Where an allottee of the Cherokee Nation died leaving surviving him a widow, a father, a maternal grandfather, and other heirs of the maternal line, descent having been cast on January 13, 1905, the date of allotment, such estate is an ancestral estate, and where both father and mother of the decedent are Cherokee citizens by blood, both the paternal and maternal lines inherit. Finley v. Thompson, 68 Okla. 250, 174 P. 535; Palmer v. King, 75 Okla. 276, 183 P. 411; Glory v. Bagby, 79 Okla. 155, 188 P. 881; Roberts v. Underwood, 237 U.S. 386; McDougal v. McKay, 237 U.S. 272, followed. 2.

We conclude that the devolution of the estate in question, having been selected subsequent to the approval of the Supplemental Creek Agreement, June 30, 1902 (32 Stat. L. 500, c. 1323), is governed by the applicable provisions found in chapter 49 of Mansfield's Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas, and under the numerous decisions of this court and the federal courts the estate is an ancestral estate, and the father and mother of the deceased allottee being both full-blood citizens of the Creek Tribe of Indians, one-half of the estate ascends to the mother and one-half to the paternal heirs, the father of the said deceased allottee being dead on the date of the selection of the allotment. Shulthis v. McDougal, 170 Fed. 529; Roberts v. Underwood, 38 Okla. 376, 132 P. 673, 59 L.Ed. (U. S.) 1007; Pigeon v. Buck, 38 Okla. 101, 131 P. 1083, 59 L. Ed. (U.S.) 1007; Palmer v. King, 75 Okla. 276, 183 P. 411. Counsel for the defendant Phillips insist that the second selection made by Louisa Berryhill on behalf of the heirs of Susanna Berryhill, deceased, shall relate back as of the date of the first selection, and the descent of the estate is controlled by the Creek law of descent and distribution, which was in force on the date of the first selection.

The provision last quoted embraces the provision quoted at the beginning of this paragraph. In the second paragraph of the syllabus to Palmer et al. v. King et al., 75 Okla. 276, 183 P. 411, it is stated: "Where general terms or expressions in one part of the statute are inconsistent with more specific or particular provisions in another part, the particular provision will be given effect, as a clearer and more definite expression of the legislative will."

50 Am.Jur., "Statutes", sec. 367. This principle has been consistently adhered to by this Court since before Statehood (see Atchison, T. S.F.R. Co. v. Haynes, 8 Okla. 576, 58 P. 738); and, we recognized in both Palmer v. King, 75 Okla. 276, 183 P. 411, and In re State Treasury Note Indebtedness, 185 Okla. 10, 90 P.2d 19, 25, that where general terms or expressions in one part of a statute may appear (or be interpreted as being) inconsistent with more specific or particular provisions in another part, "the particular provision will be given effect, as a clearer and more definite expression of the legislative will." The opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioners of Taxation, 245 Minn. 346, 71 N.W.2d 797, furnishes appellant's contention no support, because that State's law does not have the above quoted special provision applying to manufacturing or mercantile enterprises.

Thus, in the instant case, if there were involved some matter pertaining to the form of the notice or the designation therein of a name or description of the property or the amount of the taxes as well as the time of notice, such matters, other than that of the time, would be addressed to the court to be determined in light of the curative provision, while the matter of the time would have to be measured by the minimum standard that is fixed by said amendment. Being special in its enactment, it is in no wise impaired by the curative provision, which is general (Palmer v. King, 75 Okla. 276, 183 P. 411; In re State Treasury Note Indebtedness, 185 Okla. 10, 90 P.2d 19). The reason for the differing methods chosen is obvious. Successive sales require no variation in the time of notice and the period of notice, once fixed, cannot become an involved question, while the other situations by reason of their nature cannot be referable to a fixed standard, and the legislative intent in such situations is to be determined by the court under the legislative injunction contained in said curative provision.

"Where general terms or expressions in one part of the statute are inconsistent with more specific or particular provisions in another part, the particular provision will be given effect, as a clearer and more definite expression of the legislative will." Palmer v. King, 75 Okla. 276, 183 P. 411. We are of the view that the specific and definite provision in the statute that the bonds be issued to mature in not more than 15 annual installments, beginning June 30, 1940, controls over the other provisions which are permissive only.

"Hence, it is an established rule in the exposition of statutes that the intention of the lawgiver is to be deduced from a view of the whole and of every part of a statute taken and compared together The several provisions of the statute should be construed together in the light of the general purpose and object of the act and so as to give effect to the main intent and purpose of the Legislature as therein expressed. If possible a statute should be so construed as to render it a consistent and harmonious whole; if different portions seem to conflict, they should, if practicable, be harmonized, that construction being favored which will render every word operative rather than one which makes some words idle and nugatory," Eagle-Picher Mining Smelting Co. v. Linthicum, 175 Okla. 483, 53 P.2d 687. This in turn calls for the application of the rule announced in Palmer v. King, 75 Okla. 276, 183 P. 411, as follows: "Where general terms or expressions in one part of the statute are inconsistent with more specific or particular provisions in another part, the particular provision will be given effect, as a clearer and more definite expression of the legislative will."

" And as we have said in Palmer et al. v. King et al., 75 Okla. 276, 183 P. 411: "Where general terms or expressions in one part of the statute are inconsistent with more specific or particular provisions in another part, the particular provisions will be given effect, as clearer and more definite expressions of the legislative will."

Both the father and mother of the deceased allottee were members, by blood, of the Seminole Tribe of Indians. This being true, we must consider the allotment as an ancestral estate and one-half of it as coming from his father and the other one-half as coming from his mother. Schulthis v. McDougal, 170 Fed. 529; Palmer v. King, 75 Okla. 276, 183 P. 411. On the death of the intestate one-half of his allotment was inherited by his heirs who were of the blood of his father and the other one-half thereof by his heirs who were of the blood of his mother.

"Having reached this conclusion, it would follow that upon the death of Nicholas Bean, without descendants, his allotment ascended equally to his father and to the heirs of his mother; that is, one-half to the surviving father, Felin Bean, and one-half to the surviving sister, Lillian Bean." To the same effect is the case of Palmer v. King, 75 Okla. 276, 183 P. 411. Defendants in error next contended that the cause of action is barred by subdivision 2, section 4655, Rev. Laws 1910. This contention has likewise been rendered untenable by this court, in the case of Dodson v. Middleton, 38 Okla. 763, 135 P. 368, where the court stated as follows: