Opinion
1:03-cv-06525-AWI-LJO-P, ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. 34), ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 22).
June 27, 2006
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION
Henry Dean Palmer ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.
On March 22, 2006, the Magistrate Judge filed Findings and Recommendations herein which recommended the court grant Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Findings and Recommendations were served on the parties and contained notice that any objections to the Findings and Recommendations were to be filed within thirty (30) days. On April 25, 2006, Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 73-305, this Court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court finds the Findings and Recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis.
In the complaint, Plaintiff contends that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by assigning Plaintiff to a job that he was medically unable to do and Plaintiff's assignment to this job resulted in injury to Plaintiff's back. The Magistrate Judge recommended the court grant Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint because the complaint was filed outside of the one year statute of limitations. Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no specific statute of limitations, federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions in section 1983 suits.See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Torres v. City of Santa Ana, 108 F.3d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1997);Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1991). In California, the applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is one year. See Former Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(c) (for events occurring before January 1, 2003, the statute of limitations period is one year). This action was filed on October 31, 2003. The Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff's cause of action accrued on June 11, 2002, when Plaintiff was placed in a job he was not medically fit to perform. As such, the Magistrate Judge reasoned this action was not timely because it was not filed until October 31, 2003, more than one year after the June 11, 2002 accrual date. In the objections, Plaintiff contends his cause of action did not accrue until November 17, 2002, when he realized that he had severally hurt his lower back. Federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues. See Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 801-802 (9th Cir. 1994). Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996). A colorable argument can be made that Plaintiff did not know of the injury caused by Defendants' improper job placement in June 2002 until Plaintiff realized he had become physically injured performing this job on November 17, 2002. Using an accrual date of November 17, 2002, this action was timely filed on October 31, 2003.
However, even if the court agrees with Plaintiff regarding the statute of limitations issue, the action is subject to dismissal for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As explained by the Magistrate Judge, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended 42 U.S.C § 1997e to provide that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [ 42 USC § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 USC § 1997e(a). Exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). All available remedies must be exhausted, and those remedies "need not meet federal standards, nor must they be `plain, speedy, and effective.'" Id. Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Similarly, exhaustion is a prerequisite to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement does not require that inmates draft grievances with the precision of an attorney, laying out every fact, identifying every defendant by name, and identifying which constitutional rights were violated by which actions or omissions. However, satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires that inmates, in their grievances, place prison personnel on fair notice as to the events that subsequently give rise to suit. See Vieira v. Mills, 2002 WL 1067816, *1 (N.D.Cal. 2002). The court has carefully reviewed all exhibits provided by Defendants and Plaintiff. While Plaintiff did appeal issues concerning his medical care and housing needs, Plaintiff did not file an appeal alleging that Defendants' caused Plaintiff physical injury on or before November 17, 2002 because they had improperly classified Plaintiff in June 2002. Thus, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that this action is subject to dismissal for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Findings and Recommendations, filed March 22, 2006, are ADOPTED;
2. Defendant's motion to dismiss, filed on October 24, 2005, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and,
3. The action is DISMISSED for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
IT IS SO ORDERED.