Opinion
CIV-21-528-JD
06-24-2021
WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER PALMER, Plaintiff, v. GARFIELD CO. DETENTION FACILITY, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHON T. ERWIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff William Palmer, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1). District Judge Jodi W. Dishman has referred this matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). A review of the Complaint has been conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Based on that review, it is recommended that the Court: (1) dismiss, with prejudice, the claims against the GCDC and (2) dismiss, without prejudice, the allegations against Defendants Crooks, Rivers, Burton, and Burkes, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court must review each complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must accept Mr. Palmer's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Since Mr. Palmer is proceeding pro se, his complaint must be construed liberally. See id. at 1218. The Court “review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true, ” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, ” then the plaintiff has not “nudged (his) claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility requirement “serves not only to weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a reasonable prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim against them.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).
A complaint fails to state such a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are not assumed to be true; legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief' requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal).
III. DISMISSAL
The Court should: (1) dismiss, with prejudice, the claims against the GCDC and (2) dismiss, without prejudice, the allegations against Defendants Crooks, Rivers, Burton, and Burkes, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A. Plaintiff's Allegations/Named Defendants
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his capacity as a pretrial detainee. (ECF No. 1:3). As Defendants, Mr. Palmer names: (1) the Garfield County Detention Center (GCDC); (2) Ben Crooks, Jail Administrator at the GCDC; (3) Daylon Rivers, Captain at the GCDC; (4) John Burton, Corporal at the GCDC; and (5) Mya Burkes, Correctional Officer at the GCDC. (ECF No. 1:4-5).
On June 14, 2021, Mr. Palmer filed a Notice of Change of Address with the Court, which reflects a residential address in Enid, Oklahoma, indicating that perhaps Mr. Palmer is no longer detained. See ECF No. 5.
Mr. Palmer actually names the “Garfield County Detention Facility” as a Defendant, see ECF No. 1:4, but the legal name of the facility is the “Garfield County Detention Center.” See www.garcosheriff.com (last visited June 14, 2021).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts one “Claim, ” alleging: “Negligence and Failure to Protect.” (ECF No. 1:6). As factual support for this claim, Mr. Palmer states: “Inmates from H-Pod escaped and invaded G-Pod to cause harm and assault some inmates.” (ECF No. 1:7). Mr. Palmer sues each Defendant in their individual and official capacities and seeks monetary damages only. (ECF No. 1:4-5, 7).
B. The GCDC
As a Defendant, Plaintiff names the GCDC. See supra. This Defendant is not a suable entity for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1025-1026 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a non-corporate entity's capacity to be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the district court is located. In Oklahoma, each organized county can sue and be sued. Okla. Stat. tit. 19, § 1. However, a detention center in Oklahoma, as a subdivision of the county in which it is located, has no separate legal identity under Oklahoma law. See Ritchie v. Oklahoma County Detention Facility, Case No. 15-1105-M, 2015 WL 7568470, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 22, 2015). Therefore, Defendant GCDC cannot be sued in this Court. See Lindsey v. Thomson, No. 06-7114, 2007 WL 2693970 at *3 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims against police departments and county sheriff's department, entities with no apparent legal existence); White v. Utah, No. 00-4109, 2001 WL 201980 at *1 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of county jail; although applicable state law provided that county may sue or be sued, no state law supported directing a cause of action directly against a county's subdivisions, including its jails); Aston v. Cunningham, No. 994156, 2000 WL 796086 at *4 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of county jail as defendant in prisoner's § 1983 action on basis that “a detention facility is not a person or legally created entity capable of being sued”); Reid v. Hamby, No. 95-7142, 1997 WL 537909 at * 6 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that “an Oklahoma 'sheriff's department' is not a proper entity for purposes of a § 1983 suit”); Johnson v. Johnson, Case No. 17-560-D, 2017 WL 4296405, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2017).
Based on the forgoing, the Court should dismiss, with prejudice, any claim asserted against the GCDC. See Parks v. Taylor, Case No. CIV018-968-D, 2019 WL 254669, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 17, 2019) (dismissing claims against Sherriff's Office and Detention Center with prejudice).
C. The Remaining Defendants
With the forgoing recommendation, the remaining Defendants are: Crooks, Rivers, Burton, and Burkes. See supra. According to Plaintiff, these Defendants were negligent and failed to protect him. See ECF No. 1:6. In support of this claim, Plaintiff states that some inmates escaped from one pod and assaulted inmates in another pod. (ECF No. 1:7). But other than the labels of “negligence” and “failure to protect, ” Mr. Palmer has failed to provide any specific details in support of what each Defendant allegedly did or did not do to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's failure to do so renders the Complaint legally deficient. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed (the plaintiff); and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”). Mr. Palmer's reliance on “labels and conclusions, ” is simply insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In addition, in a case such as this one where Mr. Palmer has brought claims against multiple defendants, “it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). Mr. Palmer has failed to do so and the Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). Without more information, the Court should dismiss, without prejudice, the allegations against Defendants Crooks, Rivers, Burton, and Burkes, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IV. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The Court should: (1) dismiss, with prejudice, the claims against the GCDC and (2) dismiss, without prejudice, the allegations against Defendants Crooks, Rivers, Burton, and Burkes, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff is hereby advised of his right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court by July 12, 2021. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
V. STATUS OF THE REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in the captioned matter.