Opinion
06-23-00173-CR
08-23-2024
BRANDON EVERETT PALMER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish
Date Submitted: July 10, 2024
On Appeal from the 202nd District Court Bowie County, Texas Trial Court No. 22F0077-202
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice
Brandon Everett Palmer appeals his conviction of aggravated sexual assault. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021. After the jury found one enhancement allegation to be true, Palmer was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Palmer contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence to show that he held down the Victim and restrained her movements, as alleged in the indictment, and (2) the testimony of unspecified threats against trial witness, Jequenda Green, was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Because we find that there was sufficient evidence to support Palmer's conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Palmer also appeals his conviction of continuous trafficking of persons in our cause number 06-23-00172-CR. Likewise, he appeals his conviction of possession of a prohibited item in a correctional facility in our cause number 06-23-00174-CR.
The trial court's judgment of conviction shows that Palmer pled true to one enhancement paragraph.
In this case, there was overwhelming evidence that Palmer was guilty of aggravated sexual assault. For this and other reasons discussed in depth in our opinion in cause number 06-23-00172-CR, we, likewise, find in this matter that Palmer was unharmed by the admission of Davis's testimony regarding alleged threats made to Green.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first point of error, Palmer maintains that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that he committed aggravated sexual assault.
A. Standard of Review
"In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2019, pet. ref'd) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W3d 859, 863 (Tex App-Texarkana 2010, pet ref'd)) "Our rigorous [legal sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented" Id. (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917-18 (Cochran, J, concurring)). "We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury 'to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.'" Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
"In our review, we consider 'events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.'" Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985))). "It is not required that each fact 'point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.'" Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). "Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone." Id. (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004))). "Further, 'we must consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, even if that evidence was improperly admitted.'" Id. at 297-98 (quoting Fowler v. State, 517 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2017) (citing Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)), rev'd in part, 544 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
"Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge." Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). "The 'hypothetically correct' jury charge is 'one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.'" Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
B. Discussion
In its indictment, the State alleged that
on or about April 1, 2021[,] through on or about May 31, 2021, [Palmer] did unlawfully then and there act in concert with Rashaan Cunningham, by holding down and restricting the movement of Adult Victim #8 and during the course of the same criminal episode, Rashaan Cunningham, did intentionally and knowingly cause the penetration of the sexual organ of Adult Victim #8, by Rashaan Cunningham's sexual organ, without the consent of the Adult Victim #8.
Palmer concedes that "there was evidence that [he] held down the arms of the [V]ictim and, in that sense restricted the [V]ictim's movements." However, according to Palmer, "there was no evidence that [he] held down the [V]ictim, as specifically alleged in the indictment."
Palmer's argument is vague and ambiguous. That said, we will address whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that when Palmer held down the victim's arms, he actually prevented or restricted her movements.
Palmer directs the Court to the Victim's testimony. It is as follows:
A. [Palmer] was behind me, and he had his hands on each of my arms.
....
Q. So while Fashion, or Rashaan, was having sex with you, did [Palmer] stay behind you holding your arms the whole time?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Although that portion of the Victim's testimony is relevant to the issue before us, there is other relevant testimony from the Victim describing the incident in more detail.
For instance, the Victim also testified that, before the assault, she believed that Palmer added drugs to her drink because she began to feel "real heavy." Describing how she felt, she explained, "Like I could barely lift my arms, my -- I felt like I couldn't move at all." She continued, "From the drink, everything just -- I ended up on the floor, and I don't -- I don't remember how." The next thing she recalled is that her "arms were stretched out above [her] head, and [her] pants were being [taken] off" by Rashaan. She explained, "[Palmer] was behind me, and he had his hands on each of my arms." The Victim said that she was unable to move or push Palmer or Rashaan off her. She stated, "I couldn't even move my arms up." The Victim also testified that she was certain that Palmer "restrict[ed]" her movement when he held her down while Rashaan had sex with her. Despite her continued pleas for them to stop, Palmer and Rashaan changed positions, and while Rashaan held her down, Palmer sexually assaulted her.
To the extent Palmer is arguing that there was insufficient evidence to show that the Victim's movements were actually restricted when he held down her arms, we disagree. The jury heard the Victim testify to that very thing. Moreover, if Palmer is complaining that the State failed to prove that he was acting in concert with Rashaan, the Victim's testimony clearly supported those facts. For these reasons, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support Palmer's conviction of aggravated sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, we overrule Palmer's first point of error.
II. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.