Opinion
2011-08-9
Michael PALMERI, appellant,v.Cindy PALMERI, respondent
Domenick J. Porco, Scarsdale, N.Y., for appellant.Banks Curran Schwam & Squirrell, LLP, Mount Kisco, N.Y. (David J. Squirrell of counsel), for respondent.
Domenick J. Porco, Scarsdale, N.Y., for appellant.Banks Curran Schwam & Squirrell, LLP, Mount Kisco, N.Y. (David J. Squirrell of counsel), for respondent.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals (1), as limited by his brief, from so much of an amended order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Tolbert, J.), entered April 22, 2010, as granted the defendant's motion for pendente lite relief to the extent of directing him to pay temporary maintenance in the sum of $7,500 per month and interim counsel fees in the sum of $100,000, and (2) from an order of the same court entered November 9, 2010, which granted the defendant's motion for an award of additional interim counsel fees to the extent of directing him to pay the sum of $40,000.
ORDERED that the amended order entered April 22, 2010, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order entered November 9, 2010, is affirmed; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.
An award of interim counsel fees is designed to create parity in divorce litigation by enabling the nonmonied spouse to litigate the action on equal footing with the monied spouse ( see O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 N.Y.2d 187, 193, 689 N.Y.S.2d 8, 711 N.E.2d 193; Gaffney–Romanello v. Romanello, 82 A.D.3d 930, 918 N.Y.S.2d 736; Meltzer v. Meltzer, 63 A.D.3d 702, 882 N.Y.S.2d 422; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d 61, 65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667). Thus, “an award of interim counsel fees to the nonmonied spouse will generally be warranted where there is a significant disparity in the financial circumstances of the parties” ( Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d at 65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667). Here, the husband earned more than $3 million from his medical practice in 2008, and the resources available to him far exceed those available to the wife, who was unemployed at the time she sought pendente lite relief. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding her interim counsel fees totaling $140,000 ( see Witter v. Daire, 81 A.D.3d 719, 720, 917 N.Y.S.2d 870; Amante v. Amante, 78 A.D.3d 622, 909 N.Y.S.2d 666; Penavic v. Penavic, 60 A.D.3d 1026, 1028–1029, 877 N.Y.S.2d 118; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d at 66–67, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667; Dodson v. Dodson, 46 A.D.3d 305, 846 N.Y.S.2d 576; Stubbs v. Stubbs, 41 A.D.3d 832, 833, 839 N.Y.S.2d 511).
Furthermore, the husband has demonstrated no basis on which to modify the award of temporary maintenance to the wife. “Modifications of pendente lite awards should rarely be made by an appellate court and then only under exigent circumstances, such as where a party is unable to meet his or her financial obligations, or justice otherwise requires” ( Malik v. Malik, 66 A.D.3d 968, 968, 886 N.Y.S.2d 826 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Conyea v. Conyea, 81 A.D.3d 869, 870, 917 N.Y.S.2d 874; Levy v. Levy, 72 A.D.3d 651, 652, 897 N.Y.S.2d 910; Bogannam v. Bogannam, 20 A.D.3d 442, 797 N.Y.S.2d 776). The husband has not established that the temporary maintenance
obligation imposed upon him by the Supreme Court's pendente lite order will leave him unable to meet his own needs, or that other exigent circumstances warranting modification exist. Accordingly, any perceived inequities in the pendente lite order can best be remedied by a speedy trial, at which the parties' financial circumstances can be throughly explored ( see Conyea v. Conyea, 81 A.D.3d at 870, 917 N.Y.S.2d 874; Levy v. Levy, 72 A.D.3d at 652, 897 N.Y.S.2d 910; Malik v. Malik, 66 A.D.3d at 969, 886 N.Y.S.2d 826; Stubbs v. Stubbs, 41 A.D.3d at 833, 839 N.Y.S.2d 511; Bogannam v. Bogannam, 20 A.D.3d 442, 797 N.Y.S.2d 776).
DILLON, J.P., ENG, SGROI and MILLER, JJ., concur.