Opinion
No. CV 960566803
June 10, 1997
MEMORANDUM FILED JUNE 10, 1997
This administrative appeal raises the issue of whether the state can intercept a federal and/or state tax refund to apply to past due child support when the obligor is in compliance with court ordered support and arrearage payments. The Court finds that the state is statutorily authorized to make such intercept.
The factual scenario is undisputed. In January of 1995 a paternity action was initiated alleging that the Plaintiff was the father of a child born in October of 1985. The child and her mother were recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); and assigned their support rights to the state on May 22, 1995. Genetic testing established paternity and the Plaintiff was adjudicated to be the father. On January 30, 1996, the child support order was established at $55 per week plus $5 per week to the state on the $9,515 arrearage.
General Statutes § 46b-160 provides that child support may be calculated for up to three years preceding the date of the filing of the paternity action.
The Plaintiff has complied with his court ordered support obligation, both as to current support and arrearage payments.
The Department of Social Services is the state agency designated to administer the state child support enforcement plan pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. General Statutes § 17b-2.
General Statutes § 52-362e(a) and (b) authorizes the state to offset the tax refunds of child support obligors in AFDC cases when the obligor owes "past due support" of $150 or more.
General Statutes § 52-362e. Withholding federal income tax refunds in amount equal to support arrearage. Procedures. Eligibility. Regulations. (a) Subject to the provisions of section 52-362h, whenever an order of the Superior Court or a family support magistrate for support of a minor child or children is issued, and, in AFDC cases as defined in subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 46b-231, the person against whom such order was issued owes past-due support of one hundred fifty dollars or more, or in non-AFDC IV-D support cases as defined in subsection (b) of section 46b-231, the person against whom such order was issued owes past due support of five hundred dollars or more, the state shall submit to the Internal Revenue Service through the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement the name of such person and request the withholding from refunds of federal income taxes owed to such person of an amount equal to the past-due support, and payment of such withheld amount to the state for distribution to the state for reimbursement of public assistance in AFDC cases and in non-AFDC IV-D support cases for distribution to the guardian or custodial parent of such minor child or children, after first deducting from the amount payable to such guardian or custodial parent a collection fee determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be sufficient to reimburse the Internal Revenue Service for the cost of the offset procedure.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, whenever an order of the Superior Court or a family support magistrate for support of a minor child or children is issued, and, in AFDC cases, the person against whom such support order is issued owes past-due support of one hundred fifty dollars or more, or in non-AFDC IV-D support cases the person against whom such order is issued owes past-due support of five hundred dollars or more, the Department of Social Services shall submit to the Commissioner of Administrative Services the name of such person and request the withholding from refunds of state income taxes owed to such person of an amount equal to the past-due support, and payment of such withheld amount by the Commissioner of Revenue Services to the state for distribution to the state for reimbursement of public assistance in AFDC cases and in non-AFDC IV-D support cases for distribution to the guardian or custodial parent of such minor child or children. Whenever an order of the Superior Court or family support magistrate is issued against a parent to cover the cost of health insurance for a child who is eligible for Medicaid and such parent has received payment from a third party for the costs of services provided under such health coverage for such child but such parent has not used such payments to reimburse, as appropriate, either the other parent or guardian or the provider of such services, the Commissioner of Social Services shall submit to the Commissioner of Administrative Services the name of such person and request the withholding from refunds of state income taxes owed to such person of an amount necessary to reimburse the Department of Social Services for such costs under the Medicaid program, and payment of such amount shall be withheld by the Commissioner of Revenue Services and distributed to the Department of Social Services for reimbursement. However, any claims for current or past due child support shall take priority over any such claims for the costs of such services.
The case is resolved by construction of the "past due support" language of § 52-362e(a) and (b). The Plaintiff claims that "past due support" means support which is past due or delinquent under a court order. The state claims that "past due support" contemplates any child support arrearage.
The statute at issue is one component of a comprehensive child support enforcement plan mandated by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. In addition to the tax return intercepts (§ 52-362e(a) federal returns, § 52-362e(b) state returns): there are special income withholding provisions (§ 52-362f), a property lien statute (§ 52-362d), and a lottery prize lien (§ 52-362d(c)). The 1974 amendments to the Social Security Act by adding Title IV-D, were intended to create federal standards of child support enforcement because of the failure of the states to enforce child support obligations ( 42 U.S.C. § 651). The tax intercept provisions at issue here were liberalized in 1981, ( 45 C.F.R. § 303.71 (c)(1)-(2)) to reduce the amount of past due support from $750 to $150 (in Title IV-D cases) and facilitate the enforcement process. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 were designed to further facilitate support collection. See statement of Rep. Snowe, 129 Cong. Rec. H9976 (November 16, 1983). Our Supreme Court has noted "Since 1984, the United States Congress has actively encouraged states to take measures to assure that children receive adequate financial support from their parents, thereby reducing government expenditures for support of children." Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 713 (1991).
Congress again acted to facilitate child support enforcement with the Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law 100-485, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 666, et seq.
In response to the federal legislation the state legislature has enacted an extensive scheme of child support determination and enforcement. See Public Acts 85-548, 86-359, 89-203, 90-213, 91-391, 91-253, 93-262, 93-396, 94-5, 95-305, etc.
It is unquestionably the clear public policy of the state to facilitate the collection of child support, especially where the state has been supporting the child. Turner v. Turner, supra, 219 Conn. 713. Policy determinations "repose exclusively" with the legislature and "are not a function of the judicial branch." Mercado v. Commissioner of Income Maintenance, 222 Conn. 69, 77 (1992); Favrow v. Varvas, 222 Conn. 699, 716 (1992).
In construing a statute the courts look to the policy it was designed to implement. United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755 (1992). Further, it is well settled that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous its meaning is not subject to modification by construction. Thibeault v. White, 168 Conn. 112, 115 (1975).
The term "past due" support is not defined in the statute; but has a clear meaning of an obligation which should have been met at an earlier time. The Plaintiff urges a modification of the plain meaning to condition past due status to amounts accrued since the support order was entered by a court. The failure of this argument is apparent in the review of the legislative history. Prior to the enactment of Public Act 1992, No. 92-253, § 5, 52-362e(b) (non-AFDC tax intercept child support statute) contained the following underscored conditional language:
and the past-due support of five hundred dollars or more accrued since the support order was payable to the commissioner of administrative services directly or through the support enforcement unit of the division of the superior court . . .
The underscored portion was eliminated by P.A. 92-353, § 5.
It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature "did not intend to enact meaningless provisions. Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 713 595 A.2d 297 (1991). Accordingly, care must be taken to effectuate all provisions of the statute. See Pintavalle v. Valkanos, 216 Conn. 412, 418, 581 A.2d 1050 (1990) ("[a] statute should be read as a whole and interpreted so as to give effect to all of its provisions"); Hopkins v. Pac, 180 Conn. 474, 476, 429 A.2d 952 (1980) (it is a "well established principle that statutes must be construed, if possible such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant") . . . "It is an axiom of statutory construction that legislative intent is to be determined by an analysis of the language actually used in the legislation." Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, 224 Conn. 382, 391, 618 A.2d 1340 (1993) . . .
Bridgeport Hospital v. Comm. on Human Rights Opp., 232 Conn. 91, 100-01 (1995).
The language of § 52-362e(b) prior to the 1992 amendment (P.A. 92-253) establishes that the legislature clearly was able to limit past due support to instances of violation of specific court order when it wished to.
This is also evident in the statute relating to reports on child support debtors (§ 52-362d(b)).
General Statutes § 52-362d. Lien against property of obligor for unpaid child support. Notice of intent. Filing of certificate. Foreclosure. Information re unpaid support reported to participating consumer reporting agency. Offset for child support arrearage against money payable by state to obligor. Notification by Comptroller. Hearing Regulations.
(b) On October 1, 1991, and monthly thereafter, the Department of Social Services shall compile a list of all obligors who owe overdue support in the amount of one thousand dollars or more accruing after the entry of an initial court order establishing a child support obligation. Any overdue support in an amount of one thousand dollars or more shall be subject to the reporting provisions of this section unless a court or family support magistrate makes a specific finding that the amount of such overdue support shall not be reported. (Emphasis added.)
Also, see General Statutes § 46b-220 where license revocation follows child support delinquency after the entry of the court order. The tax intercept statutes at issue here are analogous to the lottery winning child support recoupment statute, General Statutes § 52-362d(c). This statute also has no reference to past court order accrual.
General Statutes § 64b-220.
(1) "Delinquent child support obligor" means an obligor who owes overdue support accruing after the entry of a court order . . .
The rationale of the policy to provide for tax intercepts of past-due support even when there is compliance with a court ordered payment plan is apparent from a review of the facts of this case.
The child at the time of the court order was approximately ten years of age. The $9,515 arrearage, at the $5 a week repayment rate, will remain in excess of $7,000 when she reaches the age of majority.
The Plaintiff relies on the decision in Neistat v. Department of Human Resources, Superior Court judicial district Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 522974 (April 4, 1995) (Barall, J.). Neistat focuses on the role of the Family Division of the Superior Court in setting and monitoring arrearage repayments, the legislative history and a policy of limiting such remedies to "deadbeat" parents.
This Court feels constrained to follow the clear meaning of "past-due" support; and not modify by construction such clear legislative expression.
Where the legislature has specifically added such limitation in other statutes; it is not for the court to insert such modification, where the legislature has chosen not to.
The policy argument is at least as strong that alternative remedies are available to facilitate the recoupment of past-due support; especially as in this case, where the support was provided by the state. It is not consistent with the purpose of the extensive federal child support enforcement legislation to assert that the state family courts do a sufficient enforcement function. The federal and state legislation was specifically prompted by a legislative determination that family courts were not doing enough to collect child support. Turner v. Turner, supra, 219 Conn. 713-14.
The Plaintiff is hardly in a position morally, equitably or legally to protest the tax refund intercepts. His child and her mother were supported by public welfare for years. His obligation is limited to three years prior to the paternity action filing. General Statutes § 46b-160. Thus in this case the Plaintiff contributed nothing for the child's first six years of life.
The Court's construction would also accord with explicit state regulations. An agency's regulations are presumed to be valid and unless demonstrated to be inconsistent with the authorizing statute, are presumed to have the force and effect of the statute. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kull, 216 Conn. 390, 399 (1990), Cameron v. Alander, 39 Conn. App. 216 (1995). The legislature authorized the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services to adopt implementing regulations. Section 52-362e(c). The construction of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to deference by the courts. Crocett v. Lynn Development Corp., 223 Conn. 376 (1992). The State's construction of § 52-362e is reasonable and entitled to such deference.
Regulations of Conn. State Agencies 52-362d-1, 52-362e-2 and 52-362e-3.
"Conn. Agencies Regs. Sec. 52-362d-1. Definitions.
(2) `Delinquency' means the total of all payments on current and past due child support orders which have become due and payable and remain unpaid.
(7) `Past due support' means any one or a combination of the following:
(a) Court ordered current support or arrearage payments which have become due and payable and remain unpaid;
(b) Unpaid support which has been reduced to a judgment or otherwise found to be due by a court of competent jurisdiction whether or not presently payable."
"Conn. Agencies Regs. Sec. 52-362e-2. Withholding of federal income tax refunds.
(a) When appropriate
(2) AFDC criterion.
The following criteria shall be met in AFDC cases submitted to OCSE for withholding:
(A) The combined amount of past due support for all accounts is at least $150.00, regardless of the status payments on any court ordered pay plan to reduce such past due support."
"Conn. Agencies Regs. Sec. 52-362e-3. Withholding of state income tax refunds.
(a) When appropriate.
(2) AFDC criterion.
(A) The combined amount of past due support for all accounts shall be at least $150.00 in AFDC cases submitted to DAS for the withholding of a state income tax refund."
The Plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
McWEENY, J.