Generally, a person other than the driver is not held liable for damages caused by negligent acts of the driver unless that person is the owner of the vehicle or has the right to control that vehicle. ( Palmer v. Miller (1942), 380 Ill. 256; Wolf v. Liberis (1987), 153 Ill. App.3d 488; Fugate v. Galvin (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 573.) In finding no duty to control the conduct of the driver, the courts have stated, where the passenger neither owns the car nor hires the driver, the driver has the last word and is the only one who could prevent the injury by his decision whether (or how) to drive.

Defendant argued in the trial court, as he does on appeal, that when the owner of a vehicle is a passenger in it, courts will impute the negligence of the driver to the owner-passenger in three situations: (1) if the owner and driver were engaged in a joint enterprise and the driver was negligent; (2) if the driver was acting as the agent of the owner, the owner had a right to control his actions, and the driver was negligent; and (3) if the owner negligently fails to control the actions of the driver. ( Palmer v. Miller (1942), 380 Ill. 256, 260; Wassmann v. Ritchason (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 770, 775.) The rationale for this rule, as explained by Palmer, was that where "the owner of the car is riding in it, he has not only the right to possession of it but has such possession and he necessarily retains the power and the right of controlling the manner in which it is being driven unless it is shown that he has contracted away or abandoned that right. He likewise has the duty to control the driver."

) Liability also may be based on a theory that the owner negligently failed to control the driving of his car. Palmer v. Miller (1942), 380 Ill. 256, 261, 43 N.E.2d 973, 976. See also Hodge v. Bzdon (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 192, 194-95, 338 N.E.2d 136, 138-39.

"[T]o impute the negligence of one person to another, such persons must stand in a relation of privity and there is no such thing as imputable negligence except in those cases where such a privity as master and servant or principal and agent exists." ( Palmer v. Miller (1942), 380 Ill. 256, 259-60.) The master's liability is merely by reason of the contractual relationship.

(Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 507, 533.) `[T]o impute the negligence of one person to another, such persons must stand in a relation of privity and there is no such thing as imputable negligence except in those cases where such a privity as master and servant or principal and agent exists.' ( Palmer v. Miller (1942), 380 Ill. 256, 259-60.) The master's liability is merely by reason of the contractual relationship. ( Palmer, 380 Ill. at 259; see also W. Keeton, Prosser Keeton on Torts § 69 (5th ed. 1984).

On appeal, plaintiffs raise one issue for this court's consideration: whether the trial court erred in granting defendant Cellak's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs place substantial reliance on the case of Palmer v. Miller, 380 Ill. 256, 43 N.E.2d 973 to support either of two theories upon which the trial court or a jury could have found Cellak liable and, therefore, should have denied the motion for summary judgment. First, that Cellak is guilty of negligence since she, as the possessor of the automobile, has the right to control the driving of said vehicle, and therefore owed the duty of controlling the driver and, secondly, that even if she was not negligent under the former theory, defendant Cellak and Bzdon were engaged in a joint enterprise for their mutual benefit, and the negligence of Bzdon may therefore be imputed to Cellak.

The inquiry was prompted because the authorities hold with virtual unanimity that although a minor is liable for his own torts (Harrison v. Carroll, 4 Cir., 1943, 139 F.2d 427, 428 and authorities therein cited), he cannot be held for the negligence of another on the theory of agency or respondeat superior. Sturtevant v. Pagel, Tex.Civ.App. 1937, 109 S.W.2d 556, 558-559; Palmer v. Miller, 1942, 380 Ill. 256, 43 N.E.2d 973, 975; Note 103 A.L.R. 487 (1936); Prosser, Law of Torts (2d Ed. 1955) pp. 789-790; Note 44 Harvard Law Review 1292 (1931). The principle of these latter decisions, however, is without relevance in view of the allegation of the complaint that Simon's negligent operation of the automobile took place subject to and under the direction and control of Richard. Accepting this allegation as true, the fact that Richard is a minor will not exempt him from liability.

No allegations of a master-servant, principal-agent or joint enterprise relationship were made. In Illinois the duty of an owner-passenger to control the driver was set forth by Palmer v. Miller (1942), 380 Ill. 256, 259. There this court held that an owner-passenger could be liable for the negligence of a driver if the passenger negligently failed to control the driver. Palmer also was ahead of its time in abolishing the now discredited imputed-negligence doctrine.

• 5, 6 In 1942, the Illinois Supreme Court examined imputed negligence and automobile owner-passengers. ( Palmer v. Miller (1942), 380 Ill. 256, 43 N.E.2d 973.) Miller, a 20-year-old minor, borrowed his mother's car to go to a dance. He was injured at the dance and had Park, a companion, drive him to the hospital in his mother's car.

• 1 Under Illinois case law there are three ways in which a passenger in his own car can be contributorily negligent: (1) If the owner and driver are engaged in a joint enterprise and the driver is negligent; (2) if the driver was acting as an agent of the owner, the owner had a right to control his actions, and the driver was negligent; and (3) if the owner negligently failed to control the actions of the driver. Palmer v. Miller (1942), 380 Ill. 256, 43 N.E.2d 973. • 2 Plaintiff argues that the evidence presented is insufficient as a matter of law to find the decedent liable for the negligence of Craig DeHol based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.