Opinion
NO. 22-C-589
12-14-2023
Stanley R. PALOWSKY, III, et al v. Allyson CAMPBELL, et al
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, STANLEY R. PALOWSKY, III, Joseph R. Ward, Jr., Covington COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, ALLYSON CAMPBELL, Lawrence W. Pettiette, Jr., Shreveport, Christopher G. Forester COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR, JUDGE CARL V. SHARP AND JUDGE J. WILSON RAMBO, Jon K. Guice, Justin N. Myers, Monroe
ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF OAUCHITA, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE JEROME J. BARBERA, III, NUMBER 15-2179
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, STANLEY R. PALOWSKY, III, Joseph R. Ward, Jr., Covington
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, ALLYSON CAMPBELL, Lawrence W. Pettiette, Jr., Shreveport, Christopher G. Forester
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR, JUDGE CARL V. SHARP AND JUDGE J. WILSON RAMBO, Jon K. Guice, Justin N. Myers, Monroe
Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois, Marc E. Johnson, and Stephen J. Windhorst
GRAVOIS, J.
1In this writ application, relators/defendants, Judge Carl V. Sharp and Judge J. Wilson Rambo, seek this Court’s supervisory review of the August 15, 2022 judgment of the trial court which denied their motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we grant the writ application, reverse the ruling, grant summary judgment in favor of Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo, and dismiss all claims against them.
By order of the Louisiana Supreme Court dated December 15, 2022, this matter was transferred from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal to this Court.
On July 22, 2015, Stanley R. Palowsky, III, individually and on behalf of Alternative Environmental Solutions, Inc. ("AESI"), filed an original Petition for Damages in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, naming as defendant Allyson Campbell, a law clerk employed by the court. Mr. Palowsky alleged in his petition that Ms. Campbell, acting under color of law but outside the course and scope of her employment duties as a law clerk, caused him injury in relation to another suit that Mr. Palowsky was a party to in the same court: Palowsky v. Cork, Docket No. 13-2059, Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita. Specifically, Mr. Palowsky alleged that Ms. Campbell "maliciously and intentionally harmed [Mr.] Palowsky and willfully violated his constitutionally-protected rights to both due process and access to courts in Palowsky v. Cork when she spoliated, concealed, removed, destroyed, shredded, withheld, and/or improperly ‘handled’ court documents such as memoranda of law, orders, pleadings, sealed court documents, and chamber copies of pleadings filed with the clerk and hand-delivered to the judge’s office," and Ms. Campbell "maliciously withheld and concealed documents and pleadings in the trial court as well as from 2the record that was sent to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal for its review of an application for supervisory writs filed by Cork." (Footnotes omitted.)
In the petition, Mr. Palowsky alleged that the following documents were withheld and concealed:
• AESI’s Opposition to Mr. Cork’s Motion to Strike Answer filed on January 13, 2014;
• Mr. Palowsky’s Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Clarify Protective Order filed on March 14, 2014;
• AESI’s Reply Memorandum to Clarify Language in Protective Order to Allow Proper Reporting of Crimes, Tax Fraud, Racketeering, and Conspiracy filed on June 24, 2014;
• AESI’s Opposition to Mr. Cork’s writ application filed on July 15, 2014;
• Mr. Palowsky’s Third Amending and Supplemental Petition and AESI’s Third Party Demand with attached order requesting leave to file same filed on August 13, 2014; and
• Mr. Palowsky’s and AESI’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Recuse Judge J. Wilson Rambo.
Before Mr. Palowsky filed his original petition in the present matter, the judge assigned to handle the Cork case, Judge J. Wilson Rambo, recused himself. The Cork case was then reassigned to Judge Carl V. Sharp. Subsequently, the entire bench of the Fourth Judicial District Court recused itself, and an ad hoc judge was appointed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
On July 31, 2015, Mr. Palowsky filed a First Supplemental, Amended, and Restated Petition for Damages. He named the following judges from the Fourth Judicial District Court as additional defendants: Chief Judge H. Stephens Winters, Judge Carl V. Sharp, Judge Benjamin Jones, Judge J. Wilson Rambo, and Judge Frederic C. Amman, hereinafter "the defendant judges." Therein, he asserted that Ms. Campbell’s actions constituted "fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, abuse of process, destruction or concealment of public records, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of his rights under the Louisiana Constitution to due process and access to courts." Further, Mr. Palowsky asserted that the defendant judges should be held liable in solido for the damages he suffered as a result of their "aiding and abetting [Ms.] Campbell by allowing her free rein to do 3as she pleased and then conspiring to conceal [Ms.] Campbell’s acts which compounded the adverse effects of her acts on [Mr.] Palowsky." He alleged that the defendant judges purposely concealed Ms. Campbell’s actions in order to maliciously defraud and harm him and deprive him of due process and access to the courts.
Further, Mr. Palowsky alleged that Ms. Campbell had a history of destroying and/or concealing court documents, and that the defendant judges have covered up such actions to protect Ms. Campbell. He specifically alleged that in 2012, an attorney, Cody Rials, made a complaint to Judge Sharp that Ms. Campbell withheld and/or shredded his proposed judgment in a suit he had pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court. The case was entitled Davidson vs. Davidson, case number 2008-2124. As part of an investigation into the matter, both Judge Sharp in 2012 and subsequently Judge Jones in 2014 interviewed an "eyewitness," later revealed to be Joey Grassi, who heard Ms. Campbell state that she "took great pleasure in shredding [Mr. Rials’ proposed] judgment." Mr. Palowsky alleged in the amended petition that the defendant judges’ "affirmative acts" to cover up Ms. Campbell’s "felonious conduct amounts to misprision of a felony."
In response to the First Supplemental, Amended, and Restated Petition, both Ms. Campbell and the defendant judges filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of action based on judicial immunity, and motions to strike allegations found in specifically enumerated paragraphs of the petition as redundant, immaterial, impertinent, and/or scandalous. The trial court struck numerous paragraphs in the petition and granted the exceptions of no cause of action on the basis of absolute judicial immunity, dismissing Mr. Palowsky’s suit against Ms. Campbell and the defendant judges with prejudice. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeal found that the trial court incorrectly struck some, but not all, of the paragraphs from the First Supplemental, Amended, and Restated Petition. Additionally, the 4First Circuit reversed the granting of the exception of no cause of action as to Ms. Campbell and affirmed the granting of the exception of no cause of action as to the defendant judges. Palowsky v. Campbell, 16-1221 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/11/18), 249 So.3d 945, 959-60.
In a per curiam opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit’s judgment insofar as it dismissed Mr. Palowsky’s claims against the defendant judges. In all other regards, the judgment of the First Circuit was affirmed. Palowsky v. Campbell, 18-1105 (La. 6/26/19), 285 So.3d 466, 467, reh’g denied, 18-1105 (La. 9/6/19), 278 So.3d 358, and cert. denied sub nom. Winters v. Palowsky, — U.S. —, 140 S.Ct. 2570, 206 L.Ed.2d 499 (2020).
Subsequently, after remand back to the Fourth Judicial District Court, the trial court ruled that La. C.E. art. 519 is applicable to the depositions of the defendant judges and granted a protective order regulating discovery in this matter, including not allowing discovery related to the subject matter contained in the allegations that were stricken from Mr. Palowsky’s petition. Mr. Palowsky sought supervisory review of the trial court’s judgment, and this Court denied the writ application. Palowsky v. Campbell, 21-279 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/26/21), 327 So.3d 589, writ denied, 21-1428 (La. 11/23/21), 328 So.3d 74.
On October 15, 2020, Mr. Palowsky filed a Second Supplemental and Amended Petition for Damages, asserting an additional cause of action against Judge Jones. In response, the defendant judges filed an exception of no cause of action, arguing that the actions taken by Judge Jones as alleged in the amended petition are entitled to the protections of absolute judicial immunity. The trial court sustained the exception of no cause of action, and this Court affirmed the ruling on appeal. Palowsky v. Campbell, 21-358 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/30/22), 337 So.3d 567.
In a Third Supplemental and Amended Petition filed on March 15, 2021, Mr. Palowsky named the defendant judges’ insurer as a defendant; however, because the insurer was incorrectly identified, Mr. Palowsky later filed a Fourth Supplemental and Amended Petition to correctly name Columbia Casualty Company as a defendant.
5On April 16, 2021, Ms. Campbell filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law since there is no evidence that she mishandled any documents in the Cork case and there is no statutory or contractual basis for Mr. Palowsky’s claim for attorney’s fees.
On that same date, the defendant judges also filed a motion, for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Palowsky cannot meet his burden of proof that Ms. Campbell destroyed or mishandled court documents and that the defendant judges engaged in any conspiracy, cover-up, aiding and abetting, or misprision of such actions. In the motion, the defendant judges argued that Mr. Palowsky never filed five out of the six allegedly missing pleadings, and Judge Rambo, while presiding over the Cork case, received and had the benefit of all documents presented by Mr. Palowsky. The defendant judges argued that there is no evidence that there was any conspiracy or "meeting of the minds" between the defendant judges and Ms. Campbell to cover up or conceal any alleged document mishandling. They asserted that Mr. Palowsky’s speculation and unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, and accordingly, they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, the defendant judges argued that Mr. Palowsky has no statutory or contractual basis for his claim for attorney’s fees.
In a combined opposition to both motions for summary judgment, Mr. Palowsky argued that though there may not be direct evidence to show that Ms. Campbell destroyed court documents in the Cork case, there is circumstantial evidence that would lead a fact finder to conclude that she destroyed and/or mishandled the documents, causing delays in the Cork case, and the defendant judges concealed her actions. Mr. Palowsky argued that there is evidence that Ms. Campbell had access to the Cork file, that she previously mishandled court documents, and that the defendant judges have protected her. Regarding attorney’s 6fees, Mr. Palowsky argued that he asserted a claim of abuse of process, which allows for attorney’s fees. Additionally, though he did not specifically plead entitlement to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), Mr. Palowsky argued that he is still entitled to attorney’s fees since he alleged violations of his constitutional rights to due process and access to courts.
Thereafter, the defendant judges filed a reply to the opposition to the motions for summary judgment and objected to and moved to strike the affidavit of Sedric Banks, provided in support of Mr. Palowsky’s opposition to the motions for summary judgment. The defendant judges also filed a "Motion to Strike Affidavits in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Costs," seeking to strike the affidavits of Mr. Palowsky and Mr. Banks attached in support of Mr. Palowsky’s opposition to the motions for summary judgment.
It appears that a reply to the opposition to the motions for summary judgment was also filed by Ms. Campbell; however, that reply was not made part of this writ application.
On August 9, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on both motions for summary judgment. The trial court first addressed Ms. Campbell’s and the defendant judges’ objections to the exhibits attached in support of Mr. Palowsky’s opposition to the motions for summary judgment. Regarding the defendant judges’ objections, the trial court found that Mr. Palowsky’s affidavit and the police report attached to Mr. Palowsky’s affidavit were inadmissible. The trial court struck Mr. Banks’ affidavit except for his statements regarding his delivery of the Cork documents to Judge Rambo’s office. As it relates to Ms. Campbell’s objections, the trial court found the following exhibits inadmissible: anything already stricken from the First Supplemental, Amended, and Restated Petition; the depositions of Judge Sharon Marchman, B.J. Graham, and Samuel Hanna; portions of Devin Jones’ deposition; the affidavits of Mr. Jones and Mr. Palowsky; and the affidavit 7of Mr. Banks, except for the parts discussing his delivery of Cork documents to Judge Rambo.
Following arguments by all parties, the trial court granted the defendant judges’ motion for summary judgment as to Judge Jones, Judge Winters, and Judge Amman, dismissing the action against them. As to Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo, the motion for summary judgment was granted only as to Mr. Palowsky’s claim for attorney’s fees. The trial court partially granted Ms. Campbell’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of attorney’s fees.
In its oral reasons for judgment, the trial court discussed each defendant judge. Pertinent to this writ application, the trial court found that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Judge Sharp concealed or protected Ms. Campbell when he knew or should have known that she concealed or destroyed a document in the Davidson case and whether this inaction contributed to her role, if any, in the missing Cork documents. The trial court found that there are genuine issues of material fact about how pleadings brought to Judge Rambo’s office are processed, who had access to them, whether any of the documents missing are still in Judge Rambo’s office, and Ms. Campbell’s involvement in handling and processing documents dropped off to Judge Rambo’s office. The trial court found that a reasonable factfinder could question whether Judge Rambo should have taken further action in 2012 after being advised of the allegations made in the Davidson case, and whether his inaction contributed to the alleged mishandling or destruction of documents in the Cork case.
Two separate final judgments were signed on August 15, 2022. Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo now seek this Court’s supervisory review of the denial of their motion for summary judgment. After reviewing the writ application, this Court 8gave the parties an opportunity to provide additional briefing and to request oral argument, if desired, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(H).
On December 16, 2022, Mr. Palowsky appealed both of the August 15, 2022 judgments, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the defendant judges’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing Judge Winters, Judge Amman, and Judge Jones, and erred in granting both motions for summary judgment on the issue of attorney's fees. The appeal, Docket Number 22-CA-592, has been designated a companion case to this writ application.
LAW
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Bell v. Parry, 10-369 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/23/10), 61 So.3d 1, 2. The summary judgment procedure is favored and is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). Under La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1), the initial burden is on the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must point out only that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. Id. The nonmoving party must then produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, summary judgment should be granted. Babino v. Jefferson Transit, 12-468 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/21/13), 110 So.3d 1123, 1125.
"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge’s role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor." Larson v. XYZ Ins, Co., 16-745 (La. 5/3/17), 226 So.3d 412, 416.
[1, 2] A fact is. "material" when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff’s cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. 9 Alexander v. Parish of St. John the Baptist, 12-173 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/16/12), 102 So.3d 904, 909, writ denied, 12-2448 (La. 1/11/13), 107 So.3d 617. Facts are material if they potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect a litigant’s ultimate success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute. Id.
[3] When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in La. C.C.P. art. 967, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in La. C.C.P. art. 967, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him. La. C.C.P. art. 967 (B); Pelitire v. Rinker, 18-501 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/17/19), 270 So.3d 817, 827, writ denied, 19-793 (La. 9/17/19), 279 So.3d 378. Mere conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation will not support a finding of a genuine issue of material fact. Sears v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 06-201 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/18/06), 943 So.2d 1219, 1228, writ denied, 06-2747 (La. 1/26/07), 948 So.2d 168. Even if contained in a deposition, such inferences, allegations, and speculation are not sufficient to satisfy the opponent’s burden of proof. Id.
[4] Appellate courts review a judgment granting or denying a motion for summary judgment de novo. Robinson v. Otis Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 20-359 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/3/21), 315 So.3d 356, 361, writ denied, 21-343 (La. 4/27/21), 314 So.3d 837. Under this standard, we use the same criteria as the trial court in determining if summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Parquet v. Louisiana HomeCare of Lutcher, L.L.C., 21-451 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/30/22), 337 So.3d 1002, 1009, reh’g denied (Apr. 20, 2022), writ denied, 22-802 (La. 9/20/22), 346 So.3d 801.
[5–7] Circumstantial evidence is evidence of a fact or set of facts from which the existence of the fact to be determined may reasonably be inferred. 10 Hanks v. Entergy Corp., 06-477 (La. 12/18/06), 944 So.2d 564, 578. When a party in a civil matter relies upon circumstantial evidence in order to prove his case by a preponderance of evidence, that evidence, taken as a whole, must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis with a fan amount of certainty, but it need not negate all other possible causes. Brown v. Evans Harvey Corp., 14-590 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/15/15), 170 So.3d 244, 249; Lacey v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Ltd., 452 So.2d 162 (La. 1984). Circumstantial evidence may be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Tomlinson v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 15-276 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16), 192 So.3d 153, 159.
ANALYSIS
[8] In this writ application, Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo argue that Mr. Palowsky failed to put forth evidence that Ms. Campbell destroyed documents in the Cork suit and that they were involved in the destruction of documents in any way. Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo argue that a past statement made by Ms. Campbell concerning a document in an unrelated case is not relevant to the issues involved in this litigation and should be found inadmissible. Even if admissible, Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo argue that the evidence surrounding Ms. Campbell’s past act in the Davidson case does not create a genuine issue of material fact in this case since the Davidson ease occurred in 2012, before the suit in Cork, it did not involve Mr. Palowsky, and Mr. Palowsky did not plead a claim for negligent supervision.
[9] A court’s determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists requires reference to the applicable substantive law. Neville v. Redmann, 22-175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/31/22), 356 So.3d 568, 575, writ denied, 23-126 (La. 4/4/23), 358 So.3d 861.
[10] In this matter, Mr. Palowsky claimed in his First Supplemental, Amended, and Restated Petition that the defendant judges "aid[ed] and abet[ted] [Ms.] 11Campbell by allowing her free rein to do as she pleased and then conspire[d] to conceal [Ms.] Campbell’s acts which compounded the adverse effects of her acts on [Mr.] Palowsky."
Mr. Palowsky also claimed in his amended petition that the defendant judges’ affirmative acts to cover up Ms. Campbell’s felonious conduct amounts to a "misprision of a felony." Importantly to note, the misprision of a felony statute was specifically repealed by the Legislature in 1942, per the recommendation of the reporter, See Official Reporter’s Comment – 1950 to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:131. See also, State v. Jackson, 344 So.2d 961 (La. 1977), disavowed on other grounds by State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La. 1983).
Additionally, absent a conspiracy, Louisiana law does not recognize a distinct cause of action for aiding and abetting. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 94-1758 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/15/95), 661 So.2d 1052, 1057, writ denied, 95-2498 (La. 1/5/96), 666 So.2d 295, and writ denied, 95-2490 (La. 1/5/96), 666 So.2d 295, and writ denied, 95-2477 (La. 1/5/96), 666 So.2d 296.
[11–14] La. C.C. art. 2324 provides that "[h]e who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person for the damage caused by such act." Louisiana law does not have an independent cause of action for civil conspiracy. Haygood v. Dies, 48,485 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/13), 127 So.3d 1008, 1013, writ denied, 13-2955 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1177. Rather, the actionable element of a conspiracy claim is not the conspiracy itself; rather it is the tort that the conspirators agreed to commit and actually commit, in whole or in part, causing plaintiff’s injury. Monroe v. McDaniel, 16-214 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/7/16), 207 So.3d 1172, 1179. To recover under a theory of civil conspiracy, a plaintiff is required to provide evidence of the requisite agreement between the parties to commit the tortious act which caused the plaintiff’s injury. Payne v. Stanley, 53,773 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/3/21), 316 So.3d 104, 112, writ denied, 21-480 (La. 5/25/21), 316 So.3d 445. The jurisprudence clearly requires a meeting of the minds or collusion between the parties for the purpose of committing wrongdoing. Stephens v. Bail Enforcement of La., 96-809 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97), 690 So.2d 124, 131, writ denied, 97-585 (La. 4/18/97), 692 So.2d 454; Crowder v. Morris, 98-673 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/28/98), 721 So.2d 972, 973.
[15, 16] 12A conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Khoobehi Properties, L.L.C. v. Baronne Dev. No. 2, L.L.C., 19-278 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/19), 288 So.3d 224, 233. Proof of a conspiracy can be by actual knowledge of both parties or overt actions with another, or can be inferred from the knowledge of the alleged co-conspirator of the impropriety of the actions taken by the other co-conspirator. Payne, 316 So.3d at 112.
Mr. Palowsky bears the burden of proof at trial as to his claims that Ms. Campbell destroyed court documents and the defendant judges conspired with her to cover-up the alleged document destruction. The defendant judges then had the burden on summary judgment to point out an absence of factual support for one or more elements, of Mr. Palowsky’s claims. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendant judges submitted their affidavits. In Judge Sharp’s affidavit, he stated that he served as a judge on the Fourth Judicial District Court from January 1, 1993 until he retired, effective July 31, 2018. Ms. Campbell previously served as his judicial law clerk. He stated that he presided over the Cork case. He never witnessed Ms. Campbell destroy, shed, secret, or mishandle court documents in any manner. He neither assisted nor encouraged Ms. Campbell or any employee of the Fourth Judicial District Court, to destroy, conceal, or mishandle court documents. He has no knowledge that any person actually destroyed or mishandled any court documents. He has not concealed or covered up any alleged destruction or mishandling of court documents and never refused to review and investigate any complaints of alleged document destruction, including complaints about Ms. Campbell. He never made an agreement with Ms. Campbell to commit any illegal act, cause injury to Mr. Palowsky, or defeat, delay, hinder, or otherwise impair the claims asserted by Mr. Palowsky in the Cork matter.
13In late 2012, he received a phone call from Joey Grassi who relayed a conversation that he had had with Ms. Campbell on October 31, 2012. It was alleged that Ms. Campbell stated that she shredded a proposed judgment submitted by attorney Cody Rials in the Davidson case. Judge Sharp investigated the allegations and met with Mr. Rials. He reviewed the entire case file and found that no proposed judgment was destroyed or shredded. He stated that he reviewed the proposed judgment submitted by Mr. Rials prior to signing a judgment in the case. He discussed this with Mr. Rials and informed him that Ms. Campbell would be removed from his case. He did not attempt to conceal or cover-up his investigation. In 2014, Judge Jones reinvestigated the matter after Mr. Rials reurged the matter in a written complaint. Judge Jones interviewed Judge Sharp as part of that process. Judge Sharp confirmed that he received and reviewed the proposed judgment in question.
In Judge Rambo’s affidavit, he stated that he started serving as a judge on the Fourth Judicial District Court on January 1, 2003. Ms. Campbell previously served as his law clerk, and he was responsible for supervising and evaluating her work product and job activities during that time. He did preside over the Cork case for a brief period of time, and during that time, he made two rulings apart from his recusal order, both of which favored Mr. Palowsky. He received, reviewed, and considered all documents presented on behalf of Mr. Palowsky and all documents that Mr. Palowsky alleges to have been destroyed or mishandled.
Judge Rambo further attested that he never witnessed or observed Ms. Campbell shred, destroy, secret, or otherwise mishandle court documents in any manner and never encouraged or assisted Ms. Campbell or any other employee of the Fourth Judicial District Court to destroy or mishandle court documents. He has no knowledge of any documents actually being destroyed. He never concealed or covered-up any alleged destruction of court documents by Ms. Campbell. He 14never refused to investigate or review any complaints of document destruction. When Mr. Banks made a complaint that a memorandum was missing, he asked all counsel to provide him with the pleadings he should have to consider. He hand-delivered all original pleadings to the Clerk of Court. All complaints against Ms. Campbell were investigated, there was no eyewitness to an any alleged document destruction, and he never discovered any evidence that Ms. Campbell actually destroyed or mishandled any court documents. He never agreed with Ms. Campbell to commit any illegal act, engage in injurious conduct, or cause injury to Mr. Palowsky. He never agreed with Ms. Campbell to defeat, delay, hinder or otherwise impair the claims asserted by Mr. Palowsky in the Cork matter.
The defendant judges also submitted the deposition of Laura Hartt. Ms. Hartt first worked as the Deputy Court Administrator for the Fourth Judicial District Court and then worked as the Court Administrator from April 2014 until April 2015. In August 2014, Mr. Banks made a complaint to Ms. Hartt that Judge Rambo was not getting his documents in the Cork case. She brought the issue to the personnel committee but did not personally investigate any further. Judge Jones investigated the matter, and it was determined that the issues were caused by a change in the filing process in the Clerk of Court’s office.
On September 11, 2014, Ms. Hartt wrote a letter to Mr. Banks regarding his complaint. The letter states that she and Judge Jones investigated the matter. They learned that the filing process had changed in the Clerk of Court’s office, and this explained why some filings did not come to Judge Rambo’s attention timely. With the new process, when a record is checked out by a judge and new filings are thereafter made with the Clerk of Court, the new filings stay in the Clerk’s office until the record is returned by the judge. Judge Rambo repeated that no filings were withheld from him. She noted that she understood from Judge Rambo that he 15had spoken with Mr. Banks about the issue in a status conference and a ruling had been made.
In Mr. Grassi’s deposition, he related that he had a conversation with Ms. Campbell at Trio’s Bar & Grill in October 2012. He had known prior to that night that Ms. Campbell and Mr. Rials had gotten into a "verbal altercation" on the phone regarding a case. In conversation with Ms. Campbell, he "poked the bear a little bit" and mentioned that he heard that they had gotten "into it." She asked if he knew Mr. Rials, and he replied that he "couldn’t stand the son-of-a-b****." He then stated that Ms. Campbell started discussing the issue she had on the phone with Mr. Rials. She finished the conversation with Mr. Grassi by stating that "she took great pleasure in shredding his judgment," Mr. Grassi informed both Judge Sharp and Mr. Rials about their conversation. In August 2014, he received a call from Judge Jones, who told him they were taking the allegations seriously, and he was investigating the matter.
In Mr. Rials deposition, he stated that he has no personal knowledge about Ms. Campbell mishandling documents in the Cork case and has no personal knowledge about any of the documents that are listed as missing in the petition. He explained that he was counsel in the Davidson domestic case in 2012. When he was told about what Ms. Campbell had said to Mr. Grassi in reference to the Davidson case, he reported it to Judge Sharp in an effort to protect his client. He had no personal knowledge that she shredded a document.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Palowsky argued that though he does not have direct evidence that Ms. Campbell destroyed documents in his case, there is circumstantial evidence to support that she destroyed the documents. He argues that her history of document destruction in the Davidson case that was covered-up by the defendant judges is sufficient to show that she destroyed the missing documents in the Cork case and that the 16defendant judges conspired to conceal her destruction of Mr. Palowsky’s documents.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Palowsky submitted the affidavit of Jay Nolen, who stated that he spent time reviewing the Cork record in the Clerk of Court’s office and found five missing pleadings. He also found that the Third Amending and Supplemental Petition was available online but not in the actual paper record.
Dana Benson; Clerk of Court for the Fourth Judicial District Court, testified as to the procedures when pleadings are filed in the Clerk’s office. She explained that if something is brought to the Clerk’s office, it is date stamped and signed. If a pleading needed a judge’s signature, the Clerk’s office would make copies of the pleading. Then, the judge’s assistant would come down and take the original to the judge’s office for the judge to sign. After it went up to the judge, she stated that it should go back to the Clerk for processing. She stated that when a record is returned, there is no process to make sure everything is there and nothing was added.
Laura Hartt, the Court Administrator, testified in her deposition regarding the allegations in the Davidson case. In 2012, Mr. Rials contacted her to make a "formal complaint" in the Davidson case. The allegations were investigated, but she was not part of it. To her knowledge, Judge Sharp did not have any documentation concerning his investigation. When she discussed the matter with Judge Sharp, he told her that Ms. Campbell probably did destroy documents, but it didn’t matter either way if the public believed she did. He told Ms. Hartt that the court needed to respond "in an admonishment of [Ms. Campbell] in such a way if she had done it."
In Mr. Rials’ deposition, he stated that after Mr. Grassi told him about what Ms. Campbell had said, he filed a motion to reconsider in his case "to get back 17before the court." He clarified that he did not know for sure what she said or didn’t say; he only knows what was told to him by Mr. Grassi. In response, there was a hearing in chambers with opposing counsel and Judge Sharp. They ultimately agreed to a consent judgment in the litigation. In 2014, after reading an article Ms. Campbell wrote in the newspaper, he sent an email to Vickie Green, a hearing officer, regarding his concerns about Ms. Campbell. He then spoke with Judge Manning and Ms. Hartt on the phone, and told them about what had happened. He followed that up with a letter, explaining everything. He did not hear about any other allegations of document destruction by Ms. Campbell besides those in Cork.
Mr. Grassi stated in his deposition that after his encounter with Ms. Campbell, he called Judge Sharp. He had two, possibly three conversations with Judge Sharp. In 2012, Judge Sharp told him that they did investigate, and they felt like there was no wrongdoing as far as document shredding. Judge Sharp told him that he personally remembered getting both judgments, that it might have been inappropriate for her to say something like that, and that they’ve taken action. Judge Sharp wanted him to know that they didn’t find any basis for what she relayed to him.
Judge Sharp testified in his deposition regarding the allegations in the Davidson case. Mr. Grassi informed him that Ms. Campbell had stated that she destroyed or shredded Mr. Rials’ judgment, He looked into the matter and was satisfied that Ms. Campbell had not destroyed anything. He indicated that he did believe that Ms. Campbell had said something similar to what Mr. Grassi reported. He discussed the matter with Ms. Campbell, and she admitted that she had made an improper comment to Mr. Grassi along the lines of what he had reported. He was satisfied that Ms. Campbell had not destroyed any judgment. He saw both judgments originally submitted, and assumes they are in the record.
18On November 28, 2012, Judge Sharp wrote a letter to Mr. Rials with a notation that carbon copies were sent to Ms. Campbell and Judge Rambo. In the letter, Judge Sharp stated that he was aware of Mr. Rials’ concern about the possibility that Ms. Campbell is biased against him. Judge Sharp wrote that he discussed the matter with Ms. Campbell and decided Mr. Rials’ concern was "reasonable." As such, he wrote that Ms. Campbell was directed to remove herself from any involvement or work on any case in which he is counsel or otherwise involved. When asked about the letter at his deposition, Judge Sharp explained that what he meant was that he had a reasonable cause to be concerned or to believe that Ms. Campbell was biased against Mr. Rials. He stated that he may have discussed the matter with Judge Rambo. In 2014, he received a telephone call from Judge Jones, and he told him what he remembered about the incident in 2012. That was the extent of his communication with Judge Jones.
In Judge Rambo’s deposition, he reiterated that he reviewed the alleged missing documents and made his ruling in the Cork case. He did not know what happened to the documents afterwards, as it was not his job to maintain the record. After the motion to recuse was granted, he had nothing more to do with the case. He stated that when Ms. Campbell worked as his law clerk, she would go to the Clerk’s, office and check out a record that was on his docket for hearing. She would take the record to the law clerk’s office to review and prepare and then bring the record to him. They would review the record and her work, and then he would take everything with him to court. If he ruled in open court, he would then return the record in open court to the minute clerk. When allegations of missing documents arose in the Cork matter, he had a telephone conference with all the lawyers on the case and asked that they send him correspondence listing everything they filed in the case. Everyone turned in a list, and he went down the list and made sure he had an original or copy of everything on the list. He made 19his ruling, and then he turned everything over to the Clerk’s office. He has no evidence that Ms. Campbell "did anything." The only thing he recalls her working on in the Cork case was a Motion to Strike, challenging Mr. Banks’ right to remain in the case. When Judge Jones investigated the allegations of destruction, Judge Jones asked him if he knew of any document being destroyed or missing, and he told him no.
Judge Rambo stated that he had nothing to do with the investigation in the Davidson case since it wasn’t his case. He did not recall knowing about Mr. Rials’ complaint in 2012. When questioned about the letter Judge Sharp wrote on November 28, 2012 in which Judge Rambo was copied, he did not deny that he received the letter, but stated that he would have left the matter with Judge Sharp to investigate since he was the presiding judge.
In Judge Jones’ deposition, he stated that he investigated the allegations in the Davidson matter in 2014 because he was the senior judge at the time and was asked to investigate. He stated that he did not have any previous knowledge about the 2012 investigation when he began his 2014 investigation. As part of the investigation, Judge Jones interviewed Mr. Grassi who told him what he knew: that he was at a "club" when Ms. Campbell told him something like that she delighted in shredding a judgement. When questioned if he believed Mr. Grassi, Judge Jones responded, "I believe, yes, that he was telling the truth when he said he heard [Ms. Campbell] say that she shredded documents – delighted in shredding." He did not talk to Ms. Campbell during his investigation in 2014 because he talked to the presiding judge, Judge Sharp. During their conversation, he specifically asked Judge Sharp whether there were any missing documents, and Judge Sharp responded that there were no missing judgment or documents. He took that as the truth and ended his investigation. When allegations arose in the Cork matter, he was asked to investigate. He conferred with Ms. Hartt and met with Judge Rambo. 20Judge Rambo informed him that there were no missing filings that should have come to him in connection with his decision in the case.
According to Ms. Campbell, she was never contacted by Judge Jones in 2014 about the allegations in the Davidson case. She wrote to Judge Jones on March 12, 2015 because she wanted a statement placed in her personnel file that said that she did not have anything to do with any allegations in the Cork matter.
Upon our de novo review, we find Mr. Palowsky failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact remains that Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo conspired to conceal Ms. Campbell’s alleged destruction of documents in the Cork case. Judge Rambo, whom Ms. Campbell worked for on the Cork case, stated that he has no evidence that Ms. Campbell "did anything" to the record. When allegations of missing documents were brought to his attention, he met with both parties in the Cork case to review the record and then made his ruling. When Judge Jones investigated the allegations of destruction, Judge Jones asked him if he knew of any document being destroyed or missing, and he told him no. Though he may have been aware of the investigation in 2012 in the Davidson case, he stated he had nothing to do with the investigation since it wasn’t his case; he left it with Judge Sharp to investigate since he was the presiding Judge. Neither Mr. Rials nor Mr. Grassi discussed Judge Rambo when testifying in their depositions about the allegations in the Davidson case. The evidence Mr. Pa- lowsky put forth regarding Judge Sharp surrounds his involvement in the Davidson case, not the present litigation. Judge Sharp stated that he looked into the allegations against Ms. Campbell in the Davidson case and was satisfied that Ms. Campbell had not destroyed anything.
[17] As established, the actionable element of a conspiracy is not the conspiracy itself, but the tort the conspirators agreed to commit and actually commit, in whole or part, causing plaintiff’s injury. Louisiana courts require an agreement between the parties and "that the agreement between the actors involved in a conspiracy 21must be an agreement as to the intended outcome or result of their acts." Walker v. American Honda Motor Co., 93-1659 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/1/94), 640 So.2d 794, 797, writ denied, 94-1741 (La. 10/7/94), 644 So.2d 644. We find that Mr. Palowsky has failed to put forth sufficient evidence that Ms. Campbell and Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo agreed to destroy documents in the Cork case and agreed to conceal the document destruction. The evidence Mr. Palowsky puts forth that the allegations in Davidson show that Ms. Campbell conspired with the judges to conceal Ms. Campbell’s alleged actions and harm Mr. Palowsky in the Cork case are purely speculative. We cannot infer a conspiracy from the evidence presented. Conclusory allegations and unsupported speculation will not support the finding of a genuine issue of material fact; such allegations and speculation are insufficient to satisfy the opponent’s burden of proof. See Sears, 943 So.2d at 1228.
Therefore, following our de novo review, we conclude that Mr. Palowsky failed to demonstrate that he could carry his burden of proof at trial, and accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we grant this writ application, reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment filed by Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo, grant summary judgment in favor of Judge Sharp and Judge Rambo, and dismiss Mr. Palowsky’s claims against them with prejudice.
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED; SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED; CLAIMS DISMISSED