Correction Law § 137 [2] and § 18 [2]; see Matter of Shabazz v Portuondo, 260 AD2d 733 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 756).
"Prison officials are solely responsible for the preservation of order and security in the facilities they administer" (Matter of Gross v Henderson 79 AD2d 1086, 1087 [4th Dept 1981], appeal denied 53 NY2d 605 [1981]). In general, courts should defer to prison authorities in matters of internal prison security (Matter of Blake v Selsky, 10 AD3d 774, 775 [3d Dept 2004]).
As the court explained in Arteaga v State of New York (72 NY2d 212, 218-219 [1988]):
"Because of the problems of maintaining security and discipline within correctional facilities, the discretion delegated to the employees and officers is necessarily comprehensive and calls for the exercise of judgment under widely varying conditions."
Addressing claimant's allegations of medical malpractice, claimant must prove, generally through expert medical opinion testimony, two essential elements: (1) a deviation or departure from accepted practice, and (2) that such departure was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury (Carter v Tana, 68 AD3d 1577, 1579 [3d Dept 2009]).
Defendant is required to exercise professional medical judgment within the range of accepted medical standards in its treatment of claimant. The law is clear that "neither a medical provider . . . nor the State or governmental subdivisions employing the medical provider, may be held liable for a mere error in professional judgment" (Ibguy v State of New York, 261 AD2d 510, [2d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 816 [1999]; Sciarabba v State of New York, 182 AD2d 892, 893-894 [3d Dept 1992]).
Conclusory allegations of medical malpractice, unsupported by competent evidence establishing its essential elements, are insufficient to state a prima facie case. Through a medical expert, it must be shown that defendant deviated from the standard for good and acceptable care in the locality where the treatment occurred and that the deviation was the proximate cause of the injury (Torns v Samaritan Hosp., 305 AD2d 965, 966 [3d Dept 2003]; Yamin v Baghel, 284 AD2d 778, 779 [3d Dept 2001]; Bracci v Hopper, 274 AD2d 865, 867 [3d Dept 2000]).
Trial of the claim was conducted on August 16, 2016. Claimant was his only witness.
Claimant did receive medical treatment, including surgery by a hand specialist, for a dislocated finger and an injured tendon. Claimant provided no expert medical proof at trial to establish the standard of care to which he was entitled or to establish that the care defendant provided him, in care of his hand, was substandard or deficient in any respect. Accordingly, claimant's cause of action founded in medical malpractice must and does fail.
Similarly, the claimant's bare bones allegation of excessive force, fails as a matter of proof. The only trial testimony provided related to this allegation was claimant's simple recitation of the claim's statement that the handcuffs were applied in a "brutal way," dislocating a finger. There was no other testimony regarding this cause of action. There was no description of the manner in which defendant's representatives acted or the manner in which the handcuffs were applied or even how the claimant's finger became dislocated. Simply put, the claimant failed to provide sufficient proof, any proof in fact, for the Court to determine how force was applied, whether the force applied was necessary or appropriate, or whether the force applied was excessive. Beyond those failings, the Court is aware through other trial evidence that claimant was administratively charged with, and found guilty of, possessing a weapon in a maximum security prison recreation yard that contained over 340 inmates and which involved an incident of several (approximately twelve) armed inmates fighting, at the time he was restrained. The claimant's cause of action alleging the use of excessive force fails as a matter of proof.
Claimant's cause of action for wrongful confinement is based upon his allegation that his administrative determination of guilt and subsequent SHU confinement were procured by false statement. Claimant provided no proof that a false statement was provided other than to state that the administrative charges and testimony against him, alleging that he possessed a net with a rock in it, which he used to strike another inmate, were untrue. He further pointed to the criminal indictment being dismissed as proof that a false statement was given against him in the administrative proceeding, although he provided no proof to explain the basis of the indictment's dismissal. The Court also notes that the indictment was dismissed with leave to represent it.
Finally, the corrections officer who observed claimant in the recreation yard on the evening of July 15, 2008, Officer Michael Coryer, testified at trial. Officer Coryer testified, credibly, that he observed claimant striking a fellow inmate with a net bag containing a rock. Officer Coryer also contemporaneously authored a "TO/FROM" memo (Exhibit F) on the date of the incident which reported, "I observed inmate Panezo hitting an unknown inmate in the back with a net bag with a rock in it. The unknown inmate was lying face down on the ground." The claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that defendant wrongfully confined him. That cause of action must and does fail.
The claim is, in all respects, dismissed.
All motions not previously decided are hereby denied.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
September 30, 2016
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims