Opinion
2:00-CV-0353
June 12, 2001
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL
On this day came for consideration plaintiffs "Motion to Recuse the Honorable Mary Lou Robinson" filed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, section 144, on June 4, 2001, in the above-referenced and numbered cause. Plaintiff argues sections of the May 22, 2001, Memorandum Opinion reflect such "pervasive bias and prejudice" as to present an exception to the rule that disqualifying bias must stem from an extrajudicial source. It appears plaintiffs dissatisfaction is really based on the Court's adverse ruling in this cause; however, this is not grounds for disqualification. United States v. Azhocar. 581 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907, 99 S.Ct. 1213, 59 L.Ed.2d 454 (1979) (cited with approval in United States v. Clark, 605 F.2d 933, 942 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 541 (5th Cir. 1977).
Final judgment has already issued in this cause. Nevertheless, in light of plaintiff's Rule 59 motion, filed June 4, 2001, the Court will consider the instant motion to recuse as timely. Affording plaintiffs Affidavit full credibility, the disparity between plaintiff's and the Court's characterizations of plaintiff's allegation against defendants HAMULA and WILLIAMSON, the denomination of the affidavits appended to plaintiff's complaint as "unsworn affidavits," and the treatment of his factual allegations concerning prison officials' knowledge of danger to plaintiff do not create the appearance of impropriety treated in United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995), nor do they show the kind of personal bias or pervasive prejudice treated in United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44, 46-47 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (judge's comments to plaintiff out of presence of jury reflected personal prejudice against defendant for successfully appealing his conviction on basis of that judge's action during earlier trial). Instead, plaintiffs arguments concern legal issues which might be properly raised on appeal and which demonstrate disagreement concerning the characterization and legal significance of certain of plaintiff's allegations, not judicial bias.
A reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would not conclude that the judge had knowledge of facts which would give the judge an interest in the litigation or that the judicial actions or omissions alleged by plaintiff were motivated by bias on the part of the District Judge for or against the plaintiff or the defendants.
Therefore recusal is not appropriate under the relevant statutes or governing canon.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's motion for recusal of the District Judge is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED