Opinion
No. CV 02-039 82 49 S
March 10, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The following facts are pertinent to the resolution of this matter. On April 14, 2002 at approximately 3 p.m. the plaintiff was operating a 1992 Lincoln Continental north on Ripton Road, Shelton, Connecticut, when he was struck from behind by the defendant, Beverly Matthews.
The impact caused the plaintiff's head to break the rearview mirror and strike the windshield. The plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness. Liability is being contested by the defendant. The plaintiff claims the accident caused him neck, back and shoulder injuries and emotional distress. He also claims that the defendant's negligence caused him lost wages, both past and future, and loss of enjoyment of life's activities.
The plaintiff is claiming economic damages, past and future, of $343,648.28. The plaintiff is also claiming non-economic damages of $432,000.00.
The defendant disputes liability and argues that the plaintiff's injuries were not proximately caused by her actions. More specifically, she argues that a previous motor vehicle accident in 1993 proves a preexisting condition that was not caused or exacerbated by her actions.
Three witnesses testified at the trial, the plaintiff, his wife and the attorney who was a custodian of the record of the 1993 accident.
I NEGLIGENCE
The broad principle of law which lies at the basis of this case is: where the activities of two persons come together so that unless proper care is used injury is likely to result, each must use such care as to avoid injury. Every person has a legal duty to exercise reasonable care in connection with other people. Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 686 n. 32, 748 A.2d 834 (2000).
Negligence is the breach of this legal duty owed by one person to another. Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn. 503, 508, 77 A. 950 (1910).
In addition to this common-law definition of negligence there is also what is known as statutory negligence which consists of violation of a state statute enacted by the legislature. Trzcinski v. Richey, 190 Conn. 285, 291 n. 7, 460 A.2d 1269 (1983).
It is axiomatic that violation of such a statute is negligence as a matter of law regardless of whether the conduct that constitutes the violation is that of a reasonably prudent person or not. Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360, 376, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995).
Here the plaintiff claims the defendant was negligent in a variety of ways. The most significant of which for today's purposes are failure to brake and failure to drive a reasonable distance apart.
The defendant disputes this theory of negligence arguing she acted reasonably under the circumstances. After a comprehensive review of the testimony the court concludes that the plaintiff has sustained its burden by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent in striking his vehicle.
In coming to this conclusion the court weighed the testimony of the plaintiff and defendant and pictorial evidence of the plaintiff's vehicle.
The plaintiff testified that he had come to a complete halt when he was struck by the defendant. It was a dry, clear day. The plaintiff claims that the force was so great that his head broke the rearview mirror and caused $8,287.35 worth of further damage to his vehicle. Defendant's exhibits 1 and 2 corroborate this testimony. They clearly show the rearview mirror broken and hanging and heavy damage to the rear of the vehicle after the accident.
Finally, the defendant admitted on the stand that she caused the damage; while in her deposition (plaintiff's exhibit 22) testimony she indicated that while she believes she was traveling at only 35 miles per hour, she did not dispute failing to see the plaintiff before impact. The court finds the testimony of the witness to be credible and supported by the evidence. It will therefore find for the plaintiff on the issue of liability.
II PROXIMATE CAUSE
In addition to proving that the defendant was negligent, the plaintiff must also prove that the negligent act was a proximate cause of his injuries. Blancato v. Randino, 30 Conn.App. 810, 813, 622 A.2d 1032 (1993).
The test for determining whether the negligent act committed by a party is the cause of the incident is: was the negligent act or failure to act a substantial factor in producing the injuries to the plaintiff? If it was, then it would be a proximate cause of the injuries. In other words, an actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm is a proximate cause of that harm. Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 571, 864 A.2d 1 (2004).
By cause is meant more than a "mere incident" in a chain of events. Ward v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539, 546-47, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004). Plaintiffs have the burden of removing the relationship between the defendant's conduct and each of their claims of injury from the realm of speculation. They have the burden of proving that each claim of injury was caused by the defendant's conduct. Plaintiffs do not satisfy their burden of proof by evidence that it was only "possible" that the defendant's conduct caused the alleged injury or damage.
The plaintiff does not have to prove that the negligent act or omission of the defendant was the exclusive factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. However, the plaintiff must prove that it was a substantial factor which acting alone or in conjunction with other factors brought about the plaintiff's injuries. Pilon v. Alderman, 112 Conn. 300, 301, 152 A. 157 (1930). Here the defendant argues that the plaintiff's injuries were not proximately caused by her actions. More specifically, she argues that evidence of a motor vehicle accident in 1993 proves a preexisting condition that was neither caused nor exacerbated by her negligence. The court does not find this argument however, to be persuasive and finds that the plaintiff has proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries.
The impact between the vehicles was substantial. Defendant's exhibit 1-10 illustrates the extent of the damage to the plaintiff's vehicle, a 1992 Lincoln Continental. The collision caused approximately $8,000 of damages to the plaintiff's vehicle and $4,000 to the defendant's vehicle. The plaintiff after experiencing pain sought medical treatment the following day.
On April 23, 2002 the plaintiff was referred from his primary care physician to an orthopedist, Doctor William Lewis. Lewis opined the pain as being caused by disc herniation acquired during the accident of 2002, and prescribed surgery. Initially the plaintiff disregarded this recommendation. When the pain persisted, however, he relented and agreed to have the surgery performed. On August 12, 2003 Lewis and Doctor Patrick Mastrianni performed the procedure inserting screws into sections C-5, C-6, C-7 of the plaintiff's spine fusing the joints. The defendant disputes the finding of Lewis and Mastrianni.
III PREEXISTING CONDITION
It is axiomatic that the court cannot award damages for any injuries or losses that preexisted the accident and were not caused or exacerbated by the defendant's negligence. D. Wright W. Ankerman, Connecticut Jury Instructions (4th Ed. 1993) § 113.
The defendant presents a two-part argument regarding the plaintiff's injuries. First, she argues that the cause of the plaintiff's lumbar back problem is not the result of the present accident but one that occurred in 1993. Second, she argues that the evidence shows that any problem with the upper spine C-5, C-6 and C-7 stem from a preexisting condition called "degenerative spine disease."
The court, however, is not persuaded by this argument. While careful review of the record show some similarities between the two accidents and injuries, those similarities are only superficial. There was no evidence presented that the 1993 accident was as severe as the present one.
The evidence shows that in 1993 the plaintiff experienced pain in a different part of his body. In addition, it shows that he received a favorable diagnosis regarding his recovery. No permanency was given. The plaintiff did not lose any time from work and stopped treatment with his doctors after 1994.
There was no evidence that C-4 and C-5 were herniated in the 1993 accident, only conjecture. In addition, while the defendant's exhibit B shows evidence of some spinal degeneration in C-6 and C-7, it does not mention C-5 which is one of the sites of the operation at issue here. Finally, it is clear that the impact was so great in the 2002 accident that it caused the plaintiff to suffer loss of consciousness, while the 1993 accident showed no such injury.
The plaintiff was involved in an accident in 1993 wherein he suffered some discomfort, was diagnosed, treated, and discharged. He had no other problem until the 2002 accident. Even after the accident the plaintiff disregarded the advice of his doctor and delayed surgery. In 2003 surgery was performed and the plaintiff was given 51% permanent partial disability to his neck and 10% to his back.
The court finds the plaintiff's testimony to be reliable, credible and supported by the evidence. The defendant provided no medical evidence challenging the findings of Lewis other than the accident which occurred nine years before. Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff has proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that his neck injury was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.
IV DAMAGES
The fundamental rule regarding damages is that the amount awarded should be fair and reasonable compensation for losses suffered as a direct and proximate consequence of a party's negligence. Bruneau v. Seabrook, 84 Conn.App. 667, 673, 854 A.2d 818, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 930, 859 A.2d 583 (2004). Here the plaintiff is claiming economic damages of $343,648.28 and non-economic damages including loss of enjoyment of life's activities of $432,000.00.
The parties have agreed that the plaintiff has a life expectancy of 24.8 years.
The plaintiff argues that he cannot engage in life's activities he once enjoyed such as fixing old cars and making household repairs. He further claims that he can barely work a 40-hour work week whereas before the accident he worked approximately 55 hours a week. The court finds the evidence presented by the plaintiff on these issues to be persuasive. It further finds the plaintiff's testimony to be credible and supported by the record. Therefore, the court awards the plaintiff $200,000.00 in economic damages and $200,000.00 in non-economic damages.
The court is also going to order a collateral source hearing prior to the entry of judgment.