Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2466-GTV
February 21, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Germent Palton, an African-American, is a former employee of Defendant Armour Swift-Eckrich. After Plaintiff repeatedly demonstrated threatening behavior and used abusive and profane language toward co-workers, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff brought the instant case, alleging that he was terminated because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The case is now before the court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 51) and Plaintiff's Cross Motion to Strike (Doc. 59). For the reasons stated below, the court grants Defendant's summary judgment motion and denies Plaintiff's motion to strike.
Plaintiff alleged four causes of action in his amended complaint, but this court dismissed Plaintiff's other claims in an order entered November 9, 2000. Plaintiff's race discrimination claim is the only remaining claim.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The requirement of a "genuine" issue of fact means that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. This burden may be met by showing that there is a lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact left for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. "A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. Therefore, the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. See id. The court must consider the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the summary judgment record and are either uncontroverted or viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff's case. Immaterial facts and facts not properly supported by the record are omitted.
Plaintiff, an African-American, was an employee of Defendant from 1979 until 1999. Effective January 4, 1999, Defendant posted work rules which provided that "threats, attacks, fighting, disorderly conduct, . . . intimidation, . . . [and] the use of abusive, insolent, . . . vulgar, profane or objectionable language or conduct toward an employee" were grounds for immediate termination. These rules superceded work rules implemented in 1997 which provided that fighting, disobedience, and disruptive behavior were grounds for immediate termination.
Plaintiff had numerous problems with co-workers. In October of 1998, Plaintiff was suspended from work after management received reports that Plaintiff was threatening Arthur Hayes, a co-worker. In February of 1999, Plaintiff was involved in an incident where he displayed threatening conduct and used abusive and profane language toward Sal Villa, another co-worker. Again, Plaintiff was suspended. Management allowed Plaintiff to explain his version of the incident, and interviewed Sal Villa and witnesses of the incident. After concluding an investigation of the incident, Paul Willman, Human Resources Manager, decided to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Paul Willman explained the reasons for his decision in an affidavit:
Plaintiff denied making the threats. Arthur Hayes was also suspended at that time.
I determined to change [Plaintiff's] suspension to a termination based on my conclusion, from all information obtained during my investigation, that [Plaintiff] had used abusive, profane, and threatening language and conduct toward Mr. Villa and that [Plaintiff] alone had been the aggressor. It was especially significant to me that three independent eyewitnesses confirmed and corroborated Mr. Villa's complaint while none did so for any part of [Plaintiff's] version of events. Further, in addition to the posted Company rules, [Plaintiff] had been specifically warned in October, 1998, after his suspension for similar language and conduct against Mr. Hayes, that continued misconduct of this kind could result in his termination. Because [Defendant] cannot tolerate such continued misconduct which violates clear Company rules and the specific warning given to [Plaintiff], he was terminated.
Plaintiff claims that other employees who engaged in similar conduct were not terminated by Defendant. He cites Jeanette Ayala and Jimmy Farris as examples. Jeanette Ayala was involved in a fight with a co-worker in 1983. Plaintiff claims that Jimmy Farris was involved in about four fights. However, the court notes that Jimmy Farris has not been employed by Defendant since 1984. Neither Jeanette Ayala nor Jimmy Farris worked under the same supervisor or superintendent as Plaintiff. Moreover, Paul Willman was not Human Resources Manager when they were employed by Defendant.
In his deposition, Plaintiff actually referred to an individual named "Jenetta Yellow." Defendant has never employed anyone by that name. Defendant concluded that Plaintiff must have been referring to Jeanette Ayala.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he has never seen anyone terminated for cursing. Alvin McCoy, an employee of Defendant during 1994 and 1995, also stated that, while working for Defendant, he never observed anyone being disciplined or terminated for using vulgar or profane language.
III. DISCUSSION A. Discriminatory Discharge Claim
The court has considered all of the arguments made in the parties' briefs. However, in the interest of brevity, unsupported, redundant, and irrelevant arguments are not repeated in this opinion.
Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff has presented no direct evidence of discriminatory motive on the part of Defendant. In considering a § 1981 claim that lacks direct evidence of discriminatory motive, the court is bound by the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) (adopting McDonnell Douglas framework for claims filed under § 1981). McDonnell Douglas provides a three-step, burden-shifting process by which to evaluate § 1981 cases. First, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Once Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Defendant. Defendant must offer a legitimate reason for the termination. See id. Finally, if Defendant offers a legitimate reason, the burden returns to Plaintiff. Plaintiff must establish "a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether [Defendant's] proffered reason for the challenged action is pretextual — i.e. unworthy of belief." Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995).
A plaintiff typically makes a showing of pretext in one of three ways: (1) with evidence that the defendant's stated reason for the adverse employment action was false . . .; (2) with evidence that the defendant acted contrary to a written company policy prescribing the action to be taken by the defendant under the circumstances . . .; or (3) with evidence that the defendant acted contrary to an unwritten policy or contrary to company practice when making the adverse employment decision affecting the plaintiff. A plaintiff who wishes to show that the company acted contrary to an unwritten policy or to company practice often does so by providing evidence that he was treated differently from other similarly-situated employees who violated work rules of comparable seriousness.
Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (citing Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997)). "Similarly-situated employees" are employees "`who deal with the same supervisor and are subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline.'" Aramburu, 112 F.3d at 1404 (quoting Wilson v. Utica Park Clinic, Inc., No. 95-5060, 1996 WL 50462, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 7, 1996) (citation omitted)). If Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case and present sufficient evidence of pretext, then his claim survives summary judgment.
In the instant case, Defendant has not challenged Plaintiff's ability to establish a prima facie case. The court will assume that Plaintiff is able to do so. The burden then shifts to Defendant to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff's termination. Defendant has met this burden, as evidenced by Paul Willman's statement. The burden then returns to Plaintiff to establish that Defendant's reasons are unworthy of belief. The only evidence Plaintiff offers of pretext is: (1) Plaintiff's own statement that he has never seen anyone terminated for cursing; (2) Alvin McCoy's similar statement; (3) the assertion that Jeanette Ayala and Jimmy Farris were treated differently; and (4) Plaintiff's declaration that he was not at fault in the incident with Sal Villa. This evidence is inadequate.
First, Plaintiff's and Alvin McCoy's statements are insufficient to establish pretext. Both stated that they have not "observed" or "seen" anyone fired for using profane language. Plaintiff, however, was not fired for merely using profane language. Paul Willman specified several other reasons for Plaintiff's termination. Neither Plaintiff's nor Alvin McCoy's statement affirmatively establishes that others have remained employed with Defendant after engaging in conduct similar to Plaintiff's conduct. Furthermore, the court notes that Alvin McCoy worked for Defendant in 1994 and 1995. The work rules which Plaintiff violated were not in effect until 1999. Consequently, Alvin McCoy is not competent to speak as to whether Defendant has fired anyone for engaging in conduct that violated the 1999 work rules.
Second, Plaintiff's argument regarding Jeanette Ayala and Jimmy Farris fails. Any alleged misconduct by those employees occurred more than fourteen years before Plaintiff was terminated. Any alleged misconduct presumably occurred while employees were subject to different rules. Furthermore, Jeanette Ayala and Jimmy Farris were not disciplined by the same supervisor, superintendent, or Human Resources Manager. See Aramburu, 112 F.3d at 1404 (quoting Wilson, 1996 WL 50462, at *1 (citation omitted)). The court concludes that no reasonable jury could find pretext from any comparatively lenient treatment of Jeanette Ayala and Jimmy Farris over fourteen years ago.
The court does not have any evidence before it which suggests that in the early 1980's, Defendant had rules in place similar to the 1999 rules. In the absence of such evidence, the court cannot assume that similar rules existed.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that because he was not the "aggressor" in the incident with Sal Villa, he was unfairly terminated. This argument also fails. While Plaintiff very well may not have been at fault in the incident, his innocence or fault is not for the court to decide. The record establishes that Defendant believed Plaintiff to be at fault. The court is "not required to resolve whether or not [Defendant's] belief was correct." Ryan v. Cohen, No. 98-6183, 1999 WL 38173, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 29, 1999). "The relevant inquiry is not whether [Defendant's] proffered reasons [for terminating Plaintiff] were wise, fair or correct, but whether [Defendant] honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs." Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Plaintiff offers no evidence which would suggest that Defendant did not honestly believe that Plaintiff was the aggressor or that Defendant did not act in good faith on that belief. Absent such evidence, the court cannot conclude that Defendant's reasons for Plaintiff's termination were pretextual. Plaintiff has failed to establish pretext, and summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff's discriminatory discharge claim.
B. Constitutional Argument
Plaintiff argues that plaintiffs are rarely, if ever, granted summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. Therefore, Plaintiff contends, the privileges of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available to Defendant, but not to Plaintiff. Plaintiff submits that such unavailability denies Plaintiff procedural due process and equal protection of the law. Plaintiff further submits that summary judgment violates his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
The court finds Plaintiff's arguments unpersuasive. Rule 56 is available to plaintiffs and defendants alike. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly held that summary judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641, 657 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Fid. Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1902)), overruled on other grounds by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997); Basolo v. Lubing, No. 97-8109, 1998 WL 458560, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1998); Payne v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, No. 00-2019, 2000 WL 1570547, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 2000). Accordingly, summary judgment is still appropriate on Plaintiff's discriminatory discharge claim.
C. Motion to Strike
Finally, Plaintiff has asked the court to strike portions of Defendant's brief in support of its summary judgment motion. The court has reviewed Plaintiff's arguments, and finds them without merit. For this reason, the court denies Plaintiff's motion to strike.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 51) is granted. Plaintiff's motion to strike (Doc. 59) is denied.
The case is closed.
Copies of this order shall be mailed to counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.