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finding that due process was not required because the appellant's 97 days in administrative segregation were not sufficiently atypical or significant
Summary of this case from Lightfoot v. GilleyOpinion
No. 08-31020 Summary Calendar.
October 28, 2009.
Warren Palmer, III, Angola, LA, pro se.
Babatunde Mobolade Anima-Shaun, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, 3:07-CV-461.
Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
Warren Palmer, III, an inmate at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against prison officials which the district court dismissed.
In his brief, Palmer raises two claims. First, he complains about the manner in which a disciplinary meeting was conducted before he was transferred to administrative segregation. Second, he argues that the magistrate judge improperly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed his claim that the defendants deprived him of his right to exercise while confined in administrative segregation.
For the following reasons we affirm the district court's judgment.
Palmer's first claim fails because due process is generally not required at prison disciplinary hearings unless a hardship much more atypical or significant than Palmer's 97 days in administrative segregation is imposed. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-36, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 563 (5th Cir. 2008). On his second claim, a review of the record reveals that the magistrate judge correctly determined that Palmer failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on his argument that defendants deprived him of his right to exercise while confined in administrative segregation.
Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED.