" Largo v. Atchison, Topeka Santa Fe Ry., 2002-NMCA-021, ¶ 5, 131 N.M. 621, 41 P.3d 347. "We interpret the intention of Congress and the meaning of its statutes de novo." Palmer v. St. Joseph Healthcare P.S.O., Inc., 2003-NMCA-118, ¶ 17, 134 N.M. 405, 77 P.3d 560, cert. granted, 134 N.M. 374, 77 P.3d 278 (2003), dismissed, 2004-NMCERT-010, 136 N.M. 542, 101 P.3d 808. Furthermore, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, "all well-pleaded factual allegations" are accepted as true, and all doubts are resolved "in favor of the sufficiency of the complaint." Padwa, 1999-NMCA-067, ¶ 8, 127 N.M. 416, 981 P.2d 1234. The only question is "whether the plaintiff might prevail under any state of facts provable under the claim.
The term "relating to" has been construed in other contexts, and is generally held to have a broad meaning unless a narrow construction is what the legislature intended. Palmer v. St. Joseph Health Care P.S.O. Inc., 134 N.M. 405, 413, 77 P.3d 560, 568 (N.M.Ct.App. 2003) (discussing the terms "relating to" and "relates to" as found in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, ERISA preemption, and the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965). A lease agreement covering equipment used at a construction site clearly is an agreement "relating to construction," as defined in N.M. Stat. § 56-7-1(D).
The term "relating to" has been construed in other contexts, and in generally held to have a broad meaning unless a narrow construction is what the legislature intended. Palmer v. St. Joseph Health Care P.S.O. Inc., 134 N.M. 405, 413, 77 P.3d 560, 568 (Ct.App. 2003) (discussing the terms "relating to" and "relates to" found in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, ERISA preemption and the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965). A lease agreement covering equipment used at a construction site is an agreement "relating to construction" as defined in § 56-7-1.
The Medicare Act does not completely preempt all state law claims. See Hofler v. AETNA U.S. Healthcare of Cal., Inc., 296 F.3d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding Medicare Act does not preempt state law claims against healthcare providers);Ardary v. AETNA Health Plans of Cal., Inc., 98 F.3d 496, 501 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding administrative procedures under Medicare Act do not preempt state law claims when claims do not "arise under" the Act);Nott v. AETNA U.S. Healthcare. Inc., 2004 WL 103176 (E.D. Pa. Jan, 23, 2004) (holding the Medicare Act does not preempt state law claims because (i) there is no civil enforcement scheme under Medicare to replace the state law system and (ii) the Act does not clearly express Congressional intent to preempt all state law claims); Palmer v. St. Joseph Healthcare P.S.O., Inc., 77 P.3d 560, 134 N.M. 405 (Ct.App. 2003) (holding Medicare Act does not preempt claims against health care providers under New Mexico. law). Olsen suggests that 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26 preempts his state law claims and that he must proceed in a federal forum.
Thus, pre[ ]emption will not lie unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." CSX Transp, Inc. v. Easterwood , 507 U.S. 658, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U.S. 504, 516-17, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (stating that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the [s]tates are not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress" and that "Congress’ enactment of a provision defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted" (alterations, omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); see also Palmer v. St. Joseph Healthcare P.S.O., Inc. , 2003-NMCA-118, ¶¶ 38-39, 134 N.M. 405, 77 P.3d 560 (stating the general preemption principles applied by appellate courts in New Mexico, including the "strong presumption against preemption" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {8} Tavenner’s argues that the FAAAA expressly preempts Plaintiffs’ state common-law claims.
{11} Acknowledging Buckman, the New Mexico Supreme Court has observed that the states do not police fraud against federal agencies. See Palmer v. St. Joseph Healthcare P.S.O., Inc., 2003-NMCA-118, ¶ 56, 134 N.M. 405, 77 P.3d 560 ("[P]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly a field which the States have traditionally occupied." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{14} We review summary judgment de novo when the material facts are undisputed. Palmer v. St. Joseph Healthcare P.S.O., Inc., 2003-NMCA-118, ¶ 17, 134 N.M. 405, 77 P.3d 560. "We interpret the intention of Congress and the meaning of its statutes de novo."