The section reads as follows: See, e.g., Ewer v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 4 Wn. App. 152, 480 P.2d 260 (Div. 3 1971); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (Div. 2 1970). Clearly, the manufacture and sale of B-406 took place long before the decision in Ulmer.

The latent-patent danger doctrine has been abandoned in a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Davis v. Fox River Tractor Co., 518 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying Oklahoma law); Beloit Corp. v. Harrell, 339 So.2d 992 (Ala. 1976); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.Rptr. 629 (1970); Auburn Machine Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 1979); Brown v. Clark Equipment Co., 62 Haw. 530, 618 P.2d 267 (1980); Derrick v. Yoder Co., 88 Ill. App.3d 864, 43 Ill.Dec. 897, 410 N.E.2d 1030 (1980); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 376 Mass. 874, 384 N.E.2d 1188 (1978); Casey v. GiffordWood Co., 61 Mich. App. 208, 232 N.W.2d 360 (1975); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Olson v. A. W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970). As pointed out by the New York Court of Appeals in overruling Campo:

Since the time of trial, a third independent cause of action, one in strict products liability, has been recognized by this court (Velez v Craine Clark Lbr. Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117; Codling v Paglia, supra). The claims constitute separate theories of recovery and the decisions both in this State (e.g., Velez v Craine Clark Lbr. Corp., supra; Rainbow v Elia Bldg. Co., 49 A.D.2d 250; Jerry v Borden Co., 45 A.D.2d 344) and beyond (e.g., Pike v Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465; Palmer v Massey-Ferguson, 3 Wn. App. 508; Ann., 52 ALR3d 101) have adhered to the distinction (Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395). Directing our attention to the cause of action for negligence in design, defendant asserts, citing Campo v Scofield (supra), that the action must be dismissed because the danger created by the absence of safeguards on the machine was open and obvious and, therefore, as the manufacturer it was under no duty to protect plaintiff from such a patent defect.

The application of negligence principles to a negligent design case is simply a special application of the general rule that a manufacturer has a duty to refrain from negligent manufacture. Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970). That rule requires a manufacturer to exercise care to eliminate from the product risk which it should recognize as creating an unreasonable likelihood of harm. Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wn.2d 720, 393 P.2d 936 (1964).

113 Ariz. at 267, 550 P.2d at 1068. For a similar reason in Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970), a Washington appellate court held that it was proper for a trial court to refuse to give a requested instruction that a manufacturer has no duty to provide guards to prevent injury from a patent peril or source manifestly dangerous: The rule excusing the duty of safe design because of a patent peril has come under criticism in treatises.

The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this contention, emphasizing that the law "'ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious form.'" Uloth, 376 Mass. at 881, 384 N.E.2d at 1193 ( quoting Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 719 (1970)). In the course of its discussion, the court observed that a patently dangerous condition may tend to warn employees to exercise caution, but it does little to reduce the risk of injuries resulting from instinctive reactions, momentary inadvertence, or forgetfulness on the part of a worker.

Rather, we are saying that the dangers of the use of alcohol are common knowledge to such an extent that the product cannot objectively be considered to be unreasonably dangerous. Palmer v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 719 (Wash. 1970). For example, presumably a duty to warn would arise in the case of an obviously unguarded blade in a power-driven saw if the danger of injury was found to be unreasonable notwithstanding the obviousness of the defect.

Dyson v. General Motors Corporation, 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (E.D.Pa. 1969). Although this doctrine has received wide support and has been applied in many jurisdictions, including this Circuit, there is an indication that the more recent trend of the cases evidences an increasing dissatisfaction with the Campo doctrine and opts instead in favor of an approach which reflects an effort to "discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious form", Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713, 719 (1970), and which further recognizes that "manufacturers ought to make safer not more dangerous products." Dorsey v. Yoder Company, 331 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D.Pa. 1971).

See Blim v. Newburry Industries, Inc., 443 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1971); Wheeler v. Standard Tool and Manufacturing Co., 359 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (1973); Byrnes v. Economic Machinery Co., 41 Mich. App. 192, 200 N.W.2d 104 (1972); Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972). See also Palmer v. Massey-Fergusen, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713, 719 (1970), wherein it was said: [t]he manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not to escape because the product was obviously a bad one.

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. Frisco maintains that if the trial court ruled that the wheel was not defective or unreasonably dangerous, it did so solely because it assumed that there could never be proof of defectiveness or unreasonable danger where the alleged defect was contemplated by the ultimate user. They point out that this position has been rejected by the courts in Washington and California. Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Company, 2 Cal.3d 465, 85 Cal.Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229 (1970). Those cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.