Opinion
97 CIV. 5457 (DLC)
May 17, 2000
Ronald Palmer, Pro Se, Green Haven Correctional Facility for petitioner.
Robert Johnson, Esq., Bronx County District Attorney, Allen Saperstein, Esq., Assistant District Attorney, for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Petitioner pro se Ronald Palmer ("Palmer") was convicted in state court of murder in the second degree on September 9, 1993. On November 30, 1999, this Court denied Palmer's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which had claimed that the state trial court's jury instructions were erroneous, that the evidence against him was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his sentence was unduly harsh. Palmer has appealed the Court's decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Now, Palmer moves this Court for reconsideration of its decision with respect to his claim that no rational jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime with which he was charged. For the reasons discussed below, that motion is denied.
While the filing of a notice of appeal ordinarily divests this Court of jurisdiction, a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a motion to amend or alter the judgment under Rule 59(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., is not effective until the motion has been decided. See Rule 4(B)(i), Fed.R.App.P.; Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 533 (2d Cir. 1994). A motion for reconsideration under this Court's local rules is the functional equivalent of a motion under Rule 59(e). See Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 704. Supp. 2d 300, 337 (S.D.N Y 1999); cf. Lowrance, 20 F.3d at 533 (motion for reargument under Northern District of New York local rules). Additionally, a district court may deny a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., although it cannot grant such a motion, while an appeal is pending. See Satcom International Group PLC v. Orbcomm International Partners, 55 F. Supp.2d 231, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (DLC) (citing Selletti v. Carey, 173 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1999)). Under either analysis, this Court has jurisdiction to deny Palmer's motion.
BACKGROUND
The facts underlying Palmer's petition are set forth in the Court's November 30 Opinion, familiarity with which is assumed. In his motion for reconsideration, Palmer asserts that (1) there were no witnesses to the shooting; (2) only one witness, Jason Mendes, then fourteen years old, placed Palmer at the scene of the crime; (3) Mendes testified to the grand jury that he had seen a man carrying a gun that was nicknamed "Budea"; that Palmer's nickname was "Kaymel"; and that Mendes' description of Budea did not fit Palmer; (4) a man known as "Budea" lived at the apartment where the crime occurred; (5) although a second person, Imani Frasier, was in the building with Mendes and the victim, Frasier did not place Palmer at' the scene; (6) the brother of the victim, who had known Palmer for several years, and had identified Palmer's co-defendant as one of two men running from the scene of the crime, was unable to identify the second person; the brother of the victim told Palmer's counsel prior to trial that Palmer had nothing to do with the murder. Based on these facts, Palmer argues that no rational jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.DISCUSSION
To prevail on a motion for reconsideration under Local Rule 6.3 "the moving party must demonstrate that the Court overlooked the controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before the Court in the underlying motion." Walsh v. McGee, 918 F. Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Thus, "a Local Rule [6.3] motion may not advance new facts, issues, or arguments not previously presented to the court." Bonnie Co. Fashions. Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 171 F.R.D. 79, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Palmer has failed to satisfy this demanding standard.
In his original petition, Palmer raised only Mendez' reference to "Budea" as grounds for finding the evidence adduced against him insufficient to support a conviction. In considering Palmer's petition, the Court did not overlook this evidence, but found that considering all the evidence, a rational jury could have found Palmer guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Palmer's other arguments are raised for the first time in this motion for reconsideration, and therefore may be disregarded.
Even in light of these new arguments, however, the Court finds the totality of the evidence against Palmer sufficient to sustain his guilt. Two witnesses, Tyrone Miller and Imani Frasier, were unable to identify Palmer as the second person at the scene of the murder because neither was in a position to see that individual's face; their testimony is in no way inconsistent with Palmer's guilt. The testimony of Jason Mendes shows that he was confused about Palmer's nickname, not his identification of Palmer. Mendes testified that he saw Palmer in the building lobby where the murder occurred, and that Palmer pulled out a gun moments before the shots were fired. The totality of the evidence offered at trial is such that a rational jury could have found Palmer guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, Palmer's motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Palmer's motion for reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED:
Dated: New York, New York May 16, 2000