Because joint ventures are governed by partnership principles, the same is true of them. See Palumbo Bros., Inc. v. Wagner, 293 Ill. App. 3d 756, 766 (1997). The Joint Venture in this case was thus inseparable from its constituent entities, Midwest and Halverson.

Since Marks, courts have followed its prohibition on nonjudicial officers and other branches of government entering judgments. See, e.g., Bottom v. City of Edwardsville, 308 Ill. 68, 72–73, 139 N.E. 5, 7 (1923) (applying Marks to a void injunction issued by a master in chancery); People ex rel. Isaacs v. Johnson, 26 Ill.2d 268, 270–74, 186 N.E.2d 346, 347–49 (1962) (holding several tax laws unconstitutional that directed the court clerk to enter judgments); Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill.2d 6, 16, 178 Ill.Dec. 750, 605 N.E.2d 544, 550 (1992) (holding the rendering of judgment independent from the ministerial function of the court clerk's entry); Palumbo Bros., Inc. v. Wagner, 293 Ill.App.3d 756, 765, 228 Ill.Dec. 139, 688 N.E.2d 837, 843 (1997) (acknowledging unconstitutionality in permitting court clerks to enter judgments); Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 14, 356 Ill.Dec. 752, 962 N.E.2d 437 (acknowledging a fee entered by the court clerk was without authority and therefore void). ¶ 12 Prior cases on fines and fees refer to the clerk's lack of jurisdiction, rather than the abolished void sentence rule in Castleberry.

Since Marks, courts have followed its prohibition on nonjudicial officers and other branches of government entering judgments. See, e.g., Bottom v. City of Edwardsville, 308 Ill. 68, 72-73, 139 N.E. 5, 7 (1923) (applying Marks to a void injunction issued by a master in chancery); People ex rel. Isaacs v. Johnson, 26 Ill. 2d 268, 270, 272, 274, 186 N.E.2d 346, 347-49 (1962) (holding several tax laws unconstitutional that directed the court clerk to enter judgments); Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d 6, 16, 605 N.E.2d 544, 550 (1992) (holding the rendering of judgment independent from the ministerial function of the court clerk's entry); Palumbo Bros., Inc. v. Wagner, 293 Ill. App. 3d 756, 765, 688 N.E.2d 837, 843 (1997) (acknowledging unconstitutionality in permitting court clerks to enter judgments); Gutierrez, 2012 IL 111590, ¶ 14, 962 N.E.2d 437 (acknowledging a fee entered by the court clerk was without authority and therefore void). ¶ 13 Prior cases on fines and fees refer to the clerk's lack of jurisdiction, rather than the abolished void sentence rule in Castleberry.

Since Marks, courts have followed its prohibition on nonjudicial officers and other branches of government entering judgments. See, e.g., Bottom v. City of Edwardsville, 308 Ill. 68, 72-73, 139 N.E. 5, 7 (1923) (applying Marks to a void injunction issued by a master in chancery); People ex rel. Isaacs v. Johnson, 26 Ill. 2d 268, 270, 272, 274, 186 N.E.2d 346, 347-49 (1962) (holding several tax laws unconstitutional that directed the court clerk to enter judgments); Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d 6, 16, 605 N.E.2d 544, 550 (1992) (holding the rendering of judgment independent from the ministerial function of the court clerk's entry); Palumbo Brothers, Inc. v. Wagner, 293 Ill. App. 3d 756, 765, 688 N.E.2d 837, 843 (1997) (acknowledging unconstitutionality in permitting court clerks to enter judgments); cf. Walker v. McGuire, 2015 IL 117138, ¶ 30, 39 N.E.3d 982 (identifying clerks of court as nonjudicial officers and performing no adjudicative or even quasi-adjudicative functions). ¶ 90 Prior cases on fines and fees refer to the clerk's lack of jurisdiction, rather than the abolished void sentence rule in Castleberry.

An affirmative matter encompasses any defense other than a negation of the essential allegations of the plaintiff's cause of action. Palumbo Bros., Inc. v. Wagner, 293 Ill. App. 3d 756, 760, 688 N.E.2d 837 (1997). If a cause of action is dismissed pursuant to a section 2-619(a)(9) motion, the question on appeal is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Illinois Graphics Co., 159 Ill. 2d at 494.

(Emphasis in original.) Palumbo Bros., Inc. v. Wagner, 293 Ill. App. 3d 756, 760, 688 N.E.2d 837, 840 (1997). We begin by examining PersonalCare's argument the Certificate authorizes it to recoup more than plaintiff's share of the capitation payments.