Opinion
2019-UP-240
07-03-2019
Demetrius Palmer, Appellant, v. Mark Keel, Chief of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, and the State of South Carolina, Respondents. Appellate Case No. 2016-000180
Charles Thomas Brooks, III, of Law Office of Charles T. Brooks, III, of Sumter, for Appellant. Adam L. Whitsett, of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division; and Assistant Deputy Attorney General T. Parkin C. Hunter, both of Columbia, for Respondents.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted May 1, 2019
Appeal From Richland County DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge
Charles Thomas Brooks, III, of Law Office of Charles T. Brooks, III, of Sumter, for Appellant.
Adam L. Whitsett, of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division; and Assistant Deputy Attorney General T. Parkin C. Hunter, both of Columbia, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM
Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Rule 56(c), SCRCP (providing a motion for summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"); George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001) ("On summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-460 (Supp. 2018) ("A person required to register [on the sex offender registry] is required to register biannually for life." (emphasis added)); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430(E), (F), (G) (2007 & Supp. 2018) (setting forth three statutory mechanisms by which a person's name may be removed from the sex offender registry); Key Corp. Capital, Inc. v. Cty. of Beaufort, 373 S.C. 55, 59, 644 S.E.2d 675, 677 (2007) ("If a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning." (quoting Buist v. Huggins, 367 S.C. 268, 276, 625 S.E.2d 636, 640 (2006))); id. ("[T]his [c]ourt does 'not sit as a superlegislature to second guess the wisdom or folly of decisions of the General Assembly.'" (quoting Keyserling v. Beasley, 322 S.C. 83, 86, 470 S.E.2d 100, 101 (1996))); Regions Bank v. Wingard Props., Inc., 394 S.C. 241, 254, 715 S.E.2d 348, 355 (Ct. App. 2011) ("It is well known that equity follows the law." (quoting Smith v. Barr, 375 S.C. 157, 164, 650 S.E.2d 486, 490 (Ct. App. 2007))); id. ("When providing an equitable remedy, the court may not ignore statutes, rules, and other precedent."); Key Corp. Capital, Inc., 373 S.C. at 61, 644 S.E.2d at 678 ("Indeed, a 'court's equitable powers must yield in the face of an unambiguously worded statute.'" (quoting Santee Cooper Resort, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 298 S.C. 179, 185, 379 S.E.2d 119, 123 (1989))).
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
LOCKEMY, C. J, and SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ, concur