Opinion
No. CV-05-4011575
October 15, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#162)
The defendant, New Britain General Hospital, has moved for summary judgment on counts four through six of plaintiff's complaint. The case arises from an incident in which the Newington police took the plaintiff into protective custody pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-683(b). The plaintiff was transported to New Britain General Hospital by the co-defendant Newington Ambulance Corporation. Count four of the complaint alleges false imprisonment, count five alleges assault and battery and count six alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is denied.
At the time the suit was filed, the ambulance company was known as Newington Volunteer Ambulance Corp. The name has since changed to the present name.
A brief procedural history is necessary. The plaintiff filed his six-count complaint in state court on or about May 15, 2005. The plaintiff sued four defendants: two members of the Newington police department, the Newington Ambulance Corporation and New Britain General Hospital. Count three of the complaint alleged the use of excessive force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by the two officers of the Newington police department. The plaintiff also alleged that the police officers exceeded their authority under General Statutes § 17a-683. The case was removed to the United States District Court in Hartford. The police officers filed a motion for summary judgment on the federal claim contained in count three, which motion was granted by the court, Chatigny, J. Palmer v. Garuti, No. 3:06-CV-795, 2009 WL 413129 (February 17, 2009). The court found that while the officers did not have probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was "incapacitated" under the statute, the police officers were entitled to immunity for their actions. The remaining state claims were remanded to the superior court.
On May 5, 2009 the defendant New Britain General Hospital filed this motion for summary judgment. On May 19, 2009 the defendant Newington Ambulance Corporation filed its motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed a consolidated motion and memorandum in opposition. Oral argument was held on September 14, 2009.
At oral argument, the plaintiff withdrew his objection to Newington Ambulance Corporation's motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment on the motion (see #165).
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivers v. New Britain, 288 Conn. 1, 10 (2008).
The following facts, relevant to the motion filed by the defendant New Britain General Hospital, are not in dispute. On May 25, 2003, in the early morning hours, the Newington police were called to Club 2001 on a report of an intoxicated person. The plaintiff was taken into protective custody by the police, pursuant to General Statute § 17a-683(b). He was transported to the hospital by Newington Ambulance Corporation. The plaintiff arrived at the New Britain Hospital emergency room at 2:36 a.m. At 2:40 a.m. an emergency room nurse performed a triage assessment of the plaintiff. In order to perform a triage assessment of the plaintiff, the nurse needed him to change into hospital clothes. The plaintiff initially refused to change into hospital attire. At approximately 3:10 a.m., a hospital nurse drew his blood for evaluation of his blood alcohol level. Shortly thereafter, at 3:24 a.m., the plaintiff ran from the emergency department of the hospital clad only in the hospital gown. Hospital security officers followed the plaintiff into a nearby park and he was returned to the hospital by ambulance, arriving back at the hospital at 3:45 a.m. At 4:00 a.m., the plaintiff was examined by a physician's assistant. The blood alcohol level test indicated that his was 0.12%. The plaintiff was released at 5:15 a.m.
Under local federal court rule 56(a)(1), the movant for summary judgment must file a statement which sets forth material facts supported by the evidence. The opponent is required to respond by admitting or denying the facts. The facts set forth herein are those admitted by the plaintiff in the district court; see Provencher v. Town of Enfield, 283 Conn. 772, 792 (2007) (factual allegations in pleadings are considered judicial admissions), Edmands v. CUNO, Inc., 277 Conn. 425, 454 (2006) (an admission in pleading dispenses with proof); as well as those facts that the plaintiff detailed in his memorandum of support in opposition to summary judgment.
General Statutes § 17a-683(b) provides in pertinent part "Any police officer finding a person who appears to be incapacitated by alcohol shall take him into protective custody and have him brought forthwith . . . to a hospital."
The defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that the hospital is entitled to immunity from suit, pursuant to General Statute § 17a-689(b), which states in pertinent part that "any . . . hospital acting in compliance with . . . sections 17a-680 to 17a-690, inclusive, shall be deemed to be acting in the course of his official duty and shall not be criminally or civilly liable therefor."
The plaintiff counters that the hospital is not entitled to its statutory immunity from suit because the hospital failed to comply with § 17a-683(c) which states that "a person who is brought to a . . . hospital shall be examined by a medical officer or his designee as soon as possible." Medical officer is defined in § 17a-680(14) as "a licensed physician in attendance" at the hospital. Pursuant to the statute, the medical officer is charged with determining whether the person requires inpatient treatment based upon the medical examination of the person and a finding that the person is incapacitated by alcohol. General Statutes § 17a-683(c). The plaintiff argues that he was not examined by a medical officer as soon as was possible. He argues that this is a factual matter in dispute and therefore, the defendant's motion should fail.
A physician's assistant is licensed pursuant to Connecticut law, and qualifies as a "medical officer" under the statute.
"The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material facts which under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 757 (2006).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 252 Conn. 193, 201 (2001). A trial court should direct a verdict if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the trier of fact could not reasonably and logically reach any other conclusion than that the defendant is entitled to prevail. Colombo v. Stop Shop Supermarket Co., 67 Conn.App. 62, 64, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 912 (2002).
It is often helpful to state what is not at issue. Whether or not the plaintiff was "incapacitated" according to the protective custody statute, as set forth in § 17a-683(b), is not at issue. The court is not concerned with the decision made by the Newington police officers to take plaintiff into protective custody. Nor is the court concerned with when the hospital made its determination that the plaintiff was no longer incapacitated by alcohol. See § 17a-683(e). The only operative question thus boils down to: was the plaintiff examined by a medical officer — here, the physician's assistant — as soon as possible?
The phrase, "as soon as possible," is not defined in the statute or prior case law. The parties themselves do not offer definitions of the phrase. The statute does not direct or limit the manner is which the examination is to be accomplished. Both parties' arguments hinge upon the amount of time that passed from the moment the plaintiff entered the emergency room of the defendant hospital to the time he was examined by the physician's assistant and the inference that that time period was or was not "as soon as possible." The court first examines the language of the statute.
"The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peters, 287 Conn. 82, 87-88 (2008). "In seeking to determine that meaning . . . [General Statutes] § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . ." State v. Lutters, 270 Conn. 198, 206 (2004).
General Statutes § 1-2z provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."
Connecticut's protective custody statute came into existence in 1974. The statute was derived in part from the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act. 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 10, 1974 Sess., p. 4818. The goal of the act was the decriminalization and treatment of alcoholism. Id., p. 4817. Under the statute, an intoxicated person can consent to treatment, and an incapacitated person can be taken into protective custody and brought to a treatment center or hospital for examination and follow-up treatment. Since its enactment, the time frame mandated for the medical officer to conduct an examination of the incapacitated person has been "as soon as possible."
Examination of other sections of the statute shows the use of the word "immediately" when referencing the examination of a person who may be committed for treatment under General Statutes § 17a-684(c). "We must presume that when the legislature uses different language, the legislature intends a different meaning . . ." State v. Moore, 98 Conn.App. 85, 92, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 944 (2006). The variation in terminology suggests that the legislature intended two different time frames for examinations. The legislature reasonably could have concluded that it would be appropriate to require a treatment facility to immediately examine someone who is in the process of being involuntarily committed to the treatment facility, whereas it would be unreasonable to impose such a stringent requirement on a hospital. A hospital emergency room would normally be expected to have other patients with critical and life-threatening injuries whose treatment would need to be given priority over intoxicated persons brought in by police under § 17a-683(c). Emergency room doctors have to be able to attend first to what they determine in their medical judgment to be the most critical cases, and should not have to fear that they are subjecting themselves to liability by doing so. It seems reasonable that the legislature sought to attain this goal by intentionally employing language preserving doctors' discretion in this context. Indeed, the changes made to this statute since 1974 have enlarged the discretion given to doctors over the method of examinations. These changes demonstrate that the legislature wants "doctors . . . to make the examination the way they feel is most appropriate." 33 H.R. Proc., Pt. 18, 1990 Sess., p. 6242.
General Statutes § 17a-684(c) provides in pertinent part: "The medical officer of the treatment facility shall immediately examine the person sought to be committed and advise the administrator of the treatment facility whether the application sustains the grounds to commit the person for emergency treatment."
"[T]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . [T]his tenet of statutory construction . . . requires [this court] to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re William D., 284 Conn. 305, 313 (2007).
The realities of our hospital emergency rooms, and the ever-changing scenarios presented therein, dictate against defining "as soon as possible" with a fixed period of time and suggest a measure of deference to a medical officer's discretion as implied by the legislature's choice of statutory language. That deference must be set within some factual context, which is lacking in the evidence presented. In this case, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the plaintiff, upon being presented in the defendant's emergency room, was examined by a physician s assistant within 1 hour and 3 minutes of his arrival, despite his uncooperative behavior. Nevertheless, it is the defendant who bears the burden of showing that there is no dispute that the plaintiff was seen as soon as possible given the circumstances existing at the New Britain General Hospital emergency room on May 25, 2005 at 2:36 a.m. Without any information other than the number of minutes that passed between arrival and examination, the court cannot say that the defendant acted within the course of its duty and is protected under the statutory immunity of § 17a-689(b).
The court does not count in the time frame the 24 minutes that the plaintiff left the emergency room and ran to the nearby park.
The motion for summary judgment is denied.